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ABSTRACT

Most noteworthy among the developments in Epistemic Logic
during the last five years are Hintikka’s proposed semantics for

perception (modelled after his 1$6Z semantics for knowledge) and
his revised (1970) semantics for knowledge.

Crucial to both of these

systems is the employment of two sets of quantifiers.

Part One of

this dissertation explores the role of multiple quantifiers in
Hintikka-tjrpe semantics.

Chapter One is an investigation of Hintikka’

semantics for perception; Chapter Two is a critique of a recent (1973)

variation of Hintikka’

s

semantics for perception (which makes use of

multiple quantifiers) proposed by
Hintikka*

s

R.

Thomason; And in Chapter Three

1970 semantics for knowledge is explored and criticized.

Part Two of this dissertation deals with the much- critic! zed

Restricted Range feature which characterizes all of Hintikka*
systems.

Chapter Four is an examination of problems Restricted

Range has been thought to create and a survey of some attempts to

create Hintikka- type systems which lack the featui’e.

Chapter Five a new variation of Hintikka*

s

Finally* in

semantics for knowledge is

proposed which both lacks Restricted Range and avoids a number of
troublesome theorems \diich show up in the other systems.
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PREFACE

In 1962, -with the publication of Knowledge and Belief , Jaakko

Hintikka introduced formal model set theoretic semantics for both
knowledge and belief.

The technique he employed consists of intro-

ducing a series of rules determining membership of well-formed

formulas in model sets in such a way that model sets can be thought of
as (possibly partial) descriptions of possible worlds.

ducing the notion of

*

By intro-

compatibility* among model sets, he was able to

treat the symbols 'Ka* (road "a knows that") and

believes that") as modal operators,

*Ba’

(read "a

Ihus, the formula ’Kap’ belongs

to a model set (is true in a world) just in case *p* belongs to

every compatible model set (is true in every compatible world)
relative to agent a.

Duo largely to Hintiklca*

s

proposal to treat

epistemic terms as modal operators and at the same to allow quantifying in, Hintikka’ s systems have been the objects of widespread

controversy and discussion ever since they first appeared.
Much of the early criticism of these systems wiiich appeared

was either mistaken or based upon mi s\mdor standing of Hintikka’
proposals, but genuine defects of Hintikka’

s

semantics for knowledge

(called "KB") were uncovered by Castaneda and Sleigh during the years
1964-1967.

A good deal of criticism, both genidlne and mistaken, was

leveled at the so-caJ-led "Restricted Range" feature of KB,

In his

Epistemic Logic’,
1967 paper, ’Individuals, Possible Worlds, and
certain obHintikka proposed a significant revision of KB to avoid

jections raised by Castaneda and Sleigh,

The resulting system, IPE,

same paper
however did not lack the Restricted Range feature; in the

Vi

Hintikka defended Restricted Range and argued that it*

s

unavoidable

in his systems.

At about the same time Hintikka began to formulate a model
set theoretic semantics for perception significantly more complex

than his previous systems.

Like the logics of knowledge and belief,

the logic of perception is believed by Hintikka to be a "branch of

modal logic", but he feels that to capture the complexities of the
logic of perception it is necessary to employ two sets of quantifiers
in the language of the system.

In this system

tvjo

independent methods

are employed according to which individuals are traced across

possible worlds.

Hintikka’

s

semantics for perception was first

presented in his 19^9 paper, ’On the Logic of Perception’.
The next year, 1970, Hintikka made the proposal (in the face

of continued criticism by Castaneda) that two sets of quantifiers

likewise be employed in his semantics for knowledge.

Convinced that

the logic of knowledge is more complex that his previous systems

indicated, Hintikka dropped IPE and outlined a new system KBC in

his paper ’On Attributions of Self-Knovrledge*

As in his semantics

.

for perception, there are two independent methods employed in KBC
to trace individuals across possible worlds.
The present study divides into

t'vro

parts.

The first three

chapters deal with multiple quantifiers in Hintikka- type systems.
Chapter One is an investigation of Hintikka’

s

semantics for perception;

Hintikka’
Chapter Two is a critique of a recent (1973) variation of

quantifiers)
semantics for perception (which makes use of multiple

proposed by

R.

Thomason; And in Chapter Three Hintikka’

s

criticized.
semantics for knowledge, KBC, is explored and

1970
The last

vii

two chapters deal with Restricted Range.

Chapter Four is an examin-

ation of problems Restricted Range has been thought to create and a
s\irvey of some attempts to create Hintikka-type systems which lack

the feat\ire.

proposed

•vrf'iich

Finally, in Chapter Five a new variation of KB is

both lacks Restricted Range and avoids a number of

troublesome theorems which show up in the other systems.

i

CHAPTER

I

In his papers »0n the Logic of Perception' and 'Information,
Causality, and the Logic of Perception'

ways in

vrfiich a

formulated.

,

Jaakko Hintikka suggests

model set theoretic semantics for perception might be

Like its counterparts in the semantics for knovrledge and

belief introduced in Hintikka'

s

Knowledge and Belief

,

the semantics

for perception is based upon the concept of a model structure consisting of model sets, or "complete novels" as they're called in 'On
the Logic of Perception'

These model sets are for Hintikka sets of

.

sentences in a specified language whose membership is subject to

conditions (set forth in Knowledge and Belief ) designed in such

a

way that they may intuitively be regarded as descriptions of
possible states of affairs.
A 'complete novel'

is defined by Hintikka as "a set of

sentences in some given language which is consistent but w^hich
cannot be enlarged without making it inconsistent", and a 'world' is

"precisely vdiat such a complete novel describes".^

At any given

time the totality of complete novels belonging to a model structure

may be divided into the set of those which are compatible with
everything an agent perceives and those which are not compatible with
everything the same agent perceives (a complete novel w is compatible

with everything S perceives relative to some specified language if ana
only if for no p is it the case that (i) S perceives that
— p is a member of w).

p,

and (ii)

And it is on the basis of this distinction

that the door is open for 'perceives that' to oe treated as a modal
operator.

2

Assuming, for the

sal^e

of simplicity, that our concern throughout

2

is limited to

-what

is perceived by a single agent Jones, the formula

'Jones perceives that p' will belong to a complete novel w if and only

if the formula

'p'

belongs to every complete novel compatible ;^th

everything Jones Perceives.

And a formula is to be regarded as true

in a vrarld just in case it belongs to a complete novel which describes
it.

Therefore, we may think of a state of affairs as being perceived

by Jones if and only if it holds in every possible vjorld compatible

with everything Jones perceives.
To vastly complicate matters, it is allowed (as in Hintikka'

system of knowledge and belief) that variables occur free within the
scope of the modal operator 'perceives that’ and get bound from the

outside.

is

To put it another V7ay, there are circumstances in which one

alloT-jed to

"quantify in" past the occurrence of one or more 'per-

ceives that' operators.

VAiat these

circumstances amount to are

not specified in either 'On the Logic of Perception’ or 'Information,
Causality, and the Logic of Perception' (vjhich we’ll henceforth

refer to as 'OLP' and 'ICLP', respectively), but they may be formudifferent
lated on the basis of rules Hintikka gives in a number of

places for quantifying past knowledge operators.

This we shall do

shortly.

There are essentially

tx-jo

crucial differences between the semantics

Hintikka develops for knowledge in Knox^rledge

Belief and the semantics

perception papers.
for perception he sketches in the two

In the

compatibility relation between
foimer, reqxiirements are placed upon the

model sets:

Ilie

relation must be reflexive and transitive.

compatible worlds.
requirements are placed upon perceptually

Mo such

Thus no

into the concept of perception
success presuppositions are incorporated

3
vTith

which the development of the formal semantics is concerned.

One

could easily incorporate reflexivity, but the resulting system would
be substantially less interesting.

"If we assume the success

condition we cannot discuss such epistemically interesting problems
as illusions, hallucinations, perceptual mistakes, impossible
objects, etc."

4

The second of the differences is of more fundamental importance,

and it'

here that we shall concentrate our attention.

It is

alleged that the logic of perception is really a bit more sophisticated than anything which can be captured in an ordinary semantics for

quantified modal logic (as in Knowledge and Belief ) «

in the form of a second set of quantifiers

—

Added machinery

-

is needed to capture

the complexities inherent in the logic of perception.

And so

Hintikka' s semantics for perception is equipped with a second set of

quantifiers '(3 x)' and '(\/x)', in addition to the ordinary quantifiers *(Ex)' and '(x)'.^

In this chapter we shall (i) Indicate how a formal semantics

without the extra quantifiers may be characterized, (ii) Determine
the role in Hintikka'

s

system of the extra quantifiers, (iii) Argue

of
that one of the major advantages Hintikka cites for the adoption
of English
the new quantifiers -- giving rise to the formal expression

"direct object" locutions

—

is not an advantage gained by adding the

the areas of
new quantifiers, and (iv) Try to determine precisely

increased expressibility afforded by the new quantifiers.
*

designating the perceptual
We shall adopt the convention of

modal operator as 'Perceives'.

what a
Since we shall speak merely of

4
single agent (Jones) perceives, there will be no need to make use of
a subscript identifying the agent in question.

It might be thought

that we are dangerously oversimplifying matters by concentrating

upon what only a single agent perceives, but Hintikka points out
(correctly, I believe) that it is a rather straightforward matter to

generalize the system to provide for

tw

or more agents.

A semantics of the sort Hintilcka has in mind for a system
involva.ng a single agent and no epistemic operators other than

•Perceives’ may be roughly characterized in the following way.

Let

a domain of complete novels be given together with a two-place

relation R taking complete novels as arguments.

Assign to each

complete novel a domain of individuals in such a way that these

individuals are allowed membership in more than one domain (an

individual b can be said to belong to the domain of a complete novel

if and only if ’(Ex) (b=x)’ belongs to the novel).

Let a member of

the set of complete novels be chosen as the actual novel.

complete the basic picture, choose appropriate free

And to

singiilai*

terms

(constant terms), predicate terms, the identity sign, variables, and
the usual connectives.
the
To this we add the model operator ’Perceives’ defined in

manner already indicated and the standard quantifiers ’(Ex)’ and
’(x)’

defined in such a way as to rule out unrestricted Universal

Instantiation and Existential Generalization.
such that
In particular, let ’Perceives’ be an operator

’Perceives

A’

the
is a member of a complete novel w if and only if

formula ’A’ is a member of every complete novel

w’

suda that Rww'

quantifiers go as follows:
Roles governing the use of the standard

5

Let ’A' be a well- formed formula and w any complete novel,
(i)

Case One - Ihe variable

*x'

occurrence of ’Perceives*.

w and

Case

Iben if *(Ex)Ax*€w, *A(b/x)*€

*(Ex) (b=x)*e w, for some *b*.

then if
(ii)

does not occur free inside an

»

Tvro

(Ex) (b=x)

*

w,

<£

And if *(x)Ax»^ w,

then *A(b/x)»€w.

- Ihe variable *x» occurs both within and without

the scope of a single occurrence of ’Perceives*.
’

(Ex)Ax’ e w,

6 w,

*A(b/x)’

for some ’b*.

€w

Then if

and *(Ex)(b=x & Perceives b=x)’

And if ’(x)Ax’ew, then if

*

(Ex)

(b=x & Perceives b=x)*6. w, *A(b/x)’ e w.
(iii)

Case Three - The variable ’x* occurs only

x*n.thin

scope of a single occurrence of ’Perceives*.
’

(Ex)Ax’ e w,

some ’b*.
'

<s-w,

*

*A(b/x)’^ w and

Then if

(Ex) (Perceives b=x)*6w,

And if ’(x)Ax’ e w, then if

*

for

(Ex) (Perceives b=x)

A(b/x)’ e w.

In addition we have the follovdng
(i)

*

the

r\iles:

If ’-Perceives A’ 6 w, then ’-A’ e w*, for some w* such
that R&tw*

(ii)

(iii)

If ’(Ex)(b=x & Perceives b=x)’ t

If ’A(b/x)’

<=

w,

and

*b’

then ’(Ex) (b=x)’ e w.

vt,

occurs free within the scope of

’Perceives’, then if ’Perceives b=c* e w,

*A(c/x)’^w.^

These rul.es may be easily generalized to handle formulas in
the variable bound by ’(Ex)’ or ’(x)’ occurs vjithin the scope of

vrfiich

mul-tiple occurrences of ’Perceives*.

For example, if ’(Ex) (Perceives

(Perceives Ax))’ belongs to a complete novel w,

infer both ’Perceives (Perceives Ab))’ew and
b=x)

’

)

^ w, for some ’b*.

’

vre

will be allowed to

(Ex) (Perceives(Perceives

An attempt is made by Hintikka in ’Existential

6

and Uniqueness Presuppositions’ to codify the general requisite
conditions for quantifying in any context containing any number of

epistendc operators.

For our purposes, hovrever, it is sufficient to

concentrate upon single modality contexts.
It may seem puzzling just

vihy

given separate formal treatments.
that

’

(Ex) (Perceives Ax)’

equivalent in the system

cases

tv;o

and three above are

It may seem strange, for example,

and ’(Ex)(jo=x & Perceives Ax)’ fail to be
have just described.

1i/hy

does Hintikka

not treat all cases of quantifying in alike?
Hintikka’

s

reasons for and defense of this particular formal

7
distinction are quite complex and cannot be examined here in detail.

Suffice it to say that this move makes it possible, Hintikka believes,
to formally capture English "perceives vjho" constructions involving

non-existent entities.

We might, for example, viish to say of a man

experiencing a hallucination of a person that he perceives

vjho

person is vdthout thereby implying that the person exists.

By

the

separating cases two and three in the manner indicated it is

possible to distingaiish between those instances in

vrfiich

perceiving

not.
who implies existence and those instances in vdiich it does

Our account of Hintikka’

s

semantics for perception must be

accompanied by an important vrord of caution.

It is alleged by

the Indeterminacy
Hintikka both in ’The Semantics of Modal Notions and

that difficulties
of Ontology’ and ’Objects of Knowledge and Belief’

"prefabricated possible
arise in connection with the notion of

individuals".
of possible indiI am not convinced that the domain

the sense of
viduals is anything w^e can start from in
the most
of
some
take for granted, at least not in

7

important philosophic applications of modal logic.
I am not sure, either, that all the possible individuals xce in some sense have to deal viith can
eventually be pooled into one big happy domain.
Suppose. . .that one begins by postulating a fixed
supplj’- of prefabricated individuals.
Ihen one
obtains a semantics which could function as an
actual means of communication, it seems to us, only
if one could assume that there are no problems in
principle about re-identifying one’s individuals as
they occur in the several possible worlds we are
considering. Once this presuppositions is made
explicit, however, it is also seen at once how
gratuitous it is for most philosophically interesting pui'poses.

My own attitude indicated there

’The Semantics of
Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology’
can be summed up as a deep suspicion of those "prefabricated possible individuals" which have recently
become so popular.^

Given these suspicions it may seem puzzling that each complete

novel in Hintikka’

s

semantics comes equipped from the outset with

a domain of vrell-de fined individuals.

Does this mean that his

system comes equipped with "prefabricated possible individuals"?
The answer is "no", and it is here that

must draw an

important distinction between those individuals which inhabit domains
of model sets, on the one hand, and fmctions which map model sets
to these individuals on the other.

These functions are referred to

by Hintikka as "individuals”, and it is this latter categoi*y which
includes

vriiat

Hintikka refers to as "possible individuals".

For our

own purposes, let us henceforth refer to individuals inhabiting
functions from
domai-ns of complete novels as "individuals^^" and
there is apt
model sets to individualsj^ as "individuals2" whenever
to be any confusion.

VJe

can then say that Hintikka has in mind

suspicion of
individuals2 and not individuals^ when he expresses

"prefabricated possible individuals".

Thus, by introducing a

8

model structure, part of which involves domains of prefabricated
individuals^ we do not thereby introduce prefabricated individuals2»
One final word before moving on.

It seems qvdte clear that to

tell whether a vrorld is compatible vdth another all that needs to
be done is to look for logical consistency between
formulas.

A world

w is compatible with

tvio

sets of

(or an alternative to) a

world w’ (Rw’w) if and only if the conjunction of the members of
the complete novel describing w is logically consistent with the

conjunction of the set of formulas
true in

'A*

such that ’Perceives A’ is

This gives us the hoped for results that no world w

vj' .

is compatible with w’ if

v?hat

is perceived in w’ happens to entail a

contradiction and that every world is compatible with
agent’s only perceptions in w’ are tautologies.

w’

if the

9

Nonetheless, Hintikka expresses a reluctance to accept

this account;
It is to be noted that the notion "compatible vdth
\^at a perceives" is to be taken as luianalyzable.
To know vrfiat someone, say a_, perceives in a world w
is to know vihat-is-compatible-with-what-he-perceives
among other possible xrorlds w' , and the latter notion
it is a relation betv;eon the possible worlds w’
turns out to be the more powerfvil one for
and w
the purposes of semantical analysis. Attempts to
analyze it have turned up nothing useful. If one can
list all the facts that a perceives in w one can of
course define the perceptual alternatives to w as
those worlds vriiich are logically compatible ijith
those lists in the sense in which all the members of
the list are true in the vrorld in question. But this
does not accomplish anything new, and it rules out
those perceptual situations in vrhich vre cannot
specify in some particular language all the facts &
perceives. In short, it does not allow for unverbalized perceptions.^'^

—

—

study turns, I believe on
Be that as it may, nothing in the present
perceptions.
the distinction between verbalized and unverbalized

So

9

for purposes of simplicity

-we

assume that our agent Jones is eloquent

enough to verbalize all he perceives.

This will then insure that the

notion of compatibility we make use of is precisely the one described
above
*

We move now to consider Hintikka'

s

introduction of a second

pair of quantifiers.
The great interest of perceptual concepts for a
philosopher of logic is due precisely to the fact
that we all as a matter of fact use two different
methods of individuation. One of them is the method
of physical individuation indicated above, but the
other is essentially different from it...VJhen presented
with descriptions of two different states of affairs
compatible with what S sees, and with two different
individuals figuring in these tx-;o respective descriptions, we ask whether they are identical as far as S*s
can
visual impressions are concerned, and often
The ouestion therefore gives
ansvjer this question.
us another method of individuating objects in contexts
in which we are talking of vriiat someone sees at a
given moment of time... we shall call individuals so
cross-identified "perceptually individuated objects".

Ihere may, for instance, be a man in front of a of
whom a^ does not see who he is. T5ien descriptively
speaking the man in front of a is a different (descriptively individuated) person in different possible worlds compatible vdth everything a sees. But
in each such world there will have to be a man in
front of a ...Obviously we can in principle use
this fact for the purpose of cross-identification and
as though it were a trans world heir ^jne through all
these men in their respective worlds.
simple.
The introduction of the new quantifiers is now quite

Having

(called
introduced these new perceptually individuated objects

Hintikka
"perceptual individuals" or "perceptual objects" for short)

permits variables to range over them.

And in order to bind these

added to the
variables special new "perceptual quantifiers" are
language.

10
Vfliat

is the nature of these perceptual individuals?

The

clearest indication Hintikka gives us is that they can be envisaged
as functions

vriiich

from each world over

\rfiich

they’re defined pick

out one individual from its domain (or less formally described in
I CLP as V7orld lines drawn through individuals in the different

compatible worlds; notice, then, that perceptual individuals are

individuals2)

•

These individuals so picked out are said to be

the ’’same” as far as the agent in question's perceptions are

concerned.

Suppose, for example, that Jones perceives that the man

in front of him is bald.

Suppose further that there is no man of vhon

Jones perceives that he is the man in front of him.

Then the locu-

tion 'the man in front of him' picks out different physically

individuated objects (called 'physical objects' for short) in
different vrorlds compatible with everything Jones perceives.

may suppose, for example, that it's compatible vdth every-

V/e

thing Jones perceives that the man in front of him is Y.A. Tittle.
Then in at least one compatible world Y.A. Tittle really is the man;

and perhaps in another world Telly Savales is the man in front of
"Because of this," Hintikka urges, "we may say that from the

Jones.

point of view of Jones'
and the same man

—

s

perceptual situation they are after all one
12

the man in front of him."

Physical individuals, by contrast, are described by Hintikka
as those functions whose value at each complete novel w coincides
vjith the

reference at w of some constant term

’b'

which is such that

perceives
(at the actual world) Jones perceptually recognizes b or

who b is.

Therefore, if Jones perceives who the man in front of

him is, the term ’the man in front of him’ picks out the same

11

individuated object in each world compatible with everything Jones perceives.

This means that we now have two different

criteria for determining trans-world identity.

If two individuals,

X and y, both turn up in the range of a physically individuated
object they are the "same" in one sense, and if both turn up in the
range of a perceptuaJ.ly individuated object they are the "same"

in another sense.
Whereas physical and perceptual individuals are both to be
thought of as functions which map worlds to members of their respective
domains, it vdll be intuitively helpful, I believe, to think of

physical individuals as constant functions and perceptual individuals
as (in general) non - constant functions.

Alternatively, we may (in

the spirit of ICLP) think of them as "rigid" and "wobbly" vrorld lines,

respectively.

There is, of course, nothing in the formal semantics

which gives us any more reason to conceive of physical individuals
as constant functions than to conceive of perceptual individuals as

constant functions.

But we shall establish this convention for the

purposes of our own discussion to aid us in better picturing the way

in which the two kinds of quantifiers relate to one another.

To be

explicit, if the value of a physical individual at a world w is an
individual]^ x, then x is the value of the physical individual at every

world compatible with w.

From this, of course, it does not follow

that every constant function defined over a set of worlds compatible

with w is a physical individual.
Occasionally perceptual individuals do, the way we are

nov?

viewing the situation, behave as constant fiinctions, and this phenomenon
occurs precisely in those cases

T<jhere

there is a perceptual individual

12

b such that Jones happens to perceive

\;ho

b is.

If Jones correctly

perceives of the man in front of him that he is Y.A. Tittle,
it is
no longer compatible vdth everything Jones perceives that Savales
or

anyone else is the man in front of him.

The perceptual individual

now picks Tittle from every compatible world.
Suppose we let »m» be short for ’the man in front of him
(Jones)’.

Then to say that

’m’

(formally speaking) to say that

designate a perceptual individual is
’

(

J x)(Perceives

m=x)’ is the case; to

say that ’m’ designates a physical individual is to say that ’(Ex)

(Perceives m=x)’ is the case ("Jones perceives who m is").

'(3 x)(Ey) (Perceives
idiere

’ra’

s?=y

Therefore,

& m-x)’ is true in precisely those cases

picks out a perceptual individual which happens to coincide

with a physical individual.

And by so coinciding the perceptual

individual is forced to become a constant function; in the case at
hand, it is now forced to choose Tittle and no one else at each

compatible world.
We tvim now to the task of finding a place for perceptual

individuals in the model set theoretic semantics sketched above.
this regard Hintikka is of very little help.

of

mles

In

Nowhere does he speak

governing the use of the new quantifiers.

Nor does he give

any indication as to how we might begin to decide just which fvinctions

definable over worlds coiint as perceptual individuals and which do
not.

Nevertheless, we are given a couple of important clues relating

to the behavior of perceptual individuals.
First, every individual^ chosen by a perceptual individual at

any v;orld w must belong to the domain of

vr;

no individualj^ failing to

exist in a given world may be the assignment of a perceptual indivj.dual
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at that world.

If an agent m perceives that there is a man in front

of him but does not perceive who he is, then, says Hintikka, "The

man in front of him (let us call him m) is a different individual
(different person) in some of the relevant possible states of affairs
...In all of these different states of affairs, however, there has
to be a man in front of him.

(Othervdse the state of affairs in

question would not be compatible with what m sees)."
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Hintikka makes

the same point in I CLP in a passage we have already quoted
(page 9 above).
Second, there is a need to restrict the domains over which

perceptual individuals are defined; they cannot be defined arbitrarily
over members of W.

upon the worlds
individuals.

For suppose that no limits at all are placed

vriiich

may qualify as members of domains of perceptual

Then suppose that each of two perceptual individuals

map each compatible world to exactly the same individual S]_.

But

suppose that the mappings diverge when they come to some world not

compatible with everything the agent in question perceives.

Then we

are forced to admit that the perceptual individuals are distinct,

even though they seem to fulfill every conceivable requirement for

being considered the same perceptual individual.

An example will

probably make this clearer.
Suppose that Jones perceives that there is a man in front of
in
him, that there is a man aiming a rifle at him, and that the man

front of him is identical to the man aiming a rifle at him.

further that he fails to perceive just who this man is.

Suppose

It seems

by
clear in this example that the perceptual individual designated
designated by
•the man in front of him’ and the perceptual individual
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*the man aiming a rifle at him’

should turn out to be identical.

And

it seems equally clear that their identity should not be called into
question by the possibility that the perceptual ftinctions extend to
a non- compatible world where,

as it turns out, the man aiming the

rifle is distinct from the man in front of Jones.

it seems

q\iite

To avoid all this

necessary to restrict perceptual individuals to vrorlds

compatible with what is being perceived.

Hintikka seems to have been aware of the need for this
restriction:

By cross-identification we of course mean here telling
which individual in one possible world is identical
with which individual in another (identification
across the boundaries of possible worlds). The
possible worlds involved here are of course those
compatible with what a perceives."^
Yet we are going to find that Hintikka allows for one exception to
this restriction:

Under certain conditions the perceptual individual

under consideration may be defined at the actual world even when it is

not an alternative to itself.

We return to this matter later.

For

the time being we shall assume that perceptual individuals as a general

rule never extend beyond the set of compatible worlds.

Given these clues relating to the nature of perceptual individuals,
it may seem pertinent now to try to specify the formal conditions
vjhich suffice for the formation of a perceptual individual.

Under what

circumstances does a function defined over the set of compatible

worlds count as a perceptual individual?

At first approximation it

may seem sufficient that there exist a f\mction which (i) Assigns to
undefined
each compatible world some member of its domain, and (ii) Is
elsewhere.

However, there are a great many bizarre functions which
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must surely be ruled out as perceptual individuals,
functions which
manage to pick out entirely random objects
from the various com-

patible worlds.

Some restriction must be placed upon these
functions

to choose those suitable to qualify as perceptual
individuals.

And

some criterion must be made to make that choice.

Unfortunately, I knovj of no simple way in vihich such
a criterion

may be spelled out, and

I shall not attempt to arrive at one.

Nevertheless, I shall argue in this section that a formal
semantical

characterization of perceptual individuals is not required in order
to formulate truth- conditions for at least one important subclass
of

formulas containing perceptual quantifiers.

Thus, we shall bypass

entirely the notion of a perceptual individual for the time being.
So far

vre

have said nothing about

fiers is required in Hintikka’s system.

v/hy a

second set of quanti-

Presumably there are English

sentences (describing Jones’s perceptions) viiich can be formally

captured in Hintikka’s system only by making use of special
quantifiers

vrfsich

in effect range over intensions.

certainly a question of major interest to determine
sentences these might be.

If so, it is

vMch

sorts of

Surprisingly, Hintikka does not have much

to say about the increase in expressive powers which results by employ-

ing perceptual quantifiers; with one exception, he almost completely

ignores the issue.
That one exception, however, seems to be regarded by Hintikka as
quite crucial.

It is the set of English sentences vrhich contain what

he calls ’’direct-object constructions”.

Perceptual cross-identification is presupposed in
the truth- conditions of such direct-object constructions as ’a sees b’ . The point is perhaps explained most quickly by pointing out that for a to
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see b (direct object constr-uction) is for b to find
a place among a* s visual objects, that is to say,
among the individuals v/hich a can locate in his
visual space. A simple argument shows that this is
the case when we have
(^x)(a sees that (b=x))
(3)
with a quantifier *3
relying on perceptual
cro s s-i den ti fi cati on . ^ ^
’

Here the appearance of perceptual quantifiers is used to give
expression to locutions (in English) of the form ‘a perceives
•a sees b‘, where *b» is a singular term.

b»

or

To say "Jones perceives

Smith" is simply to say that (for Jones) Smith is a perceptual

individual, and we can easily translate this sentence into the language

of Hintikka’s system as ’(3 x) (Perceives Smith=x)’.
"we have

nov7

And so it is that

found an analysis of the direct-object constructions in

terms of quantifiers and of 'Perceives that*".^^

As Clark observes,

"Hintikka exploits the two types of quantifiers to give expression to

direct-object constructions".
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It is Hintikka’s claim, therefore, that it is the addition of

perceptual quantifiers to his system

vrfiich

makes it possible to

formally render English direct-object constructions.

Suppose we

investigate this claim by turning to consider formulas of the form
*(

3

x) (Perceives Ax)'.

Assuming we have made sense of what it means to

say that an open formula of one variable is 'satisfied' by an

individual ]_ in a world, it is clear that ’(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is true
in a world w if and only if there is a perceptual individual which
assigns to every world compatible
a

\ri.th

w

a member of its domain in such

way that 'Ax' is satisfied by that member in that

vrorld.

Given this characterization of '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' it should be

clear that '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' virtually implies 'Perceives (Ex)
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(Ax)' in Hintikka' s system.

If there is a perceptual individual

making assignments in each compatible world, the members of
its range

must show up in the various vrorlds.
(Ax)' is false in w.
(Ax)' is false.

For suppose that 'Perceives (Ex)

Then in some vrorld w' compatible with w '(Ex)

So nothing in the domain of w'

satisfies 'Ax' in w'

Hence there can be no function assigning each compatible world an
element from its domain satisfying 'Ax'

individual

caji

do this.

.

In particular, no perceptual

So '(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is fase in w.

And this should seem reasonable.

If a man perceives an apple,

then it ought to be the case that there is at least one apple to be

found in every vrorld compatible with everything he perceives.

It is

not compatible with everything he perceives that there are no apples

if he really does perceive an apple.

Therefore, as long as we

specify that perceptual individuals map each world to an individual]^

which exists in that vrorld, it is quite easy to see that
(Perceives Ax)' virtually implies

'

Perceives (Ex) (Ax)

'

x)

'

Having shown that 'Perceives (Ex) (Ax)' is a necessary condition for
the truth of '(3 x)(Perceives Ax)', the question arises whether
'

Perceives (Ex) (Ax)

is at the same time a sufficient condition.

Does

the existence of apples in every single world compatible with every-

thing Jones perceives enable us to conclude that Jones perceives an
apple?

Again, the answer seems to be "yes".

And this can be shown

as follows.
Suppose, first of all, that

We shall argue that

'

'(

3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is false in w.

Perceives (Ex) (Ax)

(Perceives Ax)' is false in w, then

that something satisfies 'Ax' in w.

o\ir

is than false.

If '(3x)

agent (Jones) fails to perceive

So by W- completeness (see
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footnote 12) there is some world w’

,

compatible with everythj.ng Jones

perceives, such that »Ax» fails to be satisfied by something v:hich

exists in w*

.

Hence »-(Ex)(Ax)» is true in w»

.

So it is not the

case that »(Ex)(Ax)' is true in every world compatible with w.

if not, then by the
’

-Perceives (Ex) (Ax)

v?ay

'

But

we set up truth- conditions for 'Perceives*,

is true in w; and so 'Perceives(Ex) (Ax)

(because the novels are complete novels) is false in w, which was
to be shoT^m.

Intuitively, the idea is this.

If something red shows up in

every compatible world, there must be a red perceptual object.

if nothing in Jones'

s

perceptual field appears red, then it'

For
com-

patible with vAiat he perceives that nothing at all is red, and so
there must sooner or later come a compatible world in
all is red.

Thus, the presence of red things

—

vrfiich

nothing at

idiatever they are

—

in each compatible world ins\ires the presence of a red perceptual
individual.

We have no idea where the perceptual vrorld line goes

from world to world, but we know there must be one.

conditions for formulas of the form

»

(3

And so truth

x) (Percei\res Ax)*

may be given

independently of specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for
a given function's qualifying as a perceptual individual.

In short, we have shown that ’(3 x)' in its most basic role

(binding variable occurring inside an epistemic operator) may be

characterized entirely in terms of the ordinary quantifier '(Ex)'.
w if
A formula of the form *( 3 x) (Perceives Ax)' is true in a world

and only if '(Ex) (Ax)' is true in every world w* such that Rww*

A

apple
man perceives an apple if andonly if there exists at least one
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in every compatible world.
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It now looks as though the employment of Hintikka'

perceptual

s

quantifiers is quite unnecessary to formually capture English directobject locutions.

If sentences of the form "Jones perceives b" are

to be symbolized by formiulas of the form

’

(3

x) (Perceives b=x)',

and if formulas of the form ’(3 x) (Perceives Ax)' are virtually

equivalent to formulas of the form 'Perceives (Ex) (Ax)', then
sentences of the form "Jones perceives b" may equally well be sym-

bolized by formulas in which no perceptual quantifiers occur.

It may

well be the case that '(3 x) (Perceives b=x)' in some way gives us more

insight into the logic underlying English direct-object constructions
than something like

'

Perceives (Ex) (b=x)

'

.

But the point of the matter

is that, given everything we have shown, perceptual quantifiers are
not required in the formal expression of English direct-object
constructions.

If there are English sentences whose formal trans-

lation requires perceptual quantifiers, these sentences require the

quantifiers for reasons apart from the need to capture direct-object
con structions

now move to consider some objections which might arise in

Vfe

connection with our argument that
(Ex) (Ax)*

'

(3

are virtually equivalent.

x) (Perceives Ax)'

and 'Perceives

From an ordinary philosophical

point of view there appear to be counter-examples to such an
lence.

eq\ii va-

Suppose, in the first place, that Jones perceives a dagger,

and suppose that the dagger is a perceptual object.
(Perceives(x is a dagger))' is true.

Then *(3 x)

But suppose Jones is

hallucinating and that there really is no dagger.

Suppose, moreover,

and that no
that Jones realizes full well that he's hallucinating

dagger is present.

Gi\^en these

circumstances it seems a mistake to
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conclude that Jones perceives that a

dap;g:er

exists .

That is,

’Perceives(Ex) (x is a dagger)’ seems false.
The appropriate response here is that if ’Perceives (Ex)(x is a
dagger)’

seems false, then more is being read into the concept of
We have been operating throughout

perceiving than is warrented.
viith an

especially vieak notion of perceiving, and to suppose that

’Perceives A’

and ’Knows not-A’ are inconsistent is at this point

xanjustified.

These are inconsistent if and only if we are in general

guaranteed some state of affairs compatible both with what is perceived
and vath what is knovm.

3y making R reflexive we guarantee such a

mutually compatible state of affairs (the actual world), but in the
system under consideration R is not reflexive.

Hence there’s no

reason to conclude that just because Jones knows there’s no dagger
out there, he doesn’t perceive there is one,
A second counter-example to the equivalence involves the

inference going in the opposite direction.

Imagine a situation where

Jones is observing the gasoline gauge in his automobile.

By

perceives that
noticing that the gauge indicates a half-full tank Jones
there is gasoline in his tank.

is supposed to follow that
f

’

Yet from

’

Perceives(Ex) (x is gas)’ it

(3 x) (Porceives(x is gas))’ is true.

But

not true; at no time does
(3 x)(Perceives(x is gas))’ is certainly

Jones ever perceive gasoline.

He perceives that there is gasoline

VTithout ever perceiving gasoline.

And so the inference does not seem

valid after all.
English sentence
The trouble here comes with interpreting the

"Jones perceives that there is gasoline".

It is assumed in the example

captures this sentence, but
that 'Perceives(Ex)(x is gas))' correctly
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a closer examination of the facts reveals that this is not so.

*Perceives(Ex)(x is gas)’ is true just in case there is gasoline in

every world compatible with

vriiat

Jones perceives.

But although

there is a fuel gauge in every world, there are vrorlds in which
no gasoline is present in his tank (otherwise he’d be perceiving

gasoline directly).

Strictly speaking, it is only inferred from vmat

he perceives that gasoline is present, and since ’(Ex)(x is gas)’ is

not a logical consequence of what is perceived, there are complete

novels compatible with what is perceived of

vrtiich

’-(Ex)(x is gas)’

is a member.

Perhaps the real motivation behind this counter-example is the
desire for a modified notion of ’compatibility’, according to which
that which may be ’’reasonably inferred” from what is perceived is
true in each compatible world.

As Kant abserves.

Since \je have constantly to make use of inference,
and so end by being completely accustomed to it,
v/e frequently. . .treat as being immediately perceived v?hat has really only been inferred.

Such a modification might indeed produce a semantics more in line with

our common usage of ’’perceives”, but its implementation depends upon a
precise account of what English speakers vrould consider a reasonable
V
And such an account is certainly not obvious.
.

inference.
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of
It may be objected, finally, that under our interpretation
turns out to be self'(3 x)’ the formula '(3 x) (Perceives -(Ey)(x=y))’

contradictory (indefensible).
perception:

It ascribes to Jones an inconsistent

that something both does and does not exist.

Yet

his visual field
surely Jones is able to perceive that something in

observing that it appears
fails to exist; he may perceive a dagger and,
not really present.
transparent and wave-like, conclude that it’s

22
To this we reply that Jones siirely can perceive that something in

his visual field fails to exist; but when he does he simply perceives
that something he perceives fails to exist.

He perceives that

something fails to exist, and this something is just one of the things
he perceives.

Iherefore, one of the things perceived by Jones is

perceived by Jones not to exist.

And this is easily symbolized as

’Perceives-(Ey)((Ex)(x=y) A Perceives (Ex)(x=y))', a formiila
unlike (3 x)(Perceives -(Ey) (x=y)

)
’

,

is perfectly consistent.

vihich,
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So far we have argued that formulas of the form ’(9 x) (Perceives
b=x)* are (i) Einployed by Hintikka to capture English direct-object

constructions, and (ii) Can be reduced to formulas which do not

contain occurrences of perceptual quantifiers.

From this

vre

cannot, however, conclude that all formulas employed by Hintikka
to capture direct-object constructions can be reduced to formulas

lacking perceptual quantifiers without knowing in addition that
(iii) Form\ilas of the form

»

(3 x) (Perceives b=x)' are the only

formulas employed by Hintikka to capture direct-object constructions.

And

v/e

shall now discover surprisingly that (iii) is actually false.
The truth of the matter is that Hintikka makes a distinction

in both of his papers between two senses of the English sentence
’’Jones perceives b".

In OLP the two senses are described as follows:

According to one sense of ’’Jones perceives b” Jones perceives

’’the

perceives
individual in question”, while according to the second Jones

Hintikka as
b ’’whoever he is or may be”; the first is symbolized by
I

(

^ x) (Perceives

(x^y))'.

b=x)’ and the second as *(3 x)(o=x & Perceives (Ey)

horizon
Suppose we let »b» be short for ’the man on the

carrying a flag’.

be
Then by saying ’’Jones perceives b” we may
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saying either of two things.

First, we may be saying that Jones

perceives that there’s something on the horizon, that it’s a man,

and that he’s carrying a flag; this is the stronger sense of "Jones
perceives b" and is expressed by

’(,5 x)

(Perceives b=x)’.

Bnt according

to the weaker sense of "Jones perceives b", Jones perceives only

that the individual, who in fact is b, exists.
thing but fails to perceive either that it’

He perceives some-

s a man, it’ s

on the

horizon, or that it’s carrying a flag; this weaker sense is expressed

by ’(^x)(b=x & Perceives(Ey) (x=y) )’
perceive that

vrfiat

He perceives b but fails to

.

he perceives is b.

In ICLP Hintikka refers to

this distinction as a "contrast between statements 6b dicto and 6b
re" ; on the

^ dicto

reading of "Jones perceives b" Jones perceives

that what he perceives is in fact b,

i-riiile

on the

^ re

reading

Jones simply perceives an individual which happens to be b.
The upshot of this distinction is that,

formulas of the form

’

^-Thile

Hintikka employs

(3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ to give formal ex-

pression to sentences of the form "Jones perceives b", it is not

tx*ue

that formulas of the form ’(3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ are the only formulas

employed in this capacity.

In particular, the

^ re

reading of "Jones

perceives b" is captured instead by a formula in which variables bound

by a perceptual quantifier occur both within end in.thout the scope of
the epistemic operator.

And so far we have shown nothing to the

effect that formulas such as these can be reduced to formulas which
contain only ordinary quantifiers.

Therefore, we have not really

give
shovm at all that perceptual quantifiers are not required to
b".
formal expression to sentences of the form "Jones perceives

We

to express
have shown that perceptual quantifiers are not required
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fomally direct- object constructions, provided they
de dicto reading.

are given a

It may still well be the case that, given a de re

reading, sentences containing such constructions really do require
the powerfiil resources of quantifiers ranging over intensions.
I shall now state q\iite categorically that,
see,

formulas of the form *(3 x)(Ax

<§:

so far as I can

Perceives Bx)' really cannot

in general be reduced to formulas in viiich perceptual quantifiers are
eliminated.

Therefore, the

^ re

sense of sentences of the form

"Jones perceives b" does indeed seem to require the use of perceptual

quantifiers in order to be formally expressed.

Nevertheless, in the

remainder of this section I shall argue that formulas of the form

'(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)'

t\irn

out on Hintikka'

s

approach to bring

with them certain difficulties of interpretation; they turn out to

defy any sort of clear interpretation (relative to possible viorlds)

required to understand what they assert.

Hence we shall conclude that

the formal expression of direct-object constructions is not an advan-

tage gained by the addition of perceptual quantifiers.

On one reading

of such constructions the quantifiers appear unnecessary, and on the
other reading the quantifiers are employed in a

vray

that fails to

make clear sense relative to a possible worlds interpretation of
the formulas in which they appear.

We begin by asking precisely what formulas of the form
(Ax & Perceives Bx)

'

(

3

x)

are supposed to assert (where we assume there are

no occurrences of 'Perceives' in 'A').

The answer, presumably, is

perceptual
that '(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)' asserts that there is a
some member of
individual which (i) Picks out of each compatible world

that world's domain which satisfies 'Bx' in that

v/orld,

and (ii) Picks
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from the actual world something satisfying 'Ax’ in the actual world.
The formula asserts that, in other words,

to be B is as a matter of fact A.

VJhat

something perceived by Jones

could possibly be problematic

in interpreting a formiila such as this one?
The problem arises entirely out of the failure of Hintikka’

complete novels to be governed by reflexivity.

Since it is not always

the case that the actual world numbers among its ovm alternatives (that
is, is not always compatible with itself), it t\ims out that a per-

ceptual individual making assignments in the manner required by
’(3 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)’ forces us to violate the rule that per-

ceptual individuals never extend further than the set of compatible
worlds.

Of course, there is nothing sacred about this rule; but

by extending itself to the actual world even when it fails to be one
of the compatible worlds, the perceptual individual is forced to
choose something in the actual world.

And this does cause problems;

for when the actual world is not one of its own alternatives it is

often extremely difficult to see what, if anything, this something
is to be.

Consider the sentence, "What Jones perceives to be a fat man
in front of him is really not a man at all."

Letting

*

(3 x) ((Perceives

(FMx & Fx)) & -Mx)' be the formal expression of this sentence, it is
clear that we are face to face with a difficult puzzle.

It is easy

worlds;
to trace the perceptual world line through the set of compatible
in
we simply pick up whoever happens at each world to be the fat man

front of Jones.

But at the actual world there is no such man, and

yet we are required to choose something.
choose?

What, therefore, are we to

which we
And how can we draw up a criterion according to

26

can in any given situation decide which element of the actual world

is the value of the perceptual individual at the actual world?

Hintikka realizes this difficulty and offers the following
solution.

Suppose we let w be the actual world.

How then do we cross- identify between w and its alternatives? This question is crucial for the truthconditions for such propositions as (3 x)(x=d &
Perceives x=c).
The trans vrorld heir lines which are (go together
with) values of ’x’ here must be extended to the
actual world in order for us to be able to say, as
we are attempting to do in Cthe above formula!]
that in the actual world one of them is (picks out)
d.
From this we can see what the problem is intuitively.
The question concerns the principles
according to which vje say that one of a' s perceptual
objects is or is not identical with an object in the
actual world... The ‘trans world heir lines’ connecting these several worlds are as it were dra^-na
differently when it comes to connect the actual world
with its perceptual alternatives than v;hen it is required to weave together these alternatives. Since
these world lines are involved essentially with the
truth-conditions of quantified statements, it is seen
that the truth- conditions of statements in which one
quantifies both into a perceptual context and outside
it (thus requiring the alternatives to be compared
with the actual world) involve considerations essentially disparate from those involved in the truthconditions for statements in v?hich one merely quantifies in. The former turn also on causal considerations. ... Grice. . .registers some of the difficulties
in spelling out precisely what the causal connection
is which has to obtain betvjeen one of a' s perceptual
objects and an actual object in his environment before
we can tie them together with the same world line.
It seems to me that the problem of giving a precise
characterization of this connection is due more to
general difficulties in analyzing causal notions than
to the special features of causal connections relied on
in perception.
,

Consider once again the sentence,

man in front

"I^/hat

Jones perceives to be a fat

of him is not a man at all”.

The problem is to determine

perceptual
which object in the actual world is picked out be the
in the actual
individual, there being no fat man in front of Jones

2?

world.

Hintikka’

s

solution is to determine vihat exactly in w caused

Jones to perceive a fat man and simply tie the loose end of the world
line to it.
the stump.

If it'

s a

large stump, then the world line extends to

And surely there is something reasonable about this; if

a stump really caused Jones to perceive a fat man, then we'd be

inclined to say that what he perceives is really not a fat man but
rather a stump.
a

In other vzords, '(3 x) ( (Perceive s(FI'Ix & Fx)) & x is

stmp)' seems agreeable.

The stump is part of the same v7orld line

that picks out fat men in each compatible vjorld.

If nothing more,

all of this accords remarkably well viith our ordinary perceptual talk.

Hintikka'

s

solution is intuitively appealing, but how might

all of this be captured in the formal semantics?

Hovx

can we analyze

this causal connection needed to join the actual world to its alternatives?

Hintikka certainly leaves us in the dark here; he speaks of

the "difficulties in analyzing causal notions" and seems to regard

them lightly as though an exact characterization of a semantics for
'Perceives' is no longer his concern.

Yet there really seems to be no way to take Hintikka'

s

solution

seriously until we can analyze the notion, 'x causes y to perceive
that p' in terras formally specifiable in Hintikka'

s

system.

Obviously,

the prospects of cooking up such an analysis are not encouraging.

But

are able to find an analysis of 'x causes y to

notice that even if

x^e

perceive that

are still hard pressed to account for hallucina-

tions.

p'

vje

There are times, it would seem, that no actually existing

certain things
object can be cited as the cause for Jones's perceiving

causes such as alcohol).
to be the case (excepting, of course, indirect
be a mountain lion is
Thus, the sentence "What Jones perceives to
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actually nothing at all" would resist the type of treatment

Hintikka offers.
By all indications, therefore, it seems that Hintikka’
system (by virtue of lacking reflexivity) is incapable of providing
a satisfactory, intuitive possible worlds interpretation for

formulas of the form ’(3x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)’.

There simply are

no clear guidelines for deciding the value of the perceptual indi-

vidual at the actual world.

Permitting perceptual individuals to

extend beyond the safety of the set of compatible vrarlds creates
nothing but chaos in the formal semantics.
We conclude that it is not at all clear vhat, with a particu-

lar possible worlds interpretation in mind, formulas of the form
*

(9 x)(Ax & Perceives Bx)' are supposed to assert.

While we can

develop clear intuitions as to what is asserted by '(9 x) (Perceives
Ax)' by studying its truth- conditions relative to a possible worlds

interpretation, we can do nothing analogous in the case of '(3x)
(Ax & Perceives Bx)'.

Thus, while there is potentially much to be

gained by formally rendering certain English constnictions by
formulas of the form '(^ x) (Perceives Ax)', there seems to be

little or no point in doing the same with
Bx)'

as long as reflexivity fails to hold.

'

(^ x)(Ax & Perceives

^ re

direct object

constructions may not be adequately handled in a system

vri.thout

perceptual quantifiers, but there is certainly nothing to be gained
such
by dealing with them in a system with the extra quantifiers in

bind variables
a way that a perceptual quantifier is forced to
epistemic operator.
occurring both within and without the scope of the
incidentally.
The difficulties with ’(^x)(Ax<S: Perceives Bx)',
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do not arise vrith formulas of the form ’(Ex) (Ax & Perceives Bx)*,

With ‘(Ex) (Ax & Perceives Bx)‘ we are guaranteed the existence in
the actual world of the individual^ picked out by the physical

individual at the actual world (something we are not guaranteed with
(Ex) (Perceives Ax)’, as we pointed out earlier).

*

Thus, if there is

an actual flesh-and-blood person with respect to whom Jones perceives

that he B’

s,

matter what

and if as a matter of fact this person A's, then no
vre

fill in for ’A’ or ’B', still we are guaranteed someone

in the actual world to which we tie the loose end of the world line,

reflexivity or no reflexivity.

V^e

blood person and say of him that
ceives that he B’s.

And

blood person or mistaking

v/e

can take hold of this flesh-andis the person of whom Jones per-

have no trouble finding this flesh-and-

vriio

this person is.

By the very nature

of physical individuation Jones perceives who he is,
individual^^ in the domain of the actual world he is.

vjhich

We do not

have to fuss with finding whatever physical thing (if any) happened
to cause Jones’ s various perceptions.

We discovered earlier that an important subclass of formulas
containing perceptual quantifiers

—

those where

*

occurring strictly within the scope of ’Perceives’
formulas lacking perceptual quantifiers.

naturally raises the question

wiriether

(iJ

—

x)’ binds variables

can be reduced to

A reduction of this sort

further reductions of percep-

tually quantified formulas may be made.

Most exciting of all perhaps

be done away vath
is the question whether perceptual quantifiers can

whether
altogether in favor of ordinary quantifiers alone, and
Hintikka’
everything that can be said in the language of

s

system
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could be said without employing the extra quantifiers.

oil

In the final

section we shall explore the question of formal expressibility and

point to some specific instances viiere the new quantifiers really
do seem to add to vjhat can be said in Hintikka’s system.

In his paper ‘Reply' Romane Clark has a good deal to say about

what he calls "Hintikka'

s

double quantifier theory".

It is ostensibly

Clark's view that the perceptual quantifiers can be altogether

eliminated from the system; he writes that the standard quantifier
is "apparently adequate to the distinctions Hintikka wishes to
draw"
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and goes on to suggest in

of instances this is the case.

rx>ugh

fashion how in a certain number

It is my belief, however, that wore

Clark to attempt to offer a completely general account, he would

discover that there really are distinctions which can be made only

by means of employing two sets of quantifiers.
Consider first the set of formulas in which a perceptual

quantifier is directly followed by an ordinary quantifier of the
opposite sort

(*

...(^x)(y)...' and

'

. . . (

V x) (Ey)

. .

.
'

both binding

),

variables occurring within (but not without) the scope of 'Perceives'.
We take this set to include all formulas equivalent to

and

»

...( \/x)(Ey)...'

constructions

('

'

...-(^x)-(Ey)...'

. . .

,

(3 x) (y) . . .

etc.).

us refer to formulas belonging to this set as "P-formulas".

Let

It

shall then be my first contention that P-form\alas cannot be reduced
to formulas which contain no occ\irrences of perceptual quantifiers.

Suppose Jones perceives a number of people standing \uider a
bridge.

Each of the people is such that Jones perceives who he is,

under.
but suppose he fails to perceive what it is they are standing
he recognizes.
All he perceives is that a group of persons, each of which
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is standing under a structure of some sort.

Then there is a per-

ceptual individual x such that for any physical individual
y which

picks up a person at the actual world, Jones perceives that x is
over y.

This we symbolize by the P-formula ’(3x)(y)(y is a person

Perceives(x is over y))'

(for simplicity let’s just consider ’(3x)

(y) (Perceives (x is over y))’).

It is my belief that '(5 x) (y) (Perceives(x is over y))’ cannot
be rewritten in terms of ordinary quantifiers.

Ihe formula '(Ex)

(y)(Perceives(x is over y))', for example, makes the bridge a physical

individual which by hypothesis it is not; it says, in other words,
that Jones knows what it is the people are standing under.

This

particular difficulty may be remedied by trying something like

'

(y)

(Percoives(Ex) (x is over y))’, but this formula allows for the

possibility that over each person there appears a struct’ore but
that there are different structures appearing over different people.
Finally,

’

Perceives(Ex) (y) (x is over y)' fails to report that each

person in the crowd is perceptually recognized by Jones.
The problem, crudely put, is this.

In order to guarantee

that persons in Jones’s perceptual field are physically individuated
objects, the '(y)’ must remain outside the modal operator and bind

free variables occurring within.

And to guarantee that the bridge is

not a physically individuated object, the ’(Ex)’ must occur inside the
modal operator.

But to preserve the sense of the original formula it

is necessary that ’(Ex)' precede ’(y)’»

It’s hard to see how all of

this can be done at once, and so quantifying over perceptual
be said
individuals does seem unavoidable to capture what needs to

here.

outside ordinary
The perceptual quantifier seems to get trapped
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quantifiers in cases such as these, and once they are trapped in
this way they cannot be eliminated.

The situation is the same in

the case of all P-formulas.

Consider next the class of fonnulas in which a universal perceptual quantifier binds variables occurring within but not without
the scope of

*

Perceives’.

Suppose we refer to this class as the

class of "0- fonnulas" (and include

’

. .

.-(9 x)-.

constructions, etc.).

. . ’

It shall then be my second claim that Q-formulas too contain perceptual quantifiers v;hich cannot be translated out.
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Suppose that Jones visits a brickworks and that everything on

which he lays eyes is covered with orange dust.

Tnen to say in the

language of Hintikka’s system the English sentence, "Everj'thing per-

ceived by Jones is perceived by Jones to be orange",

employ the Q- formula

’

(

\ie

x) (Perceives(x is orange))'.

seem like an easy move from

'

(

V x)(Perceives(x

simply
Novr

it may

is orange))' to the

formula 'Perceives(x) (x is orange)' in the same way

vje

argued

earlier that *(3 x)(Perceives Ax)' can be reduced to 'Perceives(Ex)
(Ax)'.

Yet this is certainly not the case.

According to

'

(

V x)(Perceives(x is orange))', every perceptual

individual assigns to every compatible world w something in the
But although

domain of w v:hich satisfies 'x is orange* (in w).
'

Perceive s(x) (x is orange)' also guarantees that

everj’’

member of every

compatible world w chosen by a perceptual individual satisiies 'x is
orange' in

vj,

it says more.

It guarantees in addition that those members

perceptual
of any compatible irorld w which are not chosen by any

individual also satisfy 'x is orange' in w.

Thus,

'Perceives(x)(x is

orange))', but the
orange)' virtually implies '(V x) (Perceives(x is
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reverse does not hold.

Everything Jones perceives he perceives to be

orange, but Jones certainly does not perceive that evei^hinr^ is

orange; he does not perceive, for example, that his parents (back

home in Ohio) are orange.

It's compatible

vri.th

eveiything he

presently perceives that his parents are not orange.
ceives(x)(x is orange))' is much to strong.

V/e

And so 'Per-

want only to assert

that the things he perceives are perceived to be orange.
The remedy seems clear.

Find an antecedent 'Ax' to insert

within the scope of '(x)' in 'Perceives(x)(x is orange))' (yielding
'Perceives(x) (Ax->x is orange)') which simply asserts that Jones

perceives x.

Then instead of saying that Jones perceives that

everything is orange we'll be saying that Jones perceives that only
a certain number of things are orange, namely the things he per-

ceives, and this is presumably idiat we want.

2.3

To follow through on

this suggestion we might try something like 'Perceives(x) (Perceives
(x=x)-?x is orange)' or else
is orange)'.

\'fi.ll

'

Perceives(x) (Perceives(Ey) (x=y)->x

either of these do the trick?

Unfort\mately not.

For we now have a situation vxhere an

ordinary quantifier binds variables occurring within the scope of an
occurrence of 'Perceives', and this means that we are suddenly now
dealing with physical individuals.

*

Perceive s(x) (Perceive s(x=x)-^ x

is orange)' does not say that Jones perceives that everything he

perceives is orange; rather, it says that Jones perceives that
everything he perceptually recognizes is orange.

And now

vxe

have

something vxhich is too weak , for presumably there are plenty of

people at the brickworks Jones perceives but fails to recognize
(he does not perceive who they all are).

So we still haven't been
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able to find a way to symbolize what we set out to symbolize
without

making use of the perceptual quantifier '(V x)».
Formally speaking, the difficulty is this.

A Q-formula involves

talking about a system of worldlines each of v;hich vreaves its way

through the set of compatible worlds.

Now since there are individuals^

in each compatible world v/hich may be untouched by these lines, we

must find some way to disting\iish between the individuals^^ of a
given world that are picked up by a perceptual individual and the

individuals^ vihich are not.

This is essentially what we tried to do

by specifying the antecedent ’Ax’ in ’Perceives(x)(Ax->x is orange)’.
Hoviever, there does not seem to be a way to symbolize ’Ax’.

And so we conclude that Q- formulas too are really irreducible to
formulas in the language of ordinary quantifiers.

about a

vrtiole

VJhen we

want to talk

group of perceived individuals at once we really seem

to require the resources of Hintikka’ s new quantifiers.

In this way,

the same as with P-formulas, the quantifiers do appear to increase the

expressibility of Hintikka’

s

system.

The value of employing per-

ceptual quantifiers does not seem to lie, as Hintikka believes, in
the expression of direct-object constructions.

But in order to

formally captvire those English sentences whose symbolizations are
either P-formulas or Q-formulas, the new quantifiers appear to be
impossible to eliminate.
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FOOTNOTES

^Hintikka, ’On the Logic of Perception',
p. 143,
2As Hintikka puts it, "...to specify what someone,
say a, perceives is
to desc^be v;hat the world is like according
to his perceptions.
Since these perceptions do not fix the world
uniquely, this descriplon IS logically speaking not unlike a disjunction
of several
alteratives concerning the world, 'fhe most systematic way
of
gelling out th^e several alternatives is to make each
of them as
lull a description of the woi'ld as we can give
by means of the
sourer we are using. Sxvitching to an obvious semantical jargon.
It IS obvious that what such maidmal (consistent)
descriptions
describe is a possible world." Hintikka, 'Information,
Causality,
and the Logic of Perception' p. 4,

r

,

q

rinmodel
case

set w'
w'

can be said to be compatible with a model set w just
is compatible vo.th everything Jones perceives in w.

'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception'.
p. 14.

we say about ’( 3 x)' and '(\/x)' is not intended to bear upon
similar role these quantifiers play in a semantics for 'Knows'
Hintikka has suggested in recent years (see chapter 3 ),

^^fcat

t^

^e

assume as given rules governing non-modal formulas. For these
see Knowledge and Belief (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, I 962 ).

"^See

Hintikka,

'Reply', pp. 194- 196 .

%intikka, 'The Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy
of Ontology', p. 409; pp* 410-411; 'Objects of Knowledge and Belief,
p. 870 .

^Of course, worlds are not strictly speaking a part of Hintikka'
system, but vrfiat this comes to in tenns of complete novels is obvious.
^^Hintikka, 'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',
pp. 4-5.

^%intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception', pp. 162-163; Hintikka,
'Infoimiation, Causality, and the Logic of Perception, pp. 10-11.

^^intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception',

Nothing so far
p. I 63 .
guarantees the presence in the model structvire of every complete
novel vrfiich (relative to a given language) can be formed. Hox^rever,
Hintikka seems clearly to assume that this guarantee holds ("to
specify vrfiat a perceives is to specify the set of all possible worlds
compatible with his perceptions", 'Information, Causality, and the
Logic of Perception, p. 4). To avoid confusion let us say of a model
structure that it'
"W-complete" just in case the set V/ of complete
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novels it contains is maximal in this respect. Only now are \re
justified in asserting that there really is a compatible vjorld in
which Tittle is the man in front of Jones.

^%intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception',
^^Hintikka,

p. I 63 .

'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',

p. 9«

^ %bid

..

p. 11.

^^intikka, 'On the Logic of Perception', p. I 66 .
Clark, 'Comments', p. I 80 .
1

ft

formala virtually implies' another in a Hintikka-type semantics
just in case their conditional is 'self-sustaining'. A formula is
'self-sustaining' just in case it belongs to every model set.
Two formulas whose biconditional is self-sustaining are 'virtually
equivalent'. A formula is 'indefensible' just in case it belongs
to no model set. We shall employ this terminology throughout the
dissertation.
'

19

This accords well with Montague's treatment of 'seems to see'. The
sentence "Jones seems to see a unicorn" is translated into the formal
language vjith an operator 'seems' binding the clause 'there exists a
unicorn...'.
('On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities',
p. 179 )

^^ant, A Critique of Pure Reason

,

p. 303»

be problems vjith
sentences like "Jones perceives that there is something moving" in
connection with the recently expressed belief of some scientists that
visual perception of movement operates independently of visual
perception in general. I have no idea what to say about cases such
as these.

^Terry Parsons has suggested there still might

^^This formula too would be inconsistent were the relation R in
Hintikka's system to be transitive and reflexive.

^\intikka, 'Information, Causality, and the Logic of Perception',
pp. 15-lS*
Bx)'
^^We speculated that formulas of the form '(5 x)(Ax & Perceives
we
may
and
'(3x)',
eliminates
which
reduction
resist the sort of
a
certainly be right. Yet these formulas are incapable of providing
seen,
satisfactory formal reading for English sentences, as we have
quantifiers
and so it may still well be the case that Hintikka's new
in any
system
Hintikka's
fail to increase the expressibility of
profitable way.

^^Clark,

cit ., p. 184.
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As Thomason points out, "It is not possible to eliminate
the
quantifications of a many-individuated logic in favor of
predicates
and a single quantifier," Thomason, ‘Perception and
Individuation*
^

p. 279.
27

Notice that the class of P-formvilas and the class of Q-formulas
are not mutually exclusive.

28

^
There

as a minor difficulty here that we shall ignore. There is
a difference between (i) Jones’s perceiving that ^at he perceives

is F, and (ii) What Jones perceives being such that Jones perceives
it to be F. What Jones perceives might well be different from
what he perceives that he perceives since R is not transitive and
not reflexive. Since the suggestion fails for other reasons we’ll
pass over this difficulty.
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CHAPTER

II

A formal semantics for the Logic of Perception bearing con-

siderable similarity to Hintikka’

s

system is proposed by Richmond

Thomason in his recent study ’Perception and Individuation’.

Like

Hintikka’ s two papers on the Logic of Perception, ’Perception and

Individuation’ leaves many details of the formal semantics un-

specified and makes only the barest mention of such crucial issues
Yet the

as quantifying in and the construction of world lines.

system that does emerge is a fascinating varient of the model set

theoretic semantics for perception Hintikka has proposed.

In this

chapter Thomason’s semantics for perception (which we’ll refer to
as ”T”) will be presented and discussed, with particular attention

paid to the ways in which it differs from Hintikka’

s

system and the

desirability or undesirability of these novel features.
* *

It will perhaps be easiest to approach Thomason’s paper by
beginning with some remarks of an informal nature and then preceding
to a detailed presentation of the formal semantics.

This preliminary

discussion can be divided into a series of informal remarks.
1,

General structure of T .

We have seen that Hintikka'

s

semantics

structure confor perception is based upon the notion of a model

sisting of model sets.

Something was perceived to be true just in

compatible complete novel.
case it turned out to be a member of every

and complete novels
With T the situation is different; model sets

play no part in the system.

Rather than defining truth in terms of

terms of simultaneous
set membership and rules of deduction in
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satisfaction, Thomason employs a valuation function which maps well-

formed fomulas to truth-values.

In particular, formulas are mapped

to truth- values relative to possible worlds, or "situations" as

Thomason more frequently calls them.

Formulas are true relative to

situations.

Nothing in the way of a radical departure from Hintikka-type
semantics seems to hang on this structural feature.

Situations bear

the compatibility relation to one another and (like Hintikka's complete

novels) give us the means to tell what an agent perceives in a given
state of affairs.

To find out, we simply observe which, of all the

situations there could be, are compatible and which are not.
2.

The modal operator .

The modal operator employed in T constitutes

a slight point of departure from Hintikka (although we shall later

discover that the point of departure is not as slight as it first
appears).

Thomason confines his semantics to visual perception and

adopts the notion of

concept in T.

*

seeing that’ as the fundamental perceptual

An agent ’sees that’

such-and-such is the case if

and only if such-and-such is the case in every compatible situation
(or possible world).

The letter "S" is taken to be the modal

operator designating the locution

’

sees that’

Thomason nowhere employs the use of subscripts identifying
agents.

Nor does he introduce more than a single compatibility

relation between situations.

And hence it looks as though T is

a

system whose concern is that which a single agent visually perceives.
To capture what each of two agents visually perceives two compati-

bility relations are required to distinguish exactly

v;hich states of

perceives.
affairs (since they shall differ) are compatible with what each

4o
3-

Deductive closure .

Hintikka'

s

A feature shared in common by T and

system (perhaps an xanfortunate one) is this;

As a result

of the general strategy employed in the semantics, every logical
consequence of what is perceived turns out itself to be perceived.
This may easily be shovm as follows.

formed formulas.

Let ’A’ and

»B’

be well-

’Jones sees that A’ is true if and only if ’A’ is

true in every situation compatible with everything Jones sees.

suppose ’A' logically entails ’B’.

But

then 'B' is true in every situ-

ation logically compatible vn.th everything Jones sees; othei^vdse in
some possible world ’A’ is true and ’B' false, which is impossible.

But if ’B’ is true in every compatible situation, it follows that

Jones sees that B.
This phenomenon has been a much-criticized feature of Hintikka-

type semantics.

But it is admittedly a feature which is not nearly

as objectionable in a semantics for perception as in a semantics

for knowledge or for belief.

To say that a man knows the logical

consequences of everything he knows, or believes the logical conse-

quences of everything he believes seems more objectionable than to
say a man perceives the logical consequences of vhat he perceives.

Perceiving logical consequences does not seem to involve the extent
of mental effort or calculation required to
consequences.

knovr or

believe logical

At any rate, deductive closure is a phenomenon which

occurs in T as well as Hintikka’

s

various semantics for propositional

attitudes.
4,

Direct-object constructions.

Like Hintikka, English direct-

object constructions (like "Schvzartz sees the footstool") are

handled by Thomason in terms of the propositional ’seeing that’
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construction.

Also like Hintikka, they are eventually found to be

capable of ambiguity.

In one sense Jones can be said to see an

alligator only if he sees that the object he sees is an alligator;

but in a weaker sense Jones sees an alligator

\jhen he sees something

(that turns out to be an alligator) but does not see that it’s an

aligator.

These seem to correspond (respectively) to Hintikka’

de dicto and

^ re types of direct-object

constructions.

However,

as we shall see later, the formal treatments of these two construc-

tions in T differ significantly from Hintikka’
'(

5.

3

x) (Perceives b=x)’

s

distinction between

and ’(3x)(b=x& Perceives(Ey)(y=x))’

Constraints on the compatibility relation .

Perhaps the most

striking feature found in T which is absent in Hintikka’

s

Logic of

Perception is the introduction of a compatibility relation R which
is both reflexive and transitive.

Thomason has no strong feelings.

As far as transitivity goes,

He makes R transitive only

"provisionally", claiming that "there are few intuitive resources
to mobilize in resolving the question vhether this is desirable

or not".

The reflexivity of R, on the other hand, appears to be

a more serious matter.

We’re asking vhether seeing s-that are always successful, so that if SA is true then A is true. As
long as vre don’t confuse ’seeing that’ with
’seeming’, English usage supports a positive answer to this question; one can’t see that a thing
is so without it actually being so. If someone
claims that he sees that there are pumpkins in
the field, he will be forced to withdraw this
claim once he has been shoT-m that there aren’t
pumpkins in the field. In this respect ’sees that’
resembles ’knows that’, ’realizes that’, ’is
surprised that’, and ’forgets that’.

It will be valid to conclude in

T,

therefore, that whenever

such-and-such is
an agent sees that such-and-such is the case,
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indeed the case.
with itself.

The actual world is guaranteed to be compatible

And by transitivity it turns out that whenever an

agent sees that such-and-such is the case, then he sees that he
sees that such-and-such is the case.^

Together these conditions

insure the equivalence in T of 'S(A)’ and >SS(A)’, for any wellformed formula ’A’.
Perceptual individuation and perceptual domains .

6.

significant feature of all which Thomason’
tion shares in common with Hintikka'

s

s

The most

semantics for percep-

is the presence of two inde-

pendent methods of individuating what is perceived by the agent in
question.

There are objects which are physically individuated, and

there are objects which are perceptually individuated (as with

Hintikka, an object b is physically individuated for Jones just in
case Jones percept\ially recognizes b).

And corresponding to these

two methods of individuation are two kinds of quantifiers, physical

quantifiers and perceptual quantifiers.

Notationally, Thomason

writes an existential perceptually quantified formula as

^(3^) Q^’

(where variables are Greek letters) and an existential

physically quantified formula as ’(9 x)
Roman letters).

Qx’

(where variables are

For the sake of simplicity, however, we shall

throughout use Hintikka’

s

symbols for quantifiers and thereby hope

to avoid confusion in comparing the systems.

The two methods of cross-identifying individuals from world to

world nevertheless take on an added complication in T.

Each situation

"individuals^^"
(world) has not one, but two domains of individuals (or

as

\je

called them in Chapter One);

A domain of physical individuals^^

and a domain of perceptual individuals^.

There are two modes of
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existence in

T;

something can exist physically in a situation w, or

it can exist visually.

The Buckingham Fountain, for example,

exists physically in the actual world,
does not.
(i.e,

,

vriiile

the Fountain of Youth

Yet the latter may very easily become a visual object

perceptual individualx) in the actual world.

It often

happens, of course, that a given individual may at the same time be

both a physical and visual object in the same situation.

Yet each

domain is independent from the other; some objects may be physical
but not visual objects, and some visual objects may fail to be physical
objects.

As we shaill see later, some interesting difficulties stem

from this distinction between modes of existence, difficulties which
do not arise in Hintikka’s semantics for perception.

It might appear at this point as though Thomason’s semantics
for perception, by virtue of distinguishing physical and visual

objects in each situation, will turn out to be suspiciously suggestive
of a sense-datum theory.

This impression is strongly encoiiraged by

passages like the follovring:

—

he has an impresIn a way MacBeth sees something
and yet there is no physical
sion of a dagger
object with which the dagger can be identified. Here
it’ s plausible to say that MacBeth sees the dagger, so
thatC ’(5 x)(x=b)’J will be true, but to deny that
the dagger is to be identified vath any physical
object, so that C (Sx)(x=b)’J will be false.

—

’

Whereas Hintikka’

s

semantics vath its perceptual individuals

(individuals 2 ) mapping worlds to individuals^^ may have looked to a
certain extent (as Hintikka himself admits) like a sense-datum theory,
there was nothing in the way of "dual domains" in each v^orld.

T,

the
on the other hand, looks as though visual sense-data are part of

furniture of each situation, functions or no functions.

MacBeth’
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dagger just sits in the actual world, as much a member of the visual

domain as MacBeth himself is a member of the physical domain.
Thomason, in section VIII of his paper, readily agrees that his

may be regarded as a sense-datum theory but not in what he calls the
To be a sense-datum theory in the strong sense T

'•strong sense”.

must be able to capture the validity of

’

(x)

(Y y) (x^y)

'

.

In every

situation in every model structure it must turn out that nothing

qualifies simultaneously as a physical object and visual object.
But,

as we‘ve already seen,

’

(x)(

V y)(x^y)’ is not valid in

T;

hence, if T is a sense-datum theory at all, it is one only in an

innocent sense,
?•

The nature of perceptually individuated objects .

are formed in T as they are in Hintikka's system.

World lines

Thomason describes

them as "rules” which assign to each situation a member of the
viniversal domain

'

D*

.

D is defined as the union of all objects,

physical or visual, found in any situation in the model structure
(D may even

—

if it seems desirable

do not exist in any situation).

—

contain individuals^ which

The member of D assigned to some

situation a by some v/orld line is said to be the "perspective presented by the Cvrorld linej

,

viewed from the situation

a”.-^

A vrorld

line d may assign to a situation a any member of D whatever, but for

d to be a physically individuated object the actual situation must
be assigned a member of its physical domain, and for d to be a

perceptually individuated object the actual situation must be assigned
a member of its visual domain.

Mo such restrictions, hovjever, apply to

situations other than the actual one.
feature shortly.

We'll examine this interesting
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Physical and perceptual cross-identification over situations
comprise vihat Thomason calls the

tvjo

"modes of individuation".

We

shall refer to the modes of individuation as "n" and "m", for the

physical and perceptual modes, respectively (Thomason uses the Greek
letters "nu" and "mu").

Formally speaking, the modes of individuation

are classes whose members are the set of world lines which qualify
as individuals^*

Thus, m is the set of all and only perceptual

individuals^ and n is the set of all and only physical individuals^*

then refer to the physical domain of a situation a as
visual domain of a as
as

U

m

U ^a

n

’

.

V/e

and the

’

D itself may then be formally defined

where "K" denotes the set of situations in

the model structure.

We are now ready to offer a formal specification of
perceptual model structure consists of a septuple
of elements.
these elements.

<^K,

R,

The

T.

D^, m,

D'^,

n,

We have had occasion already to introduce most of
K is the set of situations, R is a two-place

compatibility relation taking situations as arguments, and m and n are
the modes of individuation (sets of world lines).

V/e

and

let

name functions which map to each situation its visual and

physical domains, respectively.

And ’V’, finally, names a function

>jhich assigns values to individual variables and constants and

truth- values to well-formed formulas.

Almost nothing is said of the assignments made by

V.

It is

to atomic
not clear, for example, how truth- values come to be assigned

foimulas.^

The only truth-value assignments specified are the

assignments to quantified formulas.

Once again using Hintikka's
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notation, these quantifier rules for T come to the follovTing;

Va((Vx)(Ax)) = T

if and only if

(V^/x)a(A) = T

for all d belonging to m, such that d(a) belongs to tP(a)

Va((x)(Ax)) = T

if and only if

(V^/x)^(A) = T

for all d belonging to n, such that d(a) belongs to C^(a).

Here we let the expression "V^/x" denote the function which is exactly
like V except for the assignment of d to x«

And "d(a)" stands for

the member of U assigned a situation a by the world line d.

What these rules say intuitively is this.

A perceptual

universally quantified formula '(Vx)(Ax)’ is true in a situation a
just in case 'Ax' is satisfied by every world line which belongs to
the set m and which assigns to a a member of its visual domain.

A

physically universally quantified formula '(x)(Ax)' is true in a
situation a just in case 'Ax' is satisfied by every world line

which belongs to n and which assigns to a a member of its physical
domain.

From these rules we may immediately derive rules for the

existential quantifiers as follows;
V.((Ex)(Ax)) = T

(V^/x)„(A) = T

if and only if

for some d belonging to n, such that d(a) belong to d (a)

VJG x)(Ax))

= T

(V^/x) (A) = T

if and only if

for some d belonging to m, such that d(a) belongs to ET(a).
In the

There is much that is interesting about these r\iles.
first place, the truth of a formula like

'

(Ex)S(x=Smith)

'

is dependent

not only upon the world line picking Smith out of each situation but

upon the presence of Smith in the actual world.

In Hintikka'

semantics, we may recall, no such restriction was present.

7

One

individual of
could perceive who an individual is even though no such

4?

h&pponBd.

©xist in ths actna.!

"to

woi*l.d.»

H©nc6 ths rules lor ordinaj^y

quantification in T are in an important way different from Hintikka's.
This difference, it should be noted, stands independent of reflexivity,

Hintikka’

s

system could lack the restriction even with the reflexivity

feature added.

Interesting too is the absence

(-vrfriich

we alluded to earlier) of

a requirement that the world line pick from each situation (over which

it's defined) a member from a specified domain in that situation.
For example, the formula

'

(Ex)S(x=Smith)

'

is true in a if and only

if there is a world line d which (i) Satisfies 'S(x=Smith)'
Is a member of

n,

,

(ii)

and (iii) Assigns a a member of it's physical domain.

But there's no req\:d.rement to the effect that d pick out from each

situation a member of its physical domain.

physically existing object.
'S(x=Smith)'

vriien

Only in a must Smith be a

Similarly, the world line vhich satisfies

Smith is not perceptually recognized (namely, a

member of m) must assign a a member of its visual domain but may
conceivably assign other situations member of their physical domains.
Moving

novr to a

individuation m and

n,

more detailed consideration of the modes of
we find two rather fascinating requirements

concerning their membership (see 5*2 on page 272).

Since Thomason

decides in the end to reject the second, we'll concentrate our attention

upon the first, viz . , no two members of the same mode of individuation

may assign to the same situation the same element of
a is a situation, and if
n,

dj_

D.

That is, if

and d£ are both elements of either m or

then if di^d 2 , dj_(a)^d 2 (a) .

"These objects," Thomason writes in

reference to world lines in either m or
so that they do not intersect;

n,

"must be chosen systematically,

two different objects of the same mode
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individuation cannot present the same perspective in the same situation.”®

IMs

restriction is rather interesting and on the surface appears

to be quite reasonable.

Suppose that Jones sees that two men are

standing in front of him but sees who neither man is.

addition that it’

his father.

s

Suppose in

compatible with everything he sees that either is

Then in at least one compatible situation the one man is

his father, and in at least one compatible situation the other is his
father.

But according to the restriction there is no situation in

vihich both are his father.

In no situation are the two men identical,

and this result seems to square well vdth our intuitions.
As a matter of fact, the restriction Thomason introduces here is
a very strong one.

(y) (3C=y -^S(x?=y)

)

’

Not only does it guarantee the validity of

and

*

(

V x)

surprising, the validity of

(x^y-7S(x^y) )

'

(

’

Vy) (x=y~;^S(x=y) )' in
(x) (y) (x/y-7S(x/y)

)

T,

(x)

’

but much more

and ’(l^x)(l/y)

’

We shall demonstrate informally the validity of each.

.

First, suppose ’-(x)(y)(x=y->S(x=y))’ is true in some situation a

(relative to some model structure "C k,
»

R,

,

And by

t''.'ro

n,

).

Then

applications of the quantifier rules, ((V ^/x) ^/y)a

((x=y & -S(x=y))) =

d (a) belong to

m,

So Vg^((Ex)(Ex)(x=y & -S(x=y))

(Ex)(Ey)(x=y & -S(x=y))' is true in a.

= T.

iP

T,

l/^(a).

for some

d^^

and &2 in n, such that

and

dj_(a)

But from this it follows that both ((V^^/x)
d-i

®2/y) (x=y) = T and ((V ^/x)
a

do
"^/y), (x?^y)

= T,

for some b such that Rab.

b

But this violates the restriction that distinct world lines may not in-

tersect anywhere (as they do here in ^).
is val3 .d.

Tlie

proof of the validity of

Thus,
'

(/x) (

'

(x)(y)(x=y->o(x=y))’

j/y) (x=y'^S(x=y)

’

)

is nearly identical.
situation
Now suppose ’(x)(y)(3q4y-oS(xj^y))’ is false in some

a
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(relative to some model structure).
So, like the above,

T.

Then V^((Ex)(Ey)(x?^y & -S(x^y)) =

((v'^l/x)^2/y)

^ -S(x ^y)) =

and d^ in n, such that d^(a) and d^Ca) belong to
((V^^/x)^2/y)^(3^y)

that Rab.

=:

T,

5

i

But then

D’^(a).

T and ((V'^l/x)^2/y)^(x=y) = T,

for some d,

for some b such

And again Thomason's restriction is violated,

Tito

distinct world lines merge when they reach b, and so we conclude that
'(x)(y)(x^y
Likevdso,

'

S(x/y))* is valid in T with the restriction added.
(

V x) (

\/y) (xj^y-^S(x^y)

The formulas

’

)

'

is valid.

(x) (y) (x=y-^S(x=y)

)

»

and

'

(

1

/

x)

(

\/y) (x=y-^S(x=y)

)

guarantee that no vrorld line may split when it extends from a world
to its alternatives.
'

(

V

And the formulas

x)( Vy)(^y~^S(x^y))

'

'

(x) (y) (x^y-?S(x^y)

)

'

and

guarantee that no distinct pair of world

lines may merge when they extend from a vrorld line to its alternatives.
It is interesting to see what Hintikka has to say about this particular sort of phenomenon.
The structure formed by the relations of cross-vrorld identity may be so complex as to be indescribable by speaking
simply of partial identities betvroen the domains of
individuals of the different possible worlds. Above, it
was said that in the case of many propositional attitudes
an individual cannot split' when we move from a world
to its alternatives. Although this seems to me to be
the case vdth all propositional attitudes I have studied
in any detail, it is not quite clear to me precisely
why this should alv;ays be the case. At any rate, there
seems to be reasons for suspecting that the opposite
'irregiilarity' can occasionally take place v/ith some
modalities: individuals can 'merge' together when vro
move from a world to its alternatives.^
'

Starting with the no- splitting condition,

Hintikka'

s

vje

find that in

(revised) semantics for knowledge the formvJ.a '(x)(y)

(x=y-5>Knows(x=y))' is valid (self-sustaining).^^

condition is provable in none of Hintikka'

s

But the no-merging

systems.

A Hintikka-
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type semantics having a symmetric compatibility relation as well
as a rule like

(Ex)Knows(b=x)
(Ex)Knows(c=x)
b=c
Knows (b=c)

w
w
^ w
w

would suffice to capture the no-merging condition, but none of his
systems have symmetry.

In a system with symmetry it turns out that

anything compatible with

vrfiat

is

5^

*d,

where ^ is the propositional

attitude in question, is true; and to avoid this result symmetry is

never considered.
Merging is a phenomenon which, Hintikka believes, can occasion-

ally take place in semantics for propositional attitudes.

By this

Hintikka appears to be saying that in actual situations (real-life
situations) a no-merging condition sometimes appears to be violated;

in knowledge, for example, it seems dubious to conclude that an
agent always knows that two individuals x and y are distinct just
in case (i) He knows who x is, (ii) He knows who y is, and (iii)

x^.

And if the formal semantics for knowledge is to reflect

ordinary knowledge, it’

not clear that world lines should not be

allowed to merge.

What about perception?

Is Thomason’s restriction going to be

at odds with ordinary perceptiial circ\imstances?
see who

y

distinct?

Can a man see

1.^0

x is,

is, and fail to see that x?^y when x and y are in fact

At first it seems as though this is impossible.

y are both before Jones’

s ©yes,

If x and

and if Jones sees who each is, and

they’re
if X5^, it seems that Jones cannot possibly fail to see that

distinct.

But the matter is not quite so simple.

As we shall see
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later, it is not the case in Thomason’s semantics that if Jones

sees who x is, Jones sees x.

To see who a man is it is not necessary

for him to be present to your immediate senses, according to
Thomason, and from this fact it does begin to look as though the no-

merging restriction may be overly restrictive after all from the

point of view of ordinary perception.

We shall return to this matter

in the next section.

Judging from what both Hintikka and Tnomason have to say about

physically individuated objects (namely, that to be physically individuated an object must be perceptually recognized) it would not seem
unreasonable to conclude that in both of their systems the set of

physically individuated objects will turn out to be a proper subset
of the set of perceptually individuated objects.
simple.

If a man perceives

be perceiving Smith.

vrho

The reason is

Smith is, then surely the man must

A man cannot perceptually recognize Smith, it

would seem, if he fails to perceive Smith in the first place.

Thus,

it would appear that to qualify as a physically individuated object
an object must already be a perceptually individuated object.

Interestingly, it is just this sort of reasoning Thomason

wishes to attack.
Suppose we’re at a cocktail party and there is someone
across the room you’re tr3ring to point out to me...
Suppose that from your description I realize vjho he
must be; he’s a person well knovm to me vriiom I know to
But the light is bad, people are
be at the party.
milling around, and I haven’t been able to pick him
out from the crowd. The natural thing to say in these

circumstances is
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(3»1?)
....The
(3.19)
ZT vjh ere

I see -who you mean but I don't see him

formalization of (3»17) is
(Ex)S(x=a) & -{3 x)S(x=a)
'a* stands for 'the person you mean'l

.

In this example the agent perceives who a is without perceiving

a,

and

this looks like a counter-example to the claim that perceiving who

implies perceiving.

At first glance this example does not seem convincing at
It seems rather clear in the example that I know who a is.
someone of

T-jhom

I knovj that he's the person you mean.

visually perceive

viho

he is?

There is

But do I

Is there really someone of whom I

perceive that he's the person you mean?
is.

a31..

It's hard to see that there

On the face of things there seems to be a confusion here between

my knoid.ng who a is and my visually perceiving
example.

It'

vjho a

is in this

not clear that because I know who a is I thereby see

sho a is.

It nonetheless becomes clear later in the paper that Thomason
is not confusing 'knovdng

vrfio'

vdth 'seeing who' at all.

matter is actually much more subtle than

vrfiat

The whole

it appears to be.

(6.1) (3 x)(x=a)
(6.4) (Ex)S(x=a),

and suppose that we are concerned with what is seen by an agent p.
Notice that 6.4 can be true when p is not looking at
that is, 6.4 does
the object referred to by 'a':
for 6.4 to be true
needed
not imply 6.1. All that is
is that the object should exist and be physically the
same in all situations compatible with v;hat p sees.
Since in English we commonly use locutions such as
'seeing what' or 'seeing vjho' to express 6.4, this
fact helps to explain how 'seeing' can take on nonvisual overtones akin to 'knowing'. For me to see who
the man is, it is not necessary for me to be looking
m^^back is
at him; the realization may strike me xdiile
6.1.
imply
not
does
6.4
turned to him. Thus,
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To this Thomason adds by way of footnote;

For some reason, many philosophers with whom I
have discussed this claim have found it peculiar
and somehow objectionable. Nevertheless, it’s the
way vje all use the language;
'seeing that' and
'seeing who’ are conditioned by knowledge, without
regard to how this knowledge was obtained. Someone
who is blind can "see that" and "see who" as well
as anyone else, and no metaphors are involved here,^^

It comes as rather a shock to advance to this point in
'Perception and Individuation' and suddenly learn that the 'secs that'

locution

vre

have been discussing all along is to be understood in such

a way that a blind man can 'see that'

such-and-such is the case.

Small vjonder then that I can see who someone is without actually
seeing him at a given moment,

suddenly eased its

vray

A whole semantics for knowledge has

in the back door.

As far as the cocktail party

is concerned, I see who you mean just insofar as I knovr

If I know who someone is, then I automatically see
sense of the vjord "see".

viho

vrfio

you mean.

he is in some

And if I know something is true, then I

automatically see that it is true in that same sense of the word
"see".^^

Apparently it's just this sense vdth which Thomason has

been concerned all along, and

vjere

mistaken to have ever thought

otherwise.
There is, of course, nothing objectionable about offering a

semantics for a sense of "sees that" which is such that knowing that

entails seeing that.

It may even prove advantageous in reflecting

more accurately the actual use of English expressions (an area in

which Hintikka is often criticized).

But whatever is gained in

failxire to
paralleling everyday discourse is lost, I believe, in the

concept.
present a clear and unified account of a single, unambiguous
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For T nov; looks as though it combines into a single system a

semantics for visual perception and a semantics for
it does so with the use of a single modal operator.

and

knox^rledge,

Precisely the

same system is supposed to elucidate the use of "sees" in "Smith sees
a woodpecker" and "Smith sees now that he’ll soon lose his job".

Suppose we say that an agent "visually perceives" that something

is the case if and only if his eyes actually report to him that it’s
the case.

Then "visually perceives that" is the meaning of "sees

that" which we oi*iginally took to be the interpretation of the modal

operator ’S’.

\A/hat vie

seem to have learned since is that in reality

an agent "sees that" something is the case if and only if either he

visually perceives that it is or else knows that it is.
true if and only if either

’p’

’Sp’

is

is compatible with everything the

agent visually perceives or with everything the agent knows.
This interpretation of "seeing that" brings with it an

important disadvantage.

Every formula having modal operators will be

systematically ambiguous betvreen

vihat’ s

known and what’s immediately

perceived; and, as a result, there appears to be no way in which

immediate perceptions can be captured in the formal semantics.

If

Jones visually perceives that a man is standing in front of him, it
vion’t do to suppose ’S(Ex)(Mx & Fx)’ is the correct symbolization.

This is too vieak.

It says that Jones sees that a man is standing in

front of him, and this leaves open the possibi3-ity that Jones might

only know it.

The formula might better be read, "Jones either knows

him".
or visually perceives that a man is standing in front of

There

"Jones visually
just seems to be no formula in T capable of expressing

perceives that a man is standing in front of him".
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Having seen that Thomason has chosen to interpret "sees that"
in this VTider fashion, we return to Hintikka*

s

suspicions in 'Semantics

for Propositional Attitudes* that it may be unrealistic to impose a

no-merging restriction on world lines of a semantics for certain

propositional attitudes.

Earlier we noted that a no-merging

restriction is not clearly desirable to impose upon a system of knowledge,

It now begins to look as though "sees that" is no different.

The reason is very simple.

If Jones knov;s who each of two people b and c are, then
*

(Ex)(Ey)S(b=x &c=y)* is true even when neither b nor c call T-dthin

the field of Jones's vision.

But if b and c are really distinct it

follows by the no-merging restriction that 'S(b^c)' is true in T.

But 'S(b^c)' is true just in case Jones either visually perceives
that b^c or knows that b/c.

Since the former is impossible when b and

c are not vdthin his visual field, it follows that if 'S(b^c)' is to

be true in

T,

Jones must knovr that b^c.

But concluding from all of

this that Jones really does know that b^c seems rash, as we've already

indicated.

And so if there is uncertainty (as there surely seems

to be) in imposing the no-merging condition upon a semantics for

knowledge, precisely the same uncertainty extends to T.

But one ought to go on to ask vThether the no-merging condition
I

(x) (y) (x=y -?S(x=y )

)

'

is any more unrealistic in this regard than

the no-splitting condition.

Is there anything more \inrealistic in

him are
insisting that Jones know that distinct individuals known to

him are
distinct than to insist that identical individuals known to

identical?

It's hard to see any difference here.

It has in effect

the no- splitting
been suggested by Casteneda (See Chapter Three) that
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condition is violated in ordinary epistemic circumstances.

An amnesiac

may be the famed War Hero wounded 100 times in a recent war, he may
know who the War Hero is (through research), he knows who he himself
is,

and still he may fail to know that he is in fact the War Hero

(no one knows what became of the hero).

Casteneda* s may not be as

convincing as hosts of other examples one might devise, but it
seems to show that

'

(x)(y)(x=y-^Knovrs(x=y))« is at least as question-

able a validity to have in one’s system as

'

(x)(y)(x^y-?Knows(x/y))«

Neither seems desirable.
Then why does Hintikka not fuss over splitting?

No doubt be-

cause it cannot be avoided in his system (as we shall demonstrate in
the next chapter ).^^

make

’

There is no corresponding compelling reason to

(x) (y) (x^y->Knows(x^y)

)
’

a validity, however,

and so Hintikka

hesitates incorporating anything along the lines of a no-merging
restriction.

All things considered, it seems to me that Hintikka

is not much better off than Thomason.

Both employ restrictions on

world lines that do not clearly reflect the way people actually know
or perceive things to be.

It was mentioned earlier that a major departure from Hintikka'
semantics for perception was the presence of reflexivity in

T.

If

an agent sees that something is the case, then it follows that it

is indeed the case.

Every situation in the model structure has itself

as an automatic alternative.

In Hintikka'

s

semantics, on the other,

hand, it is often the case that a world fails to be compatible with

itself.

An agent can perceive that something is the case without it'

being the case.
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We recall from our discussion of Hintikka, however, that re-

flexivity coiild just as well have been employed in his sytem.

It

wasn’t employed for the reason that it would have, according to
Hintikka, produced a system which would be substantially less
interesting.

It would not have allowed reference to illusions,

hallucinations, perceptual mistakes, and the like.

If someone can be

said to 'perceive* something to be true only if it's really true,

how can

vre

talk of perceptual mistakes without increasing the re-

sources of the language?

expression of Jones*

s

It would seem that reflexivity precludes

illusions, hallucinations, and perceptual

mistakes.

Won't it be, then, that Thomason's system T will have troubles
of a similar nature capturing situations in which a person incorrectly
views his actual environment?

If someone can be said to "see that"

something is the case only if it really is the case, it seems as

though illusions and incorrect perceptions cannot be handled by T.

In view of this, it is curious that Thomason discusses
examples which involve just these sorts of perceptual mistakes.

He

considers, for example, a case in which a man looks at a cluster of

And in another example (which

leaves and has an impression of a deer.

we've already mentioned) MacBeth hallucinates and has the impression of
a dagger when no dagger is present (and

vriiere

in addition there is

no physical object for which the so-called dagger could be mistaken).

What he says about these examples reveals that to a certain extent
perceptual mistakes can be captured in the system after all.

They

cannot be captured in terms of the "seeing that" idiom, it is true,

but that

Td.ll

make no difference.

For as

v/e

may well have forgotten
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by this time, we do have at our disposal a domain E^(a) of visual
objects in each situation a.

And we finally have occasion to use

these resources.
The MacBeth case is quite straightforward.

Although ’S(Ex)

(x is a dagger)’ is false in the case \mder consideration (and would

be true in Hintikka’

s

system),

’

(^ x)(x is a dagger)’ is not.

is a dagger found in the domain of the actual

x</orld.

Hence

There
(3 x)S

’

(x is a dagger)’ is true, and we have ’(Hx)(s(x is a dagger) & -(Ey)
(3c=y))’

as the correct symbolization of the Macbeth example.

And

in the example where the cluster of leaves resembles a deer, we have
a situation in \diich a visual object, the deer, is identical to a

physical object, the cluster (see page 2?4 of Thomason’s paper).

And so ’(3 x)(S(x is a deer) & (Ey)(y is a cluster & x=y))’ is the
symbolization we are after.
There finally seems to be a worthwhile purpose served by
the presence in each situation of dual domains.

appeared a

I'Jhat

perhaps unnecessary complication in the system tums out in the end
A halluci-

to cleverly provide a means of capturing hallucinations.

nation does not emerge in the system as a world line (as for Hintikka)
but as an element in the visual domain of a single situation.
visual domain will then consist of three kinds of objects;
VThich satisfy an open foimiula of the form

’

S(Ex) (x=y)

’

,

The

Those

those (like

the deer) which satisfy ’(Ex)(x=y)’ but nothing of the form ’S(Ex)
(x=y)’, and those (hallucinations) which satisfy neither.

The latter

two kinds of visual objects seem to provide the handle we need to

talk about perceptual mistakes in T.
of
vail this suffice to give formal expression to every kind
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perceptual mistake an individual might commit?
that it does.

I am not convinced

Suppose that Smith is standing in front of Jones and

that Smith appears to Jones to have black teeth.

actuality Smith has very
licorice.

But suppose that in

teeth and only happens to be chewing on

vriiite

Can the sentence, "Smith seems to Jones to have black

teeth" be captured in T?

the presence of visual objects

IaRLII

enable us to talk about Smith’

s

mistaken perception?

The natural move might be to suppose that our visual domain

includes a character

v;e

might refer to as "Black Tooth Smith", an

individual just like Smith except for the color of his teeth.

We

can then perhaps s3nnbolize the sentence "Smith seems to Jones to

have black teeth" as ’(3x)(x=Black Tooth Smith & S(Bx) & (Ey)(y=
Smith & x=y))’.

But this surely won’t do if the Indiscernibility of

Identicals is to be preserved in

T,

for Smith cannot be identical to

something whose teeth are of different color from his own.

There

cannot be a member common to two domains in a world, it seems clear,

if it is supposed to have different properties in each domain.
For much the same reason Thomason’
settling.

leaves

—

s

deer example seems

Is the physical object in question

—

\in-

the cluster of

supposed to be identical to a visual object, a deer?

It’s

difficult to see in what sense the same object can be at the same time
a cluster of leaves and a deer.

identified with an apparent deer.
here?

If we

vrere able to

terms of the resources of

Perhaps, then, the cluster is to be

But what do we mean by "apparent"

supply a formal account of "apparent" in
T,

the problem of capturing cases of

first place.
mistaken perceptions would never have been a worry in the

6o

Perhaps the visual object in question is not the deer at all;

perhaps the cluster is both the physical and visual object.

There

seem to bo grounds for this interpretation on the basis of Thomason'

claim on page

that if

a visual object.

Then maybe to say that Jones sees that this object

is moving, all we need is

moving))'.

’a'

»0

names the cluster of leaves

'a'

names

x)(Ey)(x is a cluster & x=y & S(x is

But this is obviously too

vreak;

it tells us nothing about

the agent's mistaking the cluster for a deer.

It could just as easily

be true in a situation where the agent mistakes the cluster for a

misquito.

How can we express the deer's role in this example as the

apparent object?

We can of course reverse tactics and admit the diversity of
Smith and Black Tooth Smith (as well as the diversity of the cluster

and the deer).

We can imagine that

Black Tooth Smith is a member of

vrtaile

Ef”(a),

Smith is a member of D^(a),

and vjhile Smith and Black

Tooth Sinith share an almost uncanny resemblance, they are entirely

distinct

(V7e

can ever speculate that there may be a casual relation-

ship which holds between the two, but that sort of speculation goes

beyond the scope of anything the theory is able to handle).

Unfor-

tunately, this solution seems to reduce Black Tooth Smith to the

position of a hallucination, much like MacBeth's dagger.
longer be identified with some physical object.

He can no

We lose the dis-

tinction between mistaking a real thing for something it is not and
seeing something where there is nothing.

It would be nice to say in the Smith example we mistake something
for something else, that Black Tooth Smith can be identified

member of the physical domain

D*^(a).

\'n.th

a

But what exactly do we mean by

6l

"identified vdth"?

As

vre

have seen, the identity sign cannot be

used to identify physical with visual objects (in cases
like these).
But it*

s

hard to find any clear alternative sense of "identify

expressible in T that will solve these puzzles.

And so

vje

vrith"

tenta-

tively conclude that T is a system which, unlike Hintikka’s, is
incapable of accounting for certain types of mistaken perceptions.

Hallucinations work out beautifully in
Cases in

vrtiich

T,

but nothing else seems to.

a man mistakes one thing for another appears, on

IViomason’ s account, to create significant problems in the theory.

There seems to be no way to indicate in formal terms in vjhat

relation Smith stands to Black Tooth Smith or the cluster stands
to the deer.

Difficulties of this sort are not \mcommon in philosophical

theories of perception.

It is convenient to postulate sense-data in

an effort to explain the similarity involved in perceiving a real

thing and perceiving a hallucination.
arise

vrfien

But well-known difficulties

one tries to explain precisely the relation that obtains

between sense-data and real things.

It is not at all clear vjhat

relation obtains between a real bear and my sensation of the bear if
we construe the latter as a sense datum.
None of this is intended to suggest that there are inlierent

problems in the postulation of separate domains in each situation.
Nor is there any obvious problem in regarding these domains as intersecting; if Jones sees Smith as he really is, then the physical Smith

and the visual Smith are supposed to be the same, and that does not
seem unreasonable.

As we have already seen, the identity

botvreen members of D^(a) and D'^(a) shows that T, if it*s a sense-datum
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theory at all, is not a sense-datum theory in
the "strong sense".

vjhat

Thomason calls

Visual objects need not be two-dimensional

discs or wave-like images but may be (and usually are) physical
objects.

Though there are no obvious inherent problems

> 7ith

dual

domains, it does begin to look as though they are unnecessary com-

plications in the theory after all.

If the presence of visual domains

was able to account for mistaken perceptions in a system whose
compatibility relation is reflexive, then they would serve a useful
p\irpose.

If, however,

they accoimt for some cases of mistaken

perceptions and not others, then the virtue of their presence is
questionable.

A semantics for perception seems cumbersome enough

vdth perceptual world lines (members of m) and quantifiers
range over them.

I’jhich

Adding to this special visual domains seems to

create an \innecessary burden in the semantics.

Thomason does seem to suggest, however, another function which
visual objects are supposed to perform
we might call "accidental perceptions".

—

to gi\'B expression to ;diat

Suppose Socrates sees the

man in front of him who is his father, but his father is wearing a mask,
and hence Socrates does not see that the man he sees is his father.

When Socrates denies that he sees his father there is
Namely,
a sense in which what he says is true.
(6.9) -(3 x)S(b=x)
is true, v;here *b’ stands for ’Socrates’s Father’....
On the other hand there is also a sense in which vdiat
the sophist says is true when he claims that Socrates
does see his father;

is

Since we don’t

vjish to

say that Socrates both sees and does not

that we
see his father, we turn to the formal semantics and find

63

have the expressive resources to show that there is no contradiction.

And the sense in which Socrates does see his father is captured by
shovring that his father can be found in the visual domain of the

actual v7orld.

Thus, visual domains do perhaps play a necessary role

in the system.

They enable one to say that he sees an F but does

not see that it is an

F.

Nevertheless, even here visual domains seem dispensible.

This

weaker sense of seeing something is perfectly capable of being
expressed without appeal to visual domains.
as Hintikka’s distinction between

(b=x & Perceives(Ey) (x=y)

)

’

*

We need only lock as far

(3 x) (Perceives b=x)’ and

*

(

3 x)

to convince ourselves that perceptual

world lines are adequate to capture the distinction between the two
senses in which Socrates might be said to see his father.

In the

weaker of these senses there is a world line which, whatever else
it does, picks from the actual world (out of the one and only domain

it has) Socrates’s father.
sees someone

xdio

And this allows us to say that Socrates

turns out to be his father;

’(3 x)(b=x &S( (Ey) (x=y)

In this respect T is even better off than Hintikka’s system;
that is, perceptually quantified formulas which bind variables

occurring both within and without modal operators are much easier to
account for semantically in T.

The problem we face in Hintikka’s

semantics, we recall, involves the failure of the actual world to be

its own perceptual alternative, and consequently in many cases a

puzzle arises as to v^ich element in the actual world we attach the
chain.

Hintikka’s solution (find out

vjhat

caused our perception)

we found impossible to describe in the language of the formal
semantics.

But no such difficulty arises at all in

T.

If Socrates

)
’
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sees his father, his father is guaranteed to show up in the
actual

world.

And in general, v^enever we have to evaluate the truth-

conditions for a fonc\ila of the form
cedure is straightforward.

>

(5 x)(Ax & S(Bx))», the pro-

Formulas like

»

(3 x)(x is fat & S(x is

not fat))' are categorically false and no fuss need be made over them.

* * *

In this chapter I have discussed Thomason'

locution ''sees that".

s

semantics for the

Though his system bears considerable similarity

to Hintikka' s semantics for "perceives", there are considerable differ-

ences.

I have argued in some cases these differences represent

improvements over Hintikka'
culties in other respects.

s system,

but there are serious diffi-

There seems to be no way to symbolize

such sentences as "Smith seems to Jones to have black teeth"; there

seems to be no way to indicate formally the distinction between

visually perceiving that something is true and knowing that it is;
there are visual domains in each possible world which seem to serve
no useful purpose in the system; and there are constraints on the

behaviour of world lines (that they may not intersect) which seem

much too restrictive
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FOOTNOTES

’Perception and Individuation'

^Thoinason,

^Ibid .

,

,

p, 263 .

pp. 263 - 264 .

^For suppose 'S(A)’ is true in a situation vr. Then in every situation
w' compatible -with w, ’A’ is true.
But by transitivity ’A’ is also
true in every situation w" compatible -with any situation compatible with
But 'SS(A)' is true in w if and only if 'A' is true in every such
w.
w". Hence ’SS(A)' is true in w.

4

Thomason,

^bid

. ,

cit .

,

270- 271.

p. 272 .

^Nevertheless, the system Q3 presented by Ihomason in his paper 'Modal
Logic and Metaphysics' provides some clues along these lines.
There the restriction was present, of course, in formulas vjhere
variables occurring free id.thin and without the scope of the modal
operator were bound by '(Ex)'.
O

cit .

^Thomason,

,

p. 272.

%intikka, 'Semantics for Propositional Attitudes', pp. 101-102.
^^There is no indication that a similar condition is supposed to show up
in his semantics for perception; but I believe the same reasons v;hich
necessitated his adoption of the rule (C.Ind. = ), \^^Lthout which the
proof of (x) (y) (x=y^Knows(x=y) ) is impossible, likewise necessitate
the adoption of a rule which in effect would guarantee a no-splitting
condition for physically individuated world lines. For the reasons which
necessitated adopting (C.Inc.=), see the next chapter.
'

'

^^Thomason, Qq. cit .
^ ^Ibid
^

. ,

,

pp. 267 - 269 .

p. 275*

^Ibid ., p. 275, n. 19 .

are
^^Ihomason writes, "In interpreting S the modal operator
vn.th
just
not
seen,
is
what
with
compatible
considering situations
or
knows
agent
an
either
with
Compatibility
what is known" (p. 275).
related
situations
the
determines
thus
perceives
everything he visually
of
by R in T. Hence knowing p entails seeing that p in the sense
"sees that" Thomason is after.

can be avoided if Hintikka' s system lacked the so-called
"Restricted Range featxire" (which we discuss in Chapter Four).
Dropping this feature seems to be wh.-t Castaneda intended to
suggest in offering his War Hero example,

^^Thomason, Qp. cit, , p. 2?6.
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CHAPTER III
We have already alluded to Hintikka'

s

move in recent years to

incorporate into his model- theoretic semantics for knowledge a second
set of quantifiers

*

(jJ x)

«

and

‘

(

\/x)

'

In this chapter we shall

(i) Examine in some detail Hintikka’ s motivation for this change,

(ii) Discuss the nature of the expanded system (which we’ll call

KBC), and (iii) Point out a number of problems which beset KBC.

*

The matter of introducing additional quantifiers to Hintikka’

original semantics for epistemic logic (developed in Krov:ledge and

Belief ) has a rather unusual history.

A nov7- famous and somewhat

bizarre imaginary example offered by Castaneda figures prominently
in this history, and in the end it is precisely this bizarre example

which drives Hintikka to the expanded system.
way, I believe, to examine Hintikka’

s

There is thus no better

motivations for introducing

new quantifiers than by starting from the beginning and tracing the
history of the problem; doing this vdll prove valuable too in
understanding the roles of the new quantifiers in KBC.
I

Belief .

propose to begin by going all the way back to Knovdedge and
It is a well-known feature of Hintikka’

theoretic semantics for knowledge (KB) that
supposed to be a formal reading for

knows

’

s

original model set

(Ex)Ka(b=x)
v;ho

’

is

(or what) b is"

or "Someone (or something) is known by a to be identical to b".

How

the English locution "knows who" is notoriously vague and seems to

have a variety of uses in English.

One is therefore inclined to
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feel suspicious from the outset when it is proposed that "a knows

who b is" be unambiguously rendered by the single fornvila
(b=x)’ in the formal semantics.

*

(Ex)Ka

One wonders how a single formula

is supposed to capture at once all the ways in vdiich "knows who" is

employed in English.

Hintikka himself seems to anticipate this sort of reaction
arising among his readers.

Although he writes on page I3I (of

Knowledge and Belief ) that "knows who" is "easy to translate into
our symbolism", he admits later that
The criteria as to when
this or that man is are
knowing the name of the
sometimes it does not.
some sort is required.^

one may be said to knovr who
highly variable. Sometimes
person in question suffices;
Often "acquaintance" of

Here he agrees that necessary and sufficient conditions for truly
saying of a person that a knows

situation to situation.

xdio

he is do not remain constant from

We cannot offer an analysis of the locution

"knows who" which applies with complete generality to all our uses of
the expression.

Yet Hintikka goes on in the same passage to say,

"Our discussion is independent of this difficulty, however".

How he

came to this conclusion at the time I fail to understand, but his

addition of '(^x)’ and *(Vx)* to the system some years later is

testimony (for reasons we shall explain) that his position on the

matter has changed drastically.

The very difficulty he speaks of in

the passage above turns out in the end to necessitate significant

changes in his semantics for knowledge.

Perhaps Hintikka was unhappy with his uni vocal treatment of
"knows who" as early as I962 (when Knowledge and Belief first
appeared).

But it should be pointed out here that surely there

was never hope that Hintikka*

s

system would provide an exact parallel
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vdth the way in which English speakers use the word "knows".

never his project.

Such was

It was clear at the outset, for example, that de-

ductive closure characterized KB.

Thus the English "Jones knows p but

not ((((p V (q & p)) & (P V q)) v (r & (p v q)))" has no consistent
form\ilation in KB even though the corresponding English sentence is

perfectly consistent.

In Castaneda'

s

1964 review of Knowledge and Belief in the Journal

of Symbolic Logic the point is made that formxilas of the form
(a=x)'

(a's knowing

>dio

a is) are

'

(Ex)Ka

particularly troublesome in terms of

symbolizing the English locution "knows

-vdio".

In Hintikka' s epistemic system there just seems to be no way of
consistently formulating, e.£., the contingent statement
(A) There is a person x such that a knows that a=x but does
not know that he himself = x.
In the reviewer' s opinion the way of dealing with the logic of
self-knowledge is by means of a special descriptor operator
" 0 " such that if a is an individual
sign with no occurrences of
"d", then "da" is an individual sign.
The desired interpretation
is shown by symbolizing (A) as (Ex) (Ka(x=a) & -Ka(x=da) )' .2
'

Castaneda argues here that

'

(Ex)Ka(a=x)

'

looks as though it is supposed

to symbolize two non-equivalent English sentences, "£ knows who a is"

and

knows that he himself is a".

But,

if so, then there is no

conceivable way of rendering sentence (A) consistently in the formal
Hence Hintikka'

language.

s

system is inadequate as it stands.

Curiously, Castaneda does not conclude from this inadequacy in

Hintikka'

s

system that there is anything inherently problematic about

Hintikka'

s

treatment of "knows who".

He suggests remedying the problem

by introducing to the language of Hintikka'

s

system an (apparently primi-

tive) operator "d" to formally disting\iish between the two sorts of self-

reference at issue.

Castaneda himself finds this particular remedy in-

effective in a later paper, ^ but what's important to note here is his acceptance of the open sentence schema
uses of "knows

"idio".

'

(Ex)Ka(x=y)

'

as properly capturing all

For Castaneda it was just a question of distinguishing
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between

’

(Ex)Ka(a=x)

’

and

'

(Ex)Ka(cr a=x)

'

At any rate, the apparent failure of KB to provide a consistent
symbolization of (A)

-vjithout

recourse to enriching the language

seemed to be a significant criticism of the system.

1966 paper,

*

Hintikka*

s

"Knowing Onesself" and Other Problems in Epistemic

Logic’, is a reply to this and other criticisms of KB raised by

Castaneda in his review.

As far as the present difficulty is

concerned Hintikka had this to say:

Intuitively
cation from
knowing who
himself" is
an implicit

speaking, it might seen that an impli"a’
knowing something about a vihile
a is" to "a* s knovdng something about

not unproblematic in that it is based upon
assumption. If the assumption is made explicit, however, it is easy to see that it is in fact
satisfied. VJhat one has to assume is, loosely speaking,
that if someone knov;s who a. is, and if he is in fact
himself a, then he knows that he himself is a. This
it seems to me is surely the case.... That there is some
confusion in Castaneda is shown by his comment that
in my system "there just seems to be no vray of consistently formulating, £•£•» the contingent statement
(A)...." On the interpretation I have argued for, however, (A) is clearly inconsistent (indefensible).
Since the bound variable x occurs in (A) vrithin the
scope of the epistemic operator "Ka", it has to range
over such individuals only as are known to the referent
knox-m not merely in the sense that he knows
of a’
that they exist but also in the stronger sense that
their identity is known to him. But if the person in
question knows that a refers to one definite individual
of this sort, and if this individual is in fact himself,
how can he possibly fail to know that ’a’ in fact refers
Thus (a) is intuitively inconsistent, and
to himself?
this fact is reflected by its being inconsistent on the
assumptions vrhich are made in Knowledge and Belief .
’

—

Here Hintikka replies to Castaneda’s objection by (i) Admitting
that (A) can be symbolized in KB only by an indefensible formula, and
to
(ii) Arguing that (A) is intuitively inconsistent and hence ought

be symbolized only by means of an indefensible formula.

Thus

knows who a is" and "a knows that he himself is a" are both
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symbolized

’

(Ex)Ka(a-x)

’

,

and this is as it ought to be.

Neither

sentence can be true while the other is false; they are intuitively
eq\ii valent.

Castaneda replied to this in his I 967 paper, »0n the Logic of
Self-Knowledge’.

Taking issue to Hintikka'

s

claim that (A) is in-

tuitively inconsistent, he sets out here to produce a possible state
of affairs in which an agent a knows who a is and also

himself is but fails to know that he himself is

knovrs vjho he

And so we have

the famous War Hero example;

Suppose that X is brought unconscious to a certain
military tent; that on gaining consciousness X suffers from amnesia and during the next months becomes
a war hero and gets lost in combat and forgets the
military chapter of his life, and that later X
studies all the accounts of the war hero and discovers that the hero was,
only one in the
war vrounded 100 times. For many normal situations,
£•£•1 passing a history examination, X knovjs who the
hero was. In many such situations "There exists a
man knovm to the war hero vrounded 100 times such
that the war hero wounded 100 times knovrs that such
a man is identical vrith the war hero wounded 100
times" is true. Yet in all such situations X may
fail to know that he himself is the vrar hero wounded
100 times.

In a later paper Castaneda refers to the imaginary war hero as
"Quintus" and adds that

Quintus studies all accounts of the war hero and discovers that he (the hero) vras the only one wounded
Qviintus becomes fascinated by the hero’s
100 times.
accomplishments and comes to vrrite the most author itative biography of the hero. . Clearly, for most
normal situations, regardless of shifts in the criteria for identifying a person, Quintus knows vjho
the hero v;as much better than most people, even
though Quintus does not know that he himself is the
war hero.^
The point Castaneda makes here is very simple.

for ’the war hero wounded 100 times’.

We let

’h’

be short

Then although "h knovjs who h
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is" and "h knows who he himself is" are both true, it»s false
that

h knows that he himself is h.

Thus, the sentence "There is a person

X such that h knows that h=x but he does not know that he himself
=x" is true.

Therefore,

sentences having the same form as (A)

should not be treated as uniformly inconsistent, and so KB is incapable of properly handling sentences having the same form as (A).

At the root of the problem, of course, is Hintikka’

ment of "knows

vrfio"

s

uni vocal treat-

contexts.

Realizing that Castaneda’s War Hero example refutes his claims

in '"Knowing Onesself" and Other Problems in Epistemic Logic' and
that his univocal treatment of "knows who" is indeed at the root of
the problem, Hintikka reverses tactics.

In his I967 paper

'Individuals, Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic' Hintikka admits

that
(1)

h knows who h is, and

(2)

h knows that he himself is h

require translations different from one another in the formal language after all.
(3)

He doesn't discuss the sentence

h knows who he himself is,

but clearly its translation can be derived from that given for (2).

What he proposes is the following.

Continue to translate

sentence (1) as
(4)

(Ex)Kh(h=x).

But now translate (2) as
(5)

(Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x)),

and presumably (3) will be ambiguous between (5)
(6)

(Ex) (h=x & Kh(x=x)

).
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The first thing to notice here is that in
KB (4) and (5) are

virtually equivalent.

This is shown as follows:

(a)

(Ex)Kh(h=x)

(b)

-(Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x))

w

\
^

4.

Redog

W
>

(c)

(x)(h^x V -Kh(h=x))

6

(d)

h^h V -Kh(h=h)

6 w

(e)

-Kh(h=h)

4

(f)

Ph(h/h)

4 W

(e).(C.-K)

(g)

h?^h

4 W*

(h)

h=h

4 W*

(f),(C.P*), for some
compatible w*
(C.Self.=)

(a)

(Ex)(h=x & Kh(h=x))

4.

(b)

-(Ex)Kh(h=x)

4 wy

(c)

h=b & Kh(h=b)

<4

(d)

(Ex)Kh(b=x)

4

(e)

(x)-Kh(h=x)

4 W

(f)

-Kh(h=b)

«

(g)

Kh(h=b)

e w

W

W

(b),(C.-E),(C.-&)
(a),(c).(l09)

(d),(C.Self.^)

W^
Redog

W^

W
w

(a),(108), for some

(b).(C.-E)

(d),(e),(109)
(c), simp.

Now since Castaneda has demonstrated that (1) and (2) are not
equivalent, certain changes need to be made in the rules of KB to

prevent the inference from (4) to (5). and vice versa .

Hintikka

recognizes this need but fails to indicate anyvjhere the specific
changes that must be implemented to block these inferences and still

make reasonable sense.
It seems to me that the req\iired changes can be made most

straightforwardly by a revision of (10 8) and (109) to:
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(108*)

If (Ex)p’ & w and x occurs free only within
the
scope of a single epistemic operator Kb or
Pb,
then for at least one free individual symbol
*a'
we have «p(a/x)'<& w and (Sx)Kb(a=x)
w; if x
occurs free both within and without the scope of
a single epistemic operator Kb or Pb, then we
have «p(a/x)»^ w and «(Ex)(a=x & Kb(a=x) )
w.
»

’

'

(109*)

If »(x)p» wand X occurs free only within the
scope of a single epistemic operator Kb or Pb,
then for at least one free individual 'a*, if
(Ex)Kb(a=x) ’<£ w, then ’p(a/x)’t w; if x occ\ars
free both vjithin and -without the scope of a
single epistemic operator Kb or Pb, then if ’(Ex)
(a=x & Kb(a=x))’<i w, then ’p(a/x)’<E: w.
’

Having admitted for the first time that (1) and (2) require
different formal treatments, Hintikka in ’Individuals, Possible
Worlds, and Epistemic Logic’ argues that his change in strategy is

necessitated only by Castaneda’s employing queer standards in using
"knows

vrfio"

the way he does.

The standards of kno-vdng who presupposed by Casaneda
are such that although h knows who h is, he cannot
point to anyone and say: "That man is h" or even get
hold of h in other v;ays. This is precisely what is
queer about these standards. .. .Castaneda is presupposing a standard of knowing who on which one can
know who h is vdthout being able to locate him in
the actual world. A standard of this kind is logically
possible to have. I'ihether such kind of ’knovdng who’
deserves to be called by this name is to my mind very
dubious.*^

It appears that Hintikka wishes to distinguish here between at least
two standards (as he calls them) of knowing

xdao.

A man can know who

h is and be able to locate him in the actual world, or a man can

know

-vdio

h is and not be able to locate him in the actual world.

What it means to "locate h in the actual vrarld" is not clear, but
we can follow Sleigh’s lead and refer to the distinction as

between h's being "known strictly" versus h’s being "known weakly".

8

To say that h knows who h is -without being able to locate h in
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the actual world, Hintikka feels, one is presupposing a standard
of

knowing
who*.

vrfio

>Mch

»'is

queer" and hardly deserving of the title ’knovdng

He therefore seems to regard the truth of (1) in Castaneda’s

example as based on some sort of less than standard use of English.

If we admit this usage of "knows who", then certainly distinct
translations of (1) and (2) must be given, and the rxiles of KB must
be changed accordingly.

As far as standard usage is concerned

(the implication seems to be) KB

vras

right all along, but to accom-

modate non-standard usage certain changes must be made.

It is ironic that Hintikka himself makes use of the expression
"knows who" in this same weak sense.

On page 148 of Knowledg;e and

Belief he speaks of our kno^ding who the teacher of Antisthenes is.

And on page 132 we are asked to consider the sentence "a

knovjs who

killed Toto", where the reference is to Toto de Brunei, a character of the auther Lawrence Durrell.

Both characters, it seems

clear, would be impossible to track doi-m in the actual v;orld.

Each could at best be known weakly by an agent.

And so it hardly

seems fair to accuse Castaneda of presupposing a standard of "knows

who"

vrfiich

is "queer" and hardly deserving of the name.

Castaneda’s I 968 paper ’On the Logic of Attributions of Self-

Knowledge to Others’ is both a reply to Hintikka’

s

’Individuals,

Possible Worlds, and Epistemic Logic’ and a discussion of his rather

involved theory of indicators alluded to earlier (see footnote!).
In those parts of his paper relevant to his dispute

vrith

Hintikka he

elaborates further upon his War Hero example and discusses a number

of complexities in self- reference brought out by the example.

He seems to welcome Hintikka’

s

abandonment of a uni vocal translation
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(1) 3.nd (2) but objscts to Hintilcka* s solution on othsr grounds*

Consider:
(7)

a knows that b knows that c knows that he himself is F

and suppose that "he himself" refers to a.

According to Hintikka*

new system IPE (7) is rendered
(8)

(Ex)(a=x & KaKbKc(Fx)).

But if (8) belongs to a model set
(9)

(10)

then so do both

a=h & KaKbKc(Fh), and

(Ex)(h=x & KaKbKc(h=x))

for at least one constant 'h*.
(11)

vi,

But (7) can be true even ^dien

a knows that b knows that c knows that h is F is false

for every constant term 'h’ in the language.

simply because there is no particular way

common of referring to a.

a,

It may be false
b,

and c share in

So since (7) does not imply (11) it ought

not be the case that (8) virtually imply both (9) and (10) in IPE;

hence it looks like there are serious difficulties with IPE,

This brings us to the final stage in the controversy,
Hintikka’

s

response to Castaneda in his 1970 paper ’On Attributions of

Self-Knowledge’.

Regarding Castaneda’s allegation that (8) virtually

implies (9) and (10) in IPE Hintikka writes:

According to my rule (C,E.), ’(Ex)f’ can be present in
only if, for some individual constant a,
a model set
Therefore (by Castaneda’s argument),
’f(a/x)’ is in X
for some a the presence of ’(Ex)f’ in entails the
.
This is an inference from
presence of ’f(a/x)’ in
a statement of the form P'-^(Ex)q(x) to a statement of
r representing some
the form (Ex) (p-»o(x) ^d.th
sort of entailment. It is clearly fallacious. .. .It is
a while since I have seen a competent philosopher being
taken in by the old operator- switch sviindlc as neatly
as Castaneda.
'

77

According

t.o

Hintikka.*

Castaneda is mistaken to have supposed that

the presence of (8) in a model set necessitates the presence
of (9)

and (lO) in the same set.

The relevant quantifier rule (see our

(108*)) tells us that if (8) is a member of w, then for at least one

free individual symbol
to w.

—

in this case

»h»

—

(9) and (10) belong

It does not tell us that for at least one free individual

symbol »h‘, if (8) belongs to w then so do both (9) and (10).

presumably, Castaneda’

so,

s

And

argument turns on a scope ambiguity,

and (8) does not virtually imply (9) and (10).
VAiat

that

’

’

is of interest here, I believe, is Hintikka’

represents "some sort of entailment".

s

warning

For consider;

(a)

If (8) is a member of w then for at least one free
individual symbol ’h’, (9) and (10) belong to v;

(b)

For at least one free individual symbol ’h’, if (8)
is a member of u , then (9) and (10) belong to w

.

Here we let the underlined portion in each case indicate what
Hintikka’

s "p"

stands for.

Clearly there is no problem inferring (b)

from (a) if what the "If . . .then.
implication (the symbol

’h’

.

."

represents here is material

never occurs in (8)

We can agree, however, that if the "If . . .then.

.

ajnd

."

hence not in p).

represents some

me ta- theoretic entailment, then the inference from (a) to (b) is not
clearly legitimate.

It is to Hintikka’

explain more fully exactly

vriiat’s

s

discredit that he does not

wrong with the fallacious inference

and the nature of the entailment in question, but

v;e

can grant him

the point.

What I fail to see, though, is the relevance of Hintikka’
objection.
(b).

Suppose that Castaneda may not make the move from (a) to

Cannot Castaneda’s point be cast in terms which bypass this

restriction?

Suppose once again that (?) is true.

formal translation of (7)»

Then we let the

(8), belong to the actual world w.

If (8) belongs to w, however, then by (a) we have
For at least one free individual symbol ‘h», (9) and
(10) belong to w.

(c)

But isn*t this the very difficulty cited earlier, since if (c) is
true it follows that

Agents

(d)

b,

and c share a common way of referring to al

As we've stated the argument there is no appeal to (b) either
explicitly or implicitly; the point Castaneda makes simply does
not depend upon the move from (a) to (b).

Hintikka's argument seems

to be beside the point, and the serious difficulty Castaneda has
\incovered remains.

Be this as it may, Hintikka (in this same paper) nevertheless

rejects his proposal to translate (2) as (5) and to make a formal

distinction between (4) and (5).

He doesn't explain this decision,

except to say that an attempt to distinguish formulas like these
(which are virtually equivalent in KB) "is doomed to remain fruitInstead, Hintikka is now ready to propose a far grander

less".^^

scheme for giving (1) and (2) separate formal readings.

We now move to the major area of concern in this chapter,
Hintikka'

s

proposal to introduce a second pair of quantifiers to his

semantics for Icnowledge to obtain the expanded system KBC.

we have seen that on account of Castaneda'

s

So far

War Hero example Hintikka

has become convinced that (1) and (2) ought to receive non-equivalent
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formal rsadings*

Hintikka*

s

reaction to Castanedia’

s

exampXe ranges

from calling it "ingenious" in ’Objects of Knovjledge and Belief’
(p»

880) to "so artificial as to sound like the parody of a philosophical

example" in ’On Attributions of Self-Knovrledge

’

(p. 76).

But it is

clear that the example has had a monumental impact on Hintikka’

approach to formalizing a semantics for knovjledge.
The solution to the problem of formally rendering (1) and (2),

as Hintikka now proposes, goes in the following

vxay;

It seems to me that the key to Castaneda’ s interesting example is that in translating (1) and in
translating (2) we have to use different quantifiers.
To mark this formally, let me use the quantifiers
(Ex), (Ux) in the intended translation (4) of (1),
and let me use the other kinds of quantifiers
say (3 x), (V x)
in the translation

—

—

(?) (3x)Kh(h=x)
or, possibly
(8)

of

(3 x)(h=x & Kh(h=x))
(2).ll

Consider once again the

V/ar

Hero.

We can agree that h (the War Hero)

does indeed know who h is, but there are certain things h cannot

know about the

V/ar

Hero.

h cannot knovj very much about the hero’s physical
appearance; for othei*wise he vjould recognize himself as the hero, amnesia or no amnesia. .. .VJhen
confronted vdth the question: v;ho is h? he will
experience a peculiar embarrassment. He cannot
tell vjhere h is now, nor give the questioner any
other recipe that would show hovj to get in touch
He cannot place the hero into any
vjith the hero.
cognitive Lebensvjelt of his ovm, nor can he help
anyone else to place the hero into his sphere of
personal acquaintance. Considerations of this
kind easily lead us to acknovjledge a sense of
"knovjing vjho" in vjhich it is false to say in
Castaneda’s example that h knovjs who the hero (=h)
is.... In this sense a. knox'js vjho b is if and only
if a can place b vjithin the range of his personal
cognitive experience, in other vjords, if he is
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(in a sense of the vrord devoid of social overtones)
acquainted \rith

We have therefore

Taken in one sense

(

tvro

sense of "knovrs vjho" to distinguish.

1 ) is true; h knows who h (the subject of his

extensive biography) is.

But in another sense, Hintikka urges,

(

1)

is false; h cannot place the hero into the range of his ovm "personal
cognitive experience".

For purposes of convenience let us distinguish

these two English senses by subscripts.

'We

shall say that "h knows

whoQ_ h is"

is true in Castaneda’s example while "h knovrs \fa02 h is"

is not.^^

Clearly

vre

are in no position to offer criteria for

distinguishing these two senses, but we shall nevertheless recognize
that a distinction is being made and hope to become clearer on what

Hintikka has in mind in what follovzs.
Regarding "knovjs vrho2" Hintikka writes:
The second sense of "knot-ring who" is precisely
the sense expressions of the form C (3 x)Kh(h=x) 7
have vThen the quantifier ’(^x)’ is based on those
methods of cross-identification which turn on the
knower’ s personal cognitive situation. .. .In analogy
to Russell’s "knowledge by acquaintance" vre might
speak here of "individuation by acquaintance".-^^
’

And

so,

’J

as in the case of perception, Hintikka urges that there are

two methods used by people to individuate objects from world to

world in those vrorlds compatible with everything they know.

And

corresponding to these two methods of cross-identification there are
two sets of quantifiers.

One set ranges over world-lines determined

deby one of these methods, and the other ranges over world- lines

termined by the other method.

Variables bound by ’(Ex)’ and ’(x)’

bound by
range over individuals known^ by the agent, and variables
'(3 x)’ and ’(Vx)’ range over individuals knovm2
(17)

h knows whoj^ h is

t>y

the agent. ^ Thus,
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is symbolized as (4), and
(18)

h knows

h is

is symbolized as
(19)

(5x)Kh(h=x).

There is, however, still a crucial question remaining to be
ansT-rered,

Hintikka has argued that (1) is ambiguous between (1?)

and (18) but that in Castaneda's story (1) is to be read as (1?).

Hence (4) is that proper formal reading of (1) as far as the story is
concerned.

Now it would be nice to say that (19) is the proper formal

reading of (2).

But so far nothing has been said regarding how

Hintikka' s new concept of cross-identification by acquaintance bears

upon the case of the War Hero.

To explain the connection Hintikka

writes.
...Each use of the first-person pronoun "I" get its
v;hich for
reference from the context of utterance
the speaker normally is part of his immediate cognitive environment. Thus, by the same token, the
reference of any occurrence of "he himself" is determined by means of the personal cognitive situation
in terms of the frame of
of the person in question
first hand acquaintance
by
his
constituted
reference
etc.
Thus when "he himself"
of persons, things, places,
is identified ^/dth someone (presupposing that the
phrase is used in the way under consideration), the
identification usually makes no sense unless his
personal frame of reference is relied on. But this
means that-3 and V are to be used rather than E and
U, yielding precisely the translation L( 19^ for (2).

—

—

And so everything is as it should be.
translates as (19) •

The War Hero knows

doesn't knov; vjho2 the War Hero is.
false.

Castaneda'

s

(1) translates as (4) and (2)
vjho^^

the War Hero is but

Hence (4) is true and (19)

problem has been solved, but the solution has

required nothing short of a major overhaul of Hintikka'
There is an interesting sidelight to Hintikka'

s

s

semantics.

solution.

We
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recall that Hintikka understands the sentence

'

(5

x) (Perceives b=x)'

to capture the English direct-object construction "Jones
perceives
b" in his semantics for perception.

Likewise he now urges that a

formula such as
(20)

O x)Ka(b=x)

can be xinder stood to capture "approximately" the English direct-

object sentence "a knows b".

Thus we shall understand "a knows who2

b is" and "a knows b" as having approximately the same force.

Again,

as in the case of perception, Hintikka distinguishes here betvjeen

two types of direct-object constructions.

A man a can know b in

the sense indicated by (20) (Hintikka calls this

a» s

knowing b

"knov/ingly" ) , or a can merely know the individual who is in fact b.

This weaker sense is captured by the form\ila
(21)

(^ x) (b=x & Ka(x=x)

)

Presumably, the War Hero knows the War Hero in the weaker, but not
the stronger, of these sense (that is, although (19) is false,

'(3 x)(h=x & Kh(x=x))' is not).
Let us now press forward and try to become a little bit clearer
as to the nature of the two types of quantifiers and the world-

lines over which they range.

Unfortunately, even Hintikka admits

that the distinction between knov/ing who^^ and knowing who£ cannot
be made perfectly clear.

17

In a number of different places’

he

concedes that distinguishing one method of cross-identification from

another in the case of knowledge is less clear than in the case of
perception.

What can be said about the distinction between known^^ and
known2 individuals?

Suppose we begin by cataloguing everything
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Hintikka says about knovdng who^ in order to
focus in a bit more on
vrfiat

he has in mind,

b is known^ by a just in case;
(i) a can place b in a cognitive LebensT^jelt of his
(P. 79);

(ii)

a.
can place b vn.thin the range of his personal cognitive
experience (p. 79);

^ is acquainted with b

(in a sense of the vrord devoid

of social overtones) (p. 79);
(iv) The reference of 'b* is determined by means of the
personal cognitive situation of a (p. 82);
(v) The reference of *b' is determined

by
s firsthand
acquaintance of persons, things, places, etc. (p, 81).

It

vjill at the same time be

helpful for our purposes to notice

Hintikka has to say about knovring

vrtiat

who^^.

In our bookish and public ciilture, "knovdng vrfio"
is likely to be interpreted in terms that are independent of the history and situation of the
particular person or persons in question.
The V7ar Hero knovrs vAlo^ the V/ar Hero is solely through books, old

newspaper accounts,

v;ar

documents, and the like, and not through

anything he can remember personally vdtnessing.
On the basis of all of this it seems that vAiile Hintikka'

distinction may be impossible to specify in a general form, there are
some instances of

"knox^rs

who" that are reasonably easy to identify

vis -a- vis the distinction.

knows

vjho-j_

It's reasonably clear, for example, that

is the sense in wiiich

or the Prime Minister is.

x-ze

know who Thomas Edison, Moses,

And in the sentence, "Jones knows who

the girl sitting on his lap is", there is little doubt that a

firsthand acquaintance has developed between Jones and the girl and
that knows who£ is the sense in

x<7hich

Jones knows who the girl is.
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In probably the majority of cases, however, it’s a toss-up
to determine which sense of "knows who" is being employed, given
what

Hintikka has said.

I

know who the Mayor is, but even though most of

my knowledge of the Mayor is based on nevjspaper, television, and
general here say, I have actually seen him in person.

Perhaps I

have seen him (from a distance) crown the winning contestant at a

beauty pageant.

Does this count as first-hand acquaintance?

Can

I place the Mayor vri.thin the range of my "personal cognitive experience"?

There seems to be no clear g'uidelines to decide.

It does seem safe to say, on the other hand, that known]_ and

known^ individuals stand in no subset/ superset relationship.
Castaneda’s example h is known to h; that is,
2

’h’

In

picks out a vjorld-

line in such a way that makes (4) true and (19 ) false.

It seems too

as though the opposite can take place, as in the case perhaps of a

man who rides the same bus every morning >dth a but
never spoken.

>jith

whom a has

Although a knows next to nothing about the man, there

is a sense in xdiich a does know
seem to be Hintikka'

s

knowing

vriio

the man is.

This sense would

vdio^*

Another safe assumption to make concerning the distinction is
that formulas of the form
(22)

(Ex)(3 y)Ka(b=x & x=y)

ought to be defensible in KBC.
as though it

allovj^s

That is, Hintikka'

s

for a common ground between that

knovm]_ and known 2 8y an agent.

distinction looks
vrfiich

is

If I were a personal friend of the

Mayor I might knov: who^ he is on the basis of this friendship, but I
might still know whoi he is on the basis of reading newspaper
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articles.

Thus Hintikka’

s

distinction may not be mutually exclusive.

Conceivably an individual b can be both known^^ to a and known^
to a
at the same time.

World- lines formed by different criteria of

cross-identification vjould turn out to coincide in such a case.
^3-ct,

it is tempting to suppose that ’’sudden recognition”

often consists in vrorld-lines established by different critera.a
suddenly coming together and forming a single vrorld-line.

might discover that the man

vjho

Our man a

rides his bus every morning is the

General Manager of the hometown baseball team.

Up until now the

General Manager has been known^ by a and the man at the busstop has

been knoxm^ by
Manager.

a,

but

_a

failed to know that the man

s

the General

Hence the respective world-lines vintil now diverged and

only happened to intersect in the actual world.
_a*

v;as

But by virtue of

discovery it woiild seem as though '(Ex)C3 y)Ka(x=the General

Manager & y=the man at the busstop & x=y)' is

nov:

true.

This same

sort of phenomenon is noted by both Hintikka and Thomason in the
case of perception.

rigid world-line

A perceptual world-line often turns into a

^dien

the agent suddenly recognizes (perceptually)

something he*s been perceiving, and this yields something of the form

'(Ex)(^ y) (Perceives(b=x & x=y))'.
Like Hintikka’

feature.

s

earlier systems, KBC has a restricted range

In KB variables within the scope of

’Ka’

and bound from

the outside by ’(Ex)’ or ’(x)’ range over rigid world lines viiich

pick up individual sj_ in the actual world only if a knovjs
they are.

Speaking loosely,

xje

xdio

or what

might say that the quantifiers range

over individuals only if they are known by a*

Mow having distinguished

formally two senses of knowing who and two sorts of quantifiers
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corresponding to these two sense, it turns out that in KBC
restricted
range is a double-barrelled feature.
range over individuals knovm^ by

a,

Whle the standard quantifiers

»Ox)‘

and •(V'x)* range over

individuals knovm^ by a.
Rules governing the new quantifiers are not stated by Hintikka,

but for the most part there would seem to be nothing difficult in
offering them.

Suppose that

«b«

is a free individual symbol, and

suppose that »p» contains exactly one occurrence of *Ka'

VTill be the

(3 x)r>(x)
^ w
(3 x)Ka(b=x) C. w
p(b/x)
6 W

(1093)

desired quantifier rules.

Ptules

.

Then

(Vx)p(x)
(^x)Ka(b=x)
p(b/x)

e.

w

6:

w
w

for more complicated

constructions can easily be formulated on the basis of general

guidelines found in Hintikka’

s

paper ’Existential and Uniqueness

Presuppositions’

Hintikka is also not clear as to whether it is supposed to be
the case that if an individual b is known^ by

b exists?

a,

it follovrs that

This is a question of considerable interest; ought we

adopt a rule
(C.3 K=)

(3 x)Ka(b=x)
(Ex)(b=x)

in KBC?

6 w
e.
w

Again, Hintikka offers no advice here; he has, of course,

repeatedly chosen to reject the corresponding rule (C.EK=) for
ordinary quantifiers.

But there seem to be good grounds to accept

(C.3 K=) even if (C.EK=) is not accepted.

Though Hintikka never explains precisely why he dropped
(C.EX=) from his oidginal system KB, evidence suggests that the major

reason

vi&s

his desire to consistently symbolize such sentences as "a
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knows who murdered Toto de Brunei" and "a knows who puts toys
in
children's stockings".
the move from

»

In his semantics for perception, for example,

(Ex) (Perceives b=x)»

to »(Ex)(b=x)' is ruled out pre-

cisely to allow one to say that Jones perceives

implying that b exists.
seems different.

vjho

b is without

With (C.3K=), however, the situation

It's extremely hard to imagine how something non-

existent could be knovm^ by an agent; how could a "firsthand acquaintance" be the basis for

fails to exist?

something is if it

a' s knovriing vriio

V7e'll leave open the question whether KBC has the

rule (C.3 K=) since Hintikka has said nothing on the subject; v/e'll

assume only that (C.EK=) does not seem to be a rule Hintikka accepts.

But (C.3 K=) certainly does seem reasonable.
We have already made mention of Hintikka'

s

rule (C.Ind. = )

in connection vdth Thomason's semantics for 'sees that'.

There we

identified it as a no- splitting condition for -vrorld-lines over which
variables bound by '(Ex)' and '(x)' range.
(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))
(Ex)(c=x 8c Ka(c=x))
b^C
Ka(b=c)

(C.Ind.=)

If *b' and

'c'

It goes as follows;
^
^

w
w

«£:

w

e

w.

pick out world-lines over which variables bound

by '(Ex)' range, and if these world- lines intersect in the actual
world, then they must intersect everyvjhere.

Hintikka'

s

original semantics for knowledge failed to have a no-

splitting condition such as (C.Ind. = ), but it was shovm by Sleigh in

his 1967 paper 'On Quantifying Into Epistemic Contexts' that the
absence of a no-splitting condition created significant problems in KB.

There we are asked to consider:
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(a)

Everj*-one

(b)

Everyone is known by a to be F

(c)

There is someone known to a v/hom a does not know
to be F

(d)

(x)KaFx

(e)

(x)(Ey)(x=y & KaFy)

(f)

(Ex)-KaFx.

known to a is known by a to be F

Here (a)-(c) are the English readings for (d)-(f), respectively.
Therefore we would expect that since (b) implies (a), (e) should

imply (d); and since (b) and (c) are inconsistent, we should expect
that (e) and (f) are mutually indefensible.

However, without (C,Ind,=)

or something equivalent it cannot be proven in KB that (e) implies (d)
or that (e) and (f) are mutually indefensible.

Therefore, it is

absolutely essential that (C,Ind,=) or something equivalent be made
a rule; realizing this, Hintikka employed (C,Ind,=) in his I967

revised system IPE,

Interestingly, there is no similar argument to

show that the comparable no-merging condition:
(Ex(b=x & Ka(b=x))
(Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x))

e

c

£

Ka(b^c)

needs to be a rule in Hintikka'

£
s

w
w
W
W

system, and consequently it is

never adopted.
Where does this leave KBC on the question of splitting and
merging?

Unfortunately, there is very little to go on here; nothing

is clearly spelled out in papers written since adopting KBC,

In

'Ihe Semantics of Modal Notions and the Indeterminacy of Ontology', for

example, he writes that a no-splitting condition is a limitation which

"seems in order", but ho fails to specify wiiich kind of world- lines
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he has in mind.

And in ’Objects of Knowledge and Belief’ he remarks

that we have '’tacitely presupposed” that world- lines do not
split,

but there is no clear indication whether he has presupposed nosplitting relative to both kinds of quantifiers or to one.

These

passages suggest that KBC has either (C.Ind.=) or

(C.Ind.9

(^x)(b=x & Ka(b=x))

)

(3 x)(c=x & Ka(c=x))
b=c
Ka(b=c)

e

w

w
w
w,

but it’s not clear that KBC has both.
More important than the question whether Hintikka actually

intends to employ these rules in KBC is the question whether he
to.

oun;ht

In the final section of this chapter I argue that by a modified

version of Sleigh’s argument it is necessary for Hintikka to
accept both rules.

Failure to do so will result in the failvire to

capture certain vital inferences in KBC.
Before moving on, it is worth pointing out that there is a
fiirther

—

and more interesting

—

reason why (C.Ind.=) should have

20

been employed in KB.

According to Hintikka, quantifiers in KB

which bind variables occurring free in epistemic contexts range over
vrfaat

he calls "genuine individuals".

Using terminology we developed

in Chapter One, we can say that an individual^ b is a "genuine
individual", as Hintikka uses the term, just in case there is an x
such that X is an individual^^ and x is the value of b at every world.

In other words, an individual^ is genuine just in case it’s a constant
function

Now consider ’(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))’ and ’(Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x))’.

In each formula

’x’

occurs vithin the scope of an epistemic operator
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and is bound by »(Ex)» from the outside.

Therefore, the first formula

asserts that b is a genuine individual, and the second that
genuine individual.

Thus,

defined over worlds.
•b=c’6 w, i«e.

,

’b»

and

’

c‘

c is a

each denote a constant function

And so if we suppose in addition the condition

that ’b’ and ’c’ happen to assign to w the same

individual^, it follows from everything we have said that »Ka(b=c)»6
w
is true.

Constant functions sharing the same value somev/here share

the same value everyvrfiere.

notion of Hintikka’
'Ka(b=c)’fe

vr

s

"genuine individuals", we should be able to prove

given that

that ’b=c*€:w.

Therefore, if we take seriously the

'b’

and

’

c’

denote genuine individuals and

Without something like (C.Ind. = ), hovjever, this

cannot be done.

We might put this argument as follows.
possible worlds interpretation

Choose an intended

for Hintikka’

D,W,

system in

s

such a way that ’(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))’ is true in a world

if

w<-

and only if there is some element d6 D such that in every world
such that Rvm’ the term 'b' designates d in w’

Ka(b=x))

every world

in KB.

w€r

W relative

Then ’((Ex)(b=x &

.

& (Ex)(c=x & Ka(c=x)) & b=c)-^ Ka(b=c)

w’

vri.ll

’

be true in

even vAaen it cannot be proven

to <^D,W,

And so the rules of KB are not povjerful enough to prove for-

mulas true in every world in the intended model.
course, is that (relative to <^D,W,

R^

)

if both

denote the same element in every compatible

The idea, of
’b’

v/orld,

and

*

each

then if ’b=c'

is true in any world it’s true in every compatible world.

*

’c’
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In this section

v/e

consider difficulties which beset Hintikka*

s

expanded system KBC.

KBC ca nnot be expanded to a vjorkable system of knowledge + belief
.
One of the most attractive features of KB when it first
appeared
vras

the obvious way in v;hich it could be expanded to a system
con-

taining both the epistemic operator 'Ka’ and the doxastic operator

In Knowledge and Belief Hintikka talks informally of such a

'Ba»

system and discusses some interesting applications it is seen to

have ("Moore«s Paradox", "Thinking that one might be mistaken", etc.).

We might similarly try now expanding KBC to a system containing the
belief operator ’Ba'.
The first thing to notice about such a system

it KBCB

—

is that while there are

cross-identified relative to

tvro

—

let us call

methods by which objects are

vzhat is known,

there is only one method

according to which world-lines are formed across doxastic alternatives (vrorlds compatible to

i-rfiat

is believed).

According to Hintikka,

there is no parallel in belief to the method of "contextual" cross-

identification according to which individuals are knovm2 by an agent.
A single set of quantifiers suffices to exhaust what Hintikka feels

to be the complexities in the logic of belief.

What happens

vihen

we actually set up a system in which vari-

ables in epistemic contexts may be bound by two sorts of quantifiers,

but variables in doxastic contexts may be bound only by ’(Ex)’ and
’(x)’?

Trouble as far as I can see.

Consider;

(33)

Someone is knovm by a to be F

(3^)

Someone is believed by a to be

F.

It’s reasonable to suppose that (33) entails (3^)* but although (33)
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is translated by either
and is translated

’

«

(Ex)KaFx* or ‘(9^x)KaFx«.

(Ex)BaFx*

.

(34) is unambiguous

To make sure that the entailment of

(3^) by (33) is maintained in KBCB, therefore, it vrould seem that

both

_CEx)KaFx

C

(Ex)BaRx;

6

w
w

(^

ought to be provable in the system.
Someone is

(35)

knovin^^

^
&

x)KaFbc

(Ex)BaFx

w
w

Now consider

by ^ to be F and knox-m^ by a to be

G,

which is symbolized

(Ex)(^ y)(x=y & KaFx & KaGy).

(36)

Given the derivations above it can be proven that

(

36 ) virtually

implies
(Ex)(Ey)(x=y & BaFx & BaGy).

(37)

Now (37) reads
(

Someone is both believed by

38 )

a to be

and this seems to raise problems.
then (35) is true if

^

to be F and believed by

G,

’

F’

For suppose a is the War Hero;

is short for ’has been wounded 100 times’

and *G’ is short for ’is the War Hero’s biographer’.

But it seems

wrong to infer from the truth of (35) that one and the same person is
both believed to be F and believed to be G.

In short, KBCB ought to

formally reflect the entailment of (3^) by (33)» but
of

”knoi-jn"

mth

two senses

and one sense of "believed” we run into difficulty.

The

entailment of (3^) by (33) either fails for one sense of "known" or we

must countenance what appears on the surface to be a bad inference
(from (35) to (38)).

At this point I’m not entirely convinced that the inference
from (35) to

(

38 ) is bad.

Nevertheless, this is not the end of the
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matter.

Gail Stine argues in ’Hintikka on Quantification and Belief

that any Hintikka-type semantics for belief must contain the rule:
(Ex)(b=x & Ba(b=x))
(Ex)(c=x & Ba(c=x))

6
6

Ba(b=c)

G
6

With "Stine’s Rule"
(39)

(

(Ex)Ba(Fx

’d’

w.

36 ) virtually implies not only (3?) but
8c

Gx).

Now this is clearly problematic.
singular term

w
w
w

For it follows for some free

that ’Ba(Fd & Gd)» is true; that is, a believes that

the same person is both F and G.

In particular,

\-jhenever someone is

knownj^ by a to be b and known^ by a to be c, then if b=c it follovrs

that a believes that b=c.

Our man at the busstop can’t fail to

believe that the General Manager is identical vdth the man he sees

every morning boarding the bus.

And the War Hero cannot fail to

believe that he himself is the War Hero.
It would be easy to avoid this difficulty by deciding that
Stine’ s Rule ought not be incorporated in KBCB.

This vrould certainly

be a heavy-handed way of dealing with an \mwanted inference; but,

more importantly, it would raise up a serious problem put to
rest by Stine’

s

adopting her rule.

Consider the belief version of

the argument of Sleigh’s we looked at earlier.
(40)

Everyone is believed by a to be F

(41)

Everyone of vjhose identity
by ^ to be F

a.

has a true opinion is believe

(42)

There exists someone of vrfiose identity a has a true
opinion and of vriiom a does not believe that he’s F

(^3)

(x)(Ey)(x=y & BaFy)

(44)

(x)BaFx

(45)

(Ex)-BaFx.

cl
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Fomulas (43)-(45) are formal renderings of (4o)-(42). respectively.
Therefore,

(i) One vxould expect that since (40) entails (4l),

(43)

should virtually imply (44), and (ii) Since (4o) and (42) are

logically inconsistent, the conjunction of (43) and (45) should be
indefensible.

However,

(43) does not virtually imply (^l4), and (43)

and (45) can in fact be imbedded in the same model set.

Hence

there is something wrong vdth the semantics for belief originally

proposed by Hintikka.
By adding to the semantics Stine’s Rule, hovrever, both difficulties can be avoided.
It),

We prove that (43) virtually implies (44)

the system Stine advocates .22

(a)

(x)(Ey)(x=y & BaFy)

(b)

-(x)BaFx

6

V

(c)

(Ex)-BaFx

&

w

(b),(C.-U)

(d)

(Ex)(b=x & Ba(b=x))

&

-BaFb

1
wy

(c),

(e)
(f)

(Ex)(b=x)

&

vr

(d)

(g)

(Ey)(b=y & BaFy)

&

w

(a),(f)

(h)

(Ey)(c=y & Ba(c=y))

(i)

b=c & BaFc

(j)

b=c

(k)

Ba(b=c)

(1)

BaFc

”1

Redog

(g),

Clearly, however,

for some c

wj
Q:

(e),

for some b

e

(k),

w

(i), Simp.

w

(d),(h).(j)

w

(i),Simp.

and (1) entail a contradiction, that in

some alternative w* of w both ’Fb' and ’-Fb’ belong to w*.

In this

proof (d), (e), (g), and (h) are obtained via Stine’s rule (103)”,
(f) comes by vxay of her rule "II.",

and the key step (j), upon vjhich
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the

vrfiole

proof depends, is inferred on the basis of "Stine's Rule".

The choice is clear.

Either KBCB can incorporate Stine's

Rule and avoid this difficulty at the expense of enabling

(

36 ) to

virtually imply (39); or KBCB can reject Stine's Rule, thereby
blocking the move from

(

36 ) to (39) but at the same time blocking the

move from (43) to (44) and the proof that (43) and (45) are mutiially
indefensible.

Either way there's big trouble; either way it appears

that KBCB is not a workable system.

That KBC cannot be expanded to

a workable system of knowledge + belief seems to be a serious

disadvantage of KBC itself.
2.

Problems

mth

23

(C.Ind. = ) and (C.Ind3

)

in KBC .

Earlier we

remarked that a varient of Sleigh's first argument in 'On Quantifying
into Epistemic Contexts' could be used to show that both (C.Ind.=)
and (C.Ind^

)

must be rules in KBC.
Everyone is known^ by a to be F

(41>)

Everyone
to be F

(42')

There exists someone knovm^^ by a
a to be F

(43')

(x)(Ey)(x=y & Kapy)

(44')

(x)(((Ey)(x=y) & Ka(x=x)

vrfio

exists and is

knoi'm-i

by a is knovm by a

\iho

is not known by

)—> KaFx)

(Ex)(Ey)(x=y & -KaEx).
As above,

(40')-(42*) are formally rendered by (43')-(45'),

respectively.

It should be the case in KBC, therefore, that (43'

virtually imply (44'
fensible.

)

and that (43'

)

and (45'

)

be mutually inde-

Hov/ever, this may be proven in KBC only with the use of

(C.Ind.=) or something equivalent to it.

argument shows that (C.Ind^

)

And a perfectly parallel

must be likewise present in KBC.
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V7e

must therefore assume that both conditions are rules in the
new

system; vrorld- lines of neither type are allovred to split.

Formally speaking, there is nothing problematic in employing
both (C.Ind. = ) and (C.Ind3

).

But I believe that a serious question

arises v/hether these principles are too strong from the point of

view of ordinary knowledge.

In ‘Existential and Uniqueness

Presuppositions’ Hintikka admits that what appear to be counter-

examples have been raised against (C.Ind.=), but all such examples,

he maintains, turn on the use of different criteria for knoxd.ng
who.

Thus,

for example, Castaneda’

as a counter-example to (C.Ind.=);

Hero is, he knows

vjho

s V7ar

Hero case can be viewed

The War Hero knows

he himself is, but he fails to

himself is the War Hero.
ent criteria for knowing

xdio

kno\-r

the War

that he

This example, hovjever, depends upon differvAio;

different methods of cross-

t\-ro

identification are being employed, and in KBC these methods are
formally distinguished.

Hence the War Hero example is not a coionter-

example to (C.Ind.=) in KBC.

In light of this, consider the foUoxang two examples.
Jones is an ardent basketball fan.
he knows

iriio

He knows

vjho V7alt

First,

Hazzard is, and

Abdul Rahman is; with respect to each he knovrs a

wealth of statistics.

Jones has, however, never seen the man in

And as much as Jones knows about the man, Jones fails to

person.

know that
father is.

V/alt

Hazzard is Abdul Rahman.

Jones also knows

iidio

Second, Jones knows

vrfio

the vjinner of the masquerade contest

is (it’s the gorilla, and Jones has just congratulated him).
Jones fails to know that it is his father who has just won the
contest

his

let
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In the first example Jones knows

v;ho

both Hazzard and Rahman

are, but notice that he cannot know idi02 either
of them are; neither

of them is knovm2

Jones.

Therefore, either they are both knovmj_

to Jones and we have a counter-example to (C.Ind. =
), or our example

turns on employing "different criteria" for knowing vho,
one of

which has so far been unaccounted for by Hintikka.

And in the second example both Jones's father and the winnter
of the contest are knov/n to Jones, but neither of them is known^ to
Jones.

Tlierefore either both are knovm2 to Jones and

counter-example to (C.Ind .3

)

x-^e

have a

in KBC, or our example turns on

employing "different criteria" for

knox^ring vjho,

one of vjhich has

so far been unaccounted for by Hintikka.

Thus,

either we have counter-examples to both (C.Ind.=)

and (C.IndH) in KBC, or there are methods of cross-identification yet
to be worked into the formial semantics.

If the latter is true,

then there will no doubt have to be still more quantifiers added
to the system to captxire all that needs to be said.

situation does not look encouraging for KBC.

trouble

the

tvro

Tiie

Either way the

very sort of

sets of quantifiers were supposed to avoid has not

been avoided at all; making formal distinctions betvjeen different
senses of "knowing who" by introducing quantifiers does not seem to
be a promising line to pursue.
3«

KLgid and non-ripj-d world- lines in KBC .

generated by Hintikka’

in v;hich Hintikka'

s

s

Much of the appeal

original system KB lay in the obvious

v;ay

model sets could be thought of in terms of

possible vTorlds over which could be defined a compatibility relation

determined by

vrfiat

is known by a given agent.

We looked earlier at
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an account of such an intuitive interpretation of KB, according to

which a possible vrorlds semantics

s;^W,

D,I^ can be identified as the

intended model of the formulas of KB.
Central to the specification of

vjas

the set of

truth conditions for formulas of the form '(Ex)(b=x & Ka(b=x))>:
true in a world

weW

just in case there is an element d«=-D such that

in every world w* such that
vdio

(b,W*)=d.^^

Ri-tvj*,

An agent a knows

someone b is only if in every state of affairs compatible

everything a knows,

*b»

has intuitive appeal.
is if, so far as
people.

a' s

picks out the same person.

vjith

Such a condition

It would seem wrong to say that a knows

vriio

b

knowledge is concerned, b could be any number of

To really know who the masked man is is to knovr vdth

respect to some one particular person that he*s the masked man.
In Hintikka’

s

terms, the masked man must be a "genuine individual".

It is unfortunate, I believe, that such an intuitively appealing

interpretation of Hintikka*

system is forfeited by the move to KBC.

s

It is not the presence of two sets of quantifiers in the formal
language which necessitates the abandonment of this simple interpre-

and

’

(^ x)Ka(b=x)* in<^W,

that *b* in either

’

a rigid world-line.
knov.vi^

The truth-conditions for

Rather, it is this:

tation.

or

knoT-jn^

D,

^

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

’

(Ex)Ka(b=x)’

are non- equivalent; hence it must be
•

or

’

x)Ka(b=x)

’

does not pick out

Hence the world- lines associated

individuals (or both) are wobbly.

mth

either

In general, it

is no longer the case that if a knov;s who b is then b is a genuine

individual, an individual vrhich remains invarient over all worlds

compatible vrith

vriiat

a knows.

Perhaps (as in his semantics for perception) Hintilcka has this
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in mind:

that both knovmj^ and knovai^ individuals are invarient over

the set of vrorlds but invarient in different respects.

That is,

according to two different criteria of identity, the elements
chosen by the respective world-lines are identical vdth one another.

Hence if b is known^^ by

a,

b picks out the same individual in each

world according to one criteria of sameness, and is b is knovaip
by

a,

b picks out the same individual in each vrorld according to a

different criteria of sameness.
If this is the case then clearly

the formulas of KBC.

D,

is unable to model

Something far more sophisticated and far less

intuitive is required, and

vjhat

that might be I have no idea.
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FOOTNOTES

^intikka, Knowledpie and Belief

,

p, 1^9, n, 9 ,

Review of Knovdedne and Belief , p. I 34 .

‘^Castaneda,

^n

’On the Logic of Self-Knowledge' Castaneda considers the sentence
"a knows that b knows that he knows that he is tall" and finds that
the "ct" operator alone can't make all the necessary distinctions.
In later papers Castaneda proposes a general system to handle cases
of arbitrary complexity, but such is beyond the scope of our

discussion.
Hintikka,

'Knoxrdng

Onesself, pp. 10-12.

^Castaneda, 'On the Logic of Self-Knowledge', pp. 11-12.

^Castaneda, 'On the Logic of the Attribution of Self-Knovjledge to
Others', p. 446.
"^Hintikka, 'Individuals, Possible VJorlds, and Epistemic Logic',
pp. 52- 53 .
O

See Sleigh,

'On a Proposed System of Epistemic Logic', pp. 39^-395.

%intikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knowledge', p. 75 .
^^ Ibid ., p.
77 * n. 6 .

^ ^Ibid .

,

p. 78 .

exactly
^

hbid

, ,

vjith

By coincidence Hintikka' s (1), (2), and (4) correspond
our sentences of those numbers.

pp. 78-79.

^^There is no reason to believe that this distinction is the same
distinction as the one made earlier between knovdng who strictly
and knovring x-Tho weakly.

l4
Hintikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knowledge', p. 79.
that x is knovm^ (knoX'm 2 ) by y just in case y knows
who^^ (knovjs vrfiOg) x is.

^^)Te shall say

^^intikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knowledge', pp. 80-81.
17see for example, 'Different Constructions in Terms of Basic
Epistem.ological Terms', p. 119

^^intikka, 'On Attributions of Self-Knov:ledge'
19

See Hintikka’

s

brief paper 'Reply'.

,

p.

81.
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20m,

.

Inis point is made by Sleigh in his I967 paper also,
but his explanation (involving talk of the "indiscernibility of
identicals”)^
I find somex-.iiat misleading.

^See ’Objects of Knowledge and
Acquaintance, p. 66 .

^^e

Belief*, p. 80I, and ’Knowledge by

same proof demonstrates the mutual indefensibility of

and (45).

(

43 )

^^Ihere are other problems irdth KBCB. There seems to be no way, for
example, to consistently symbolize sentences like, "There is someone X such that h believes that h=x but h does not believe that
he himself is x”, the belief version of Castaneda’s (A).
24

V

The ’p
function is explained by Hintikka in ’Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes’, p. 92 , as mapping pairs of constant terms
and worlds to members of a large domain.
’
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CHAPTER IV
There has been no single issue discussed in connection

vrith

Hintikka’s semantics for propositional attitudes more than the
socalled Restricted Range feature (though not always luider this
name).

Already

vje

have had occasion several times to make reference to this

feature, but so far
•vriiether

vie

have not addressed outselves to the question

this feature is avoidable in a Hintikka-type semantics.

this chapter and the next

vre

In

shall attempt to answer this question.

We shall proceed as follows:

(i) Discuss what is meant by

•'Restricted Range" and vihy Hintikka holds that the feature is un-

avoidable in his systems; (ii) Take notice of several criticisms

of this feature vjhich have appeared in print; (iii) Present variants

of Hintikka'

s

system KB proposed by F?^llesdal, Tienson, and Sleigh

vrhich lack the feature;

and (iv) Point out disadvantages in the

approach taken by each.

Then in the next chapter

v;e

shall present a

variant of KB minus Restricted Range which avoids these disadvantages.
It shall be concluded that the Restricted Range feature is avoidable

in Hintikka-type systems.
In what follows, unless specifically stated to the contrary,
our remarks about Hintikka will be confined to his original system KB.

*

*

There are doubtless a great many things one might mean by
speaking of "Restricted Range".

explaining precisely
vTith Hintikka-tjrpe

hovT

Let us set the record straight by

the term has been employed in connection

semantics for propositional attitudes.

Informally
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the Restricted Range feature comes to the following.

agent a and a world w.

In describing

a’ s

Consider an

knowledge relative to w

quantifiers binding variables vjhich occur free inside the scope
of
a single epistemic operator range over world-lines which
do not

pick up eveiy individuali in the domain of w.

Pother, they range over

world-lines which pick up only that subset of individuals in
domain whose members are knov/n to

w‘ s

Speaking loosely, we might

say that the quantifiers are restricted to that subset.

Thus

'(x)KaFx* is not read "Everyone is known by a to be F" but "Everyone

who is

knox^7n

to a is known by a to be F" (supposing for the sake

of simplicity throughout that we’re talking about domains of
persons).

In this way

’

(x)KaFx’ and

’

(x)(Ka(x=x)->'PCaFx)’

are virtu-

ally equivalent.
A formal definition of "Restricted Range" can be based in

part on this virtual equivalence.

We shall say that a Hintikka-

type semantics for knowledge possesses the Restricted Range featxire

if and only if:

(i) All instances of

(Ka)^Fx)' are valid,

x^jhere

’

(Ka)

•

’

(x)

is short for n iterated occur-

rences of ’Ka’, for any positive integer
(x)KaFx
(x)Fx

is not valid.

(Ka)^Fx^(x) ( (Ka)^(x=x)-^

n,

6

vr

6

w

and (ii)

To extend this definition to systems for other propo-

sitional attitudes, replace ’Ka' throughout by ’Perceives’, ’Ea’, and
the like; and vrhere reflexivity fails in a system (such as with
•Ba’) replace (iii) by

(x)(Fx & BaFx)
( 2

c)(Fx)

and so forth.

& w
‘S'

w,

(x)(Fx & Perceives Fx)
(x)(Fx)

^

v?

w,
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Let us now examine Hintikka’

s

reasons for holding that

Restricted Range is unavoidable in his systems.

Those who have con-

sidered Restricted Range to be a drawback to Hintikka’

s

approach

and have looked for ways to eliminate it have been confronted by

Hintikka

vri.th

a

well-known "proof" that Restricted Range cannot

bo dropped from KB.

Castaneda thinks of the restriction as a dodge for
meeting some of Quine' s criticisms of quantified modal
logic. Hovjever, the restriction is not an
hoc
device calculated to meet certain specific criticisms.
It can be shov/n that it has to be adopted by everyone
who countenances quantification into a context
governed by "Ka" or "Pa" in their normal sense and
who accepts the normal meaning of our epistemic
notions and of logical connectives as codified by
suitable semantic conditions.^
The proof goes as follows.
We begin by considering formulas in

\-jhich

quantifiers bind

variables occurring free inside the scope of a single epistemic
operator.

For simplicity consider '(x)p(x)' and '(Ex)p(x)'.

To

determine whether the quantifiers range over a mere subset of exis-

tent individuals it must be determined how rules governing these

quantifiers are going to be drawn up.

In particular, under vjhat

conditions may we instantiate and generalize upon '(x)p(x)' and
»

(Ex)p(x)’?

Suppose we let our quantifier rules take the following form:
(C.U.)»

where

'a'

(x)p(x/b)
-Q(d)
p(d/b)

6w
<g

w

e

1,7

is a new constant and

(C.E.)'

'

Q'

(Ex)p(x/b)
w
6 w
Q(a)
e V7
p(a/b)

,

is some yet unspecified formula

of one free variable.

It can easily be proven, Hintikka maintains,

that

’

'

’

A(b)<r-^Ex)Ka(b=x)

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

'

is self-sustaining and hence that

or something logically equivalent must serve as the
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instantiating and generalizing conditions for *(x)p(x)»
and '(Ex)p(x)'.
This is easily demonstrated;
(a)

A(b)

e

(b)

-(Ex)Ka(b=x)

e

(c)

(x)Pa(b^x)

£ w

(d)

Pa(b^b)

£

(e)

b^^b

£ w*

(f)

b=b

£ w*

(a)

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

G "(

(b)

-Q(b)

G

(c)

Ka(b=d)

G

(d)

Q(d)

C w^

Redog

(b),(C,-E,),(C,-K)

w

(c),(a),(C,U.)'
(d),(C,P*), for some w*
such that Rww*
(C.self,=)

Redog

(e)

Q(b)

e

1

s

(a),(c.E.)'
1

w

(e).(d),(97)

Supposing, then, that we let the quantifier rules of KB be
(C.E.)* and (C.U. )*, we are saddled with the Restricted Range

feature.

According to Hintikka:

Hence we may conclude that, for the kind of *p* we
assumed vre were dealing with, "(Ex)Ka(b=x)'^ has to
be assumed as-a-prerequisite for quantifying with
respect to the term *b’ in *p’....Thus the restriction of the substitution- values of bound variables
to such individual constants b as satisfy this condition is not just an 'ingenious device' but a
necessity which I do not see any chance of
escaping.^

Therefore not only does KB have the Restricted Range feature, but

KB could not have lacked it.
Criticisms of various sorts have been levelled at Hintikka'
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proof, but for the time being we shall
accept it at face value.

By eventually arguing that there exists
a plausible modification of

KB

Trrfiich

lacks Restricted Range we shall in effect
suggest that

Hintikka's proof is defective.

At that point we shall argue that

the proof is defective and try to identify
at exactly which point

it breaks dovm.

But before

vre

do any of that, we turn to

criticisms of the Restricted Range feature,

*

Perhaps most interesting among the criticisms of the
Restricted Range feature which have appeared in print are those

raised by Castaneda.

In his Review of Knovrledge and Belief Castaneda

charges that the English sentence
(1)

There exists an object of which a does not know that it
exists

cannot, as a result of Restricted Piange, be consistently rendered in

the language of KB.
(2)

For consider;

(Ex)-Ka(Ey)(x=y).

Since the quantifier ranges over individuals knovm to

implies
since

»

'

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

'

’

and ’-Ka(Ey)(b=y)’

,

(2) virtually

for some constant ’b’

virtually implies 'Ka(Ex) (b=x)

implies a contradiction.

a,

«

,

but

(2) virtually

Hence (2) cannot serve as a consistent

formal rendition of (1).

Hintikka replies in ’"Knovdng Onesself" and Other Problems in
Epistemic Logic’ that although Castaneda is correct in pointing out
that (2) is indefensible in KB, he (Hintikka) has

decide on independent grounds that the rule

meanx-rfiile

come to

10 ?

(C.EX.=*)

ought to be given up.

(Ex)Ka(b=x^
Ka(Ex)(b=x)

€
^

V
w

These independent gro\inds, as we have pointed

out elsewhere, apparently come to this:

that (C.EK.=*) does not

allow one to symbolize such sentences as "a knows who puts toys
in
children*

stockings'* and is therefore too restrictive.

s

Giving up

(C.EK.=*) turns out to be especially convenient for answering
Castaneda*

s

objection, however, in that (2) no longer virtually

implies a contradiction.
In his 1969 paper *0n the Logic of the Ontological Argument*

Hintikka goes a step further and points out that even if
(2) turns
out to be indefensible in KB, this does not show that (1) has no
formal counterpart in KB.
(3)

For the formula

(Ex)(y)(x=y^ -Ka(Ez)(y=z))

is both a formalization of (1) and perfectly consistent in KB (with

or without (C.EK.=*)).

Much the same can be said of the English sentence
(4)

There exists someone of which a doesn*t know

-who

he is

(a slight variant of which is charged by Castaneda in *0n the Logic

of Self-Knowledge* to be untranslatable in the language of KB).

If quantifiers range over persons known to
someone that he fails to be known to a?
(5)

a,

how can it be said of

That is, the formula

(Ex)-(Ey)Ka(x=y)

is outright inconsistent in KB.

And the presence or absence of

(C.EK.=*) is irrelevant to the indefensibility of (5)«
V70

capture (4) in formal terms?

How then do

The answer is easy given Hintikka*

proposal to translate (1) as (3); we simply translate (4) as
(6)

(Ex)(y)(x=y-i- -(Ez)Ka(y=z)).
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And it may be easily demonstrated that

consistent in KB.

(

6 ).

like

(

3 ),

is perfectly

It looks, therefore, as though Hintikka has

successfully defended KB against the charge that Restricted
Range brings with it an inevitable restriction on the
powers of

expressibility.

Nevertheless this is not the end of the matter.

Sleigh asks us

to consider
(7)

There is someone such that a knows that he exists but not
he is

vjho

in his paper ’Restricted Range in Epistemic Logic’.

Making reference

to the points Castaneda has raised he writes:

Still there may be life in this line of criticism.
Ci3)J andL( 6 )^ are equivalent in KB. But the inference from C(^)J to C(1)J may seem counterintuitive. An examination of a proof that C(3)^
implies C( 6 )Z/ suggests that KB utilizes conditions
which make it impossible to formulate an intuitively acceptable and consistent symbolization for
•
It is natural to assume thatC(7)17 is
consistent, that it is not correctly symbol! zable
in KB and that this failure is a consequence of the
restricted range feature of KB.^
There is no disputing the fact that (3) and

(

6 ) are equivalent

in KB; but why should this convince us that (7) cannot be consistently
rendered in KB?

Unless I am missing something obvious, it seems

apparent that we can use Hintikka’

consistent symbolization

vje

s

ploy once again and find the

are looking for.

In the case at hand

this would amount to
(

8)

(Ex)((y)(x=y—:?Ka(Ez)(z=y)) & (y)(x=y->-(Sz)Ka(z=y))).

Like both (3) and

(

6 ),

(

8 ) is perfectly consistent in KB.

And so

once again it appears that we have no English sentences v;hose failure
to be expressed in KB can be pinned on the Restricted Range feature.
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Castaneda

criticisms, though interesting, do not seem
to amount
4
to anything in the end.
s

Further criticism of the Restricted Range feature
is raised

by Romane Clark in his paper 'Comments’.

His remarks arise out of

a set of comments directed at Hintikka' s semantics
for perception,

but the point he raises applies to KB in precisely analogous
fashion.
Consider Existential Generalization in the folloxijing form:

Perceives p(b/x)
4w
(Ex)(b=x)
<2 v;
(Ex) (Perceives p(x)6v7.

Again suppose that

contains no epistemic operators.

'p'

It will have been noticed that Hintikka' s account of
the nature of the premise x-Those addition reconstitutes the validity of E.G. is different, and stronger,
than that given above. .. .Hintikka requires not merely
that the object of the agent's sensuous belief exists,
but (I think) that the agent perceives vrho he is
£T(Ex) (Perceives b=x)I7 .
Are these stronger assxmiptions
essential; i,.£. , do the vjeaker versions of E.G. sanction
invalid inferences for the contejrts of belief and
perception? The ansx;er is "no” on at least one transcription of the commonsense statements of belief or
perception into a semantics close in spirit to Hintikka'
own* • • •\'hy then does Hintikka require the stronger premise...? It is not, I thinkf part of commonsense to do
so. .. .Hintikka, it seems to me, is led to his stronger
requirement because of a stronger, and I believe doubtfxil, principle about hovj quantifiers are to be
understood. .. .This principles of "relative agent
omniscience" seems to me to be false. 5

Here Clark makes

important claims:

tvjo

the vreaker version of E.G.

,

xrfiich

(i) The employment of

for knovdedge amounts to

Ka p(b/x)

e

w

(Ex) (b=x)

&

\T

(Ex)Ka p(x)

e w

produces an adequate system, and (ii) The system produced avoids the
principle of "relative agent omniscience" (as he refers to the Restricted Range featxire), a principle which is "doubtful" and seemingly
"false"
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The first of these contentions we shall
examine in the next

section.

We shall discover the system he proposes
which lacks the

principle of relative agent omniscience
("RAO" for short) is, while

perhaps in some sense reasonable, qvdte a bit
less interesting and

powerful a system than KB.

As far as his contention that the prin-

ciple of RAO seems false, Clark has this to say:

Nonetheless, this principle seems to me to be pretty
clearly unacceptable, for it precludes, or appears
to preclude, our saying quite ordinary things.
Take
our freshman and Vercingetorix again. I want to say
that there was someone, namely V., v;hom our freshman
does not believe to have existed. But the natural
symbolization of this, read back into English, comes
out in Hintikka' s translation to be that there was
someone knovm to our freshman x-jhom he believed not
(9)
to exist.®

Here it is the belief version of Castaneda's
(1)

v/hich,

given the

presence of the Restricted Range feature, seems to resist translation.
The most natural way to symbolize

There was someone our freshman does not believe to
have existed,
namely,
(10)

(Ex)-Bf(Ey)(x=y),

turns out to be the symbolization for the longer sentence
(11) Someone knovm to our freshman is not believed by
our freshman to have existed.’'^

Clark's ciuticism differs from Castaneda's in that,

vrfiile

the

latter charged that the natural translation (2) of (1) is indefensible,
Clark argues that what one might expect to be the natural translation

of (9)» viz .

.

(10), is the translation already for an English

sentence (11) not equivalent to (9)»

mentioned in his criticism.

Nothing about consistency is

Therefore, Hintikka'

s

reply to Clark

O

that (C.EK. = *) has been dropped from KB

seems beside the point.

Ill

Vhether or not one can prove that (10) is indefensible, the
fact
remains that (10) is a fonnal translation of (11) and hence cannot
at the same time be a formal rendition of (9).

should have pointed out is that the

vjay

What Ilintikka

to translate (9) is not the

way that strikes one as "most natural", but rather,
(12)

(Ex)(y)(x=y-^-Bj(Ez)(y=z)).

And so, if the RAO principle is an undesirable feature of KB, it’s
undesirability does not lie, as far as Clark has
our saying "quite ordinary things".

sho't'jn,

in precluding

Restricted Range has simply not

been shown to limit the expressibility of KB.
There is one further criticism of the Restricted Range feature

which has appeared in print, but

vre

shall note it only in passing.

Sellars, in his ’Some Problems About Belief’ levels the follo;d.ng

charge against KB:

When Hintikka offers a definition. .. .of a ’transparent’ in terms of an ’opaque’ sense of ’believe’,
the definition does not achieve the above purpose,
for the range of the quantified variable is restricted
to individuals known to the person vihose beliefs are
under consideration. Hintikka’ s claim to have defined
’’Quine’s transparent sense" in terms of "the basic
(opaque) sense plus quantification" is simply
mistaken.^
It is obvious that a satisfactory discussion of a charge such as this
vrauld require a lengthy digression into a number of profound and con-

troversial areas relating to

vrork done

by Quine.

Hence we shall not

evaluate the charge, noting only that (i) Sleigh argues that Sellars’s

criticism relies upon attributing to Hintikka a definition of
’transparent knowledge’ v^ich is "not an accxirate representation of
Hintikka’

s

account of transparency", and (ii) Quine points out that

Sellars’ s own account of transparency leads to paradoxical results.

112
*

*

In this section we shall examine the highlights of several

variations of KB

vrfiich

avoid the Restricted Range feature.

This will

include systems proposed by Fjillesdal in ’Knowledge, Identity, and
Existence’, by Tienson in ’The ’’Basic Restriction” inHintikka’s
Qu.antified Epistemic Logic’, and by Sleigh in ’Restricted Range in

Epistemic Logic'
As a preliminary to considering Fjillesdal’s system

vxe

shall

talk briefly of Clark’s claim, mentioned above, that an adequate

revision of a Hintikka-type semantics can be produced by employing

Existential Generalization in its ’’weak form”, which for knowledge is:

Ka p(b/x)
(Ex)(b=x)
(Ex)Ka p(x)

^ w
& w
6 w.

Suppose we revise KB in such a way that (108) and (109) are replaced
by:

(108C)

(Ex)Ka o(x)
(Ex)(b=x)
Ka p(b/x)

Clearly such a system
weak form.

vri.ll

6w
^ v;
6: w

(x)Ka p(x)
(Ex)(b=x)
Ka p(b/x)

(109C)

6 V7
6 w
e w.

yield Existential Generalization in its

Is such a revision of KB promising?

At first glance it appears that exactly the opposite is the
case.

Consider Existential Generalization.

If Jones knows that the

tallest spy is a spy, and there is in fact a tallest spy, is it
plausible to conclude that the tallest spy is knovm by Jones to be a
spy (and hence that someone is knovm by Jones to be a spy)?

Can we

conclude that Jones knows with respect to someone that he’s a spy?
It'

inferences.

obvious that Clark does not intend to sanction such
Suppose

v;e

are able to draw a distinction between vrhat
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people have called

re'»

might say that Clark*

s

and

dlcto » senses of knowing; then we

^ dicto knowpresupposition yields ^ ^ knowledge.

purpose is not to propose that

ledge together with an existence

Then how might Clark avoid the inference in question?

One method

would be to limit the constant terms in the language in such a way that
»the tallest spy* does not automatically qualify as a genuine constant

term upon

one can generalize and instantiate.

vriiich

And another method

would be to assign English readings to formulas in such a way that
Ka(the tallest spy is a spy)
(Ex)(x i s the tallest spy)
(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)
comes out plausible.

Consider

*

Of these, Clark chooses the second.

(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)’; by reading it "There exists

someone who is known by a to be a spy" the inference is quite im-

plausible.

But I believe there is a reading of ’(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)*

according to which the inference is perfectly plausible;

"There

exists someone x and a knows that the proposition that x is a spy
is true".

We do not require for the truth of ’(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)*

that anyone be known by

according to the latter reading.

a,

In

other words, we simply do not give *(Ex)Ka(x is a spy)* a de re
reading; rather, we read it

^ dicto.

As unusual a practice as

this might be, it does, I believe, give us a way to make perfectly

good sense out of Clark*
the above inference a

s

proposal.

By giving the conclusion of

dicto reading, we move only from a de

dicto premise to a

^ dicto

fectly plausible.

Given this way of reading

conclusion, and the inference is per*

(Ex)KaFx' and *(x)KaFx*

there appears nothing wrong with the adoption of (108C) and (109C);
the rules themselves seem perfectly plausible.

Why then cannot one bypass the question of Restricted Range
altogether by assigning de dicto readings to formulas formed
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by quantifying in?
semantics for

Of course one can if all that's desired
is a

^ <^cto

knovrledge.

The system Clark seems to be

proposing is, as far as I can see, not of much interest
at all.

By leaving no room for the

^ re

sense of knovdng one is perhaps

able to produce a system that is in some sense perfectly
acceptable.

But such a system appears to be only mildly interesting and

certainly a much less powerful system than KB.
Suppose

take the opposite course and revise KB in such a

way that (i) (108) and (I 09 ) are replaced by (108C) and (109C),
and (ii) To avoid implausible inferences we place a limitation on
terms upon v;hich one is allowed to instantiate and generalize in
such a way that 'the tallest spy' does not automatically qualify.

Just such a proposal forms the basis of a system proposed by
F^llesdal.

Consider the following well known difficulty,
(a)

The man who is coming toward me = Corsicus

(b)

I

(c)

I knov: that Corsicus is musical

know that the man

xdio

is coming toward me is musical

Although the principle of substitutivity of identity in epistemic
contexts licenses the inference from (a) and (b) to (c), the inference
is obviously implausible.

In this connection F^llesdal observes;

It seems... that we are in a dilemma, on the one side
we have the prima facie implausibility of the principle
of substitutivity of identity in epistemic contexts,
on the other side we have the metaphysical and epistemological reasons for assuming the principle. Hintikka,
in his book, chooses to reject the principle. In this
paper, I shall choose the other alternative and accept
the principle,
To explain

hox-j

the acceptance of the principle is compatible with the
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failure of (a) and (b) to imply (o). F(«llesdal
asks us to consider
(13)

(Ey)Ka(x)(Fxi-?^(x=y)).

Ihe fact that the expressions *the man vrho comes
toand ’Corsicus’ change their reference from
world to world. .. should perhaps be taken as evidence
that they contain some descriptive element, and that
they shouldn’t be regarded as genuine names. The
descriptions that should be regarded as genuine
names are those >iiich keep the same descriptum in
every possible v7orld, that is, in symbols, a description ’ ( 7 x)Fx’ behaves like a genuine name if
and only
.
it may be sho>m that we can
avoid all the difficulties that we have been discussing till now, if we require all names to satisfy
this condition, i..^., permit a name-like expression
a to be treated like a name only if it satisfies
vjards me»

’(Ey)Ka(x)(x a’ s<->(x=y) ) . Only expressions vjhich
satisfy this condition should be permitted to flank
identity signs and be used in arguments t\irning on
existential generalization and universal instantiation. All other name-like expressions should be regarded as hidden descriptions and be eliminated,
£•£•» by R'^ssell’s theory of definite descriptions.^^
’

We have, therefore, a system vzhich (unlike KB) preserves sub-

stitutivity of identity but avoids bad inferences by a restriction
on constant terms vjhich may occur in well-formed formulas.
’b'

be short for 'the tallest spy’.

if true, enables us to symbolize
spy” as 'Ka(b is a spy)'.

through.

Let

Then ’(Ey)Ka(x)(x b’ s^>(x=y)

)

knows that the tallest spy is a

On this s^miboli zation the inference goes

On the other hand, if ’(Ey)Ka(x)(x b’ s<r?(x=y)

)

’

is false,

then the first premise is symbolized ’Ka(Ey) (x) ( (x b’s<-^(x=y)) & y
is a spy)', a formula which contains no singular terras other than

variables, and with this symbolization the inference is blocked.

Similar remarks apply to the Corsicus example.
Does F^llesdal’s system (let’s call it 'F') lack the

Restricted Range feature?

’

It is absolutely clear that F^Uesdal

intends F to avoid Restricted Range.

On page 14 he indicates that
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’

(x)Ka(Ey)(y=x)» is to be read "Every object is such that
everybody

knows that it exists".
VThich is for

And on page 23 he points out that

’

(x)KaFx«

Hintikka read, "Of each person which a knows, a knows

that it is F", is read in F as, "Each person is known by
Thus

»

(x)KaFx’

and ’(x)(Ka(x=x) —-7KaFx)’

vri.ll

a to be F".

not be equivalent in F.

Given that Faille sdal intends F to lack the Restricted Range
feature, the question is vjhether this can be shorn to be the case

in F.

The

ansx'jer

are made about F.

is "yes", provided certain natural assumptions
These assumptions can be made explicit in what

we might call the "large-scope correlates" of (108C) and (109C);
(108F)

(Sx)KaFx
£ w
(Ex)(y)(x b‘ s <->(x=y)
6 v;
(Ex)(y)((x b’s'o(x=y)) & KaFx)

e

v;,

for some predicate
»b»s»

(109F

(x)KaFx
^w
(Ex)Cv)(x b* S<-»(xr:y))
fe-W
(Ex)(y)((x b‘ s<-)’(x=y)) & KaFx)

6

v;.

It is absolutely essential that F contain these rules; for

vri.thout

them F is incapable of accounting for such inferences as;
Everyone is known by a to be F
The tallest soy is someone
The tallest spy is Knovm by a zo be

F,

when a fails to know who the tallest spy is.
But given these rules it is easy to show that F lacks the

Restricted Range feature.

To show this it is sufficient to show that

(x)KaFx
(x)Fx
is valid.
E.I.,

Assume both that ’(x)KaFx’ 6-w and that

»-F( 7 x)(x b»s)»

'-Fb' ev;,

ew
ew

w.

’

(Ex)-Fx’ ew.

Now if »(Ey)Ka(x)(x b's<->(x=y))'e

and hence »(Ex)(b=x)’6 w.

a contradiction immediately follows.

So by U.I.,

w,

’KaFb’&vr, from

By
then
vriiich

On the other hand, if ’(Ey)Ka
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(x)(x b*S4^(x=y))t e w, then

•

(Ex)(y)((x b« s<^(x=y)) & -Fx)'ew. Hence

»(Ex)(y)(x b*so(x=y))€ w; but by (109F) »(Ex)(y)((x b*s4^(x=y))
&

KaFx)*e w.

And it can easily be shown that *(Ex)(y)((x b*so(x=y)) &

-Fx)* and *(Ex)(y)((x b»s^(x=y)) & KaFx)» entail a contradiction.

So

in either case the assumption we began with entails a contradiction.
There is one rather surprising feature found in F.
»KaFx-4-Pa-Fx* is valid in

F.

*-Pa-Fx->KaFx» is not.^^

F^llesdal, »KaFx* is true just in case »x is
world; but in order for »x is

exist in that world.

F*

According to

is true in every compatible

to have a truth-value in a world, x must

If, therefore, there are some compatible words in

which X fails to exist, »KaFx* is false.
in no compatible worlds is *x is
true.

F*

Although

F*

Yet it may still be true that

false, and if so, *-Pa-Fx* will be

Hence *-Pa-Fx* and *-KaFx* may be imbedded in the same model set.
F^llesdal*s reasons for formally distinguishing *KaFx* and

*-Pa-Fx* in F arise out of the following difficulty.

It would appear

that unrestricted substitutivity of identity would make formulas of
But by simple quantification theory

the form *b=c-»Ka(b=c)* valid.

one can infer from *b=c-^Ka(b=c)* both
*

(x)Ka(Ey)(x=y)*

’

(x)(y)(x=y-»Ka(x=y))* and

And in a system lacking Restricted Range these

formulas have counterintuitive readings (more counterintuitive than
There-

the already counterintuitive readings with Restricted Range).
fore to avoid the validity of

*

(x)(y)(x=y->Ka(x=y))' and »(x)Ka(Ey)

(x=y)*, F will require substitutivity of identity only insofar as it

requires the validity of the weaker condition *b=c-^-Pa-(b=c)

*

;

in

compatible worlds in which b and c both exist *b=c’ will be true,
and otherwise *b=c’ will lack a truth-value.

accept the validity of the weaker formulas

and

'

(x)-Pa-(Ey) (x=y)

’

,

*

Now we need only
(x) (y) (x=y-> -Pa-(x=y)

formulas which Fjillesdal believes to have

’

)
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perfectly innocent readings.
The basic idea behind the solution is that vrhen
have now eliminated all spurious singular
terms and sit back vrith merely variables, then
vjhenever these variables, vjhich function approximately like the ’it* of ordinary language, have
no reference, sentences vmich contain them have
no truth value. ^5
vje

By admitting truth-value gaps and by not requiring the validity of
modal negation, therefore, Fj^llesdal believes he has produced an
adequate system of epistemic logic which, as it turns out, lacks the

Restricted Range feature.

We return to F^^llesdal’s system in the

next section.
A rather interesting modification of F^illesdal’s F lies at the

heart of a system proposed by
in Hintikka’

s

J.

Tienson in ’The "Basic Restriction"

Quantified Epistemic Logic’.

In this paper Tienson

sets out to construct a system of epistemic logic using model sets

which "preserves Hintikka’

s

insights concerning quantification into

epistemic contexrts but which does not contain the basic restriction

ri*—

Restricted Range feature!/

• »

Considered as a revision of Hintikka’
let’s call it F*

—

s KB,

Tienson’ s system

is succinctly described as follows:

is required is tx-ro different kinds of individual
symbols. . .Let us allow ordinary/- constants to continue
Thus vre retain
to represent ordinary singxxlar terms.
C(109)^and drop £1(108)1/ , Let us then introduce a new
type of symbol, say axixiliary symbols, Xviiich can be
thought of as purely designative. All the rules vri.1
apply to formulas containing auxiliai’y symbols
but they need not be thought of
auxiliary formulas
Three new rxiles
them.selves.
meaning
in
as having
dealing vdth auxiliary symbols are needed.
If (Ex)A<&M, then A(‘< /x) di-' and (Ex)(x=c^)
(C.E._^)
^M, for at least one auxiliary symbol
If (x)A^hU and (Ex)(x=^) M, then A(°C /x) M.
(C.U.^)

I'Jhat

—

—

(C.=_^l)

and

M’*'

is alternative to M, then

—
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In addition, Hintikka’s rules of substitutivity
of
identity in atomic formulas (C.=.), must be extended
to refer to auxiliary symbols as well as constants.
The case not yet covered is that of identity statements involving one constant and one auxiliary symbol.
When these rules are added to Hintikka’s rules for
propositional epistemic logic the resulting system
does not contain any restriction of values of variables, but it does preserve Hintikka’s insights
concerning the relationship between constants and
quantified formula s.^'^

It appears to me that F* and F may be contrasted in the following way.

Where auxiliary symbols are employed in F*, genuine names are
employed in

F;

and xdiere ordinary constants are employed in F*, ex-

panded descriptions are employed in

F.

Furthermore, F* does not

contain truth- value gaps, and F* preserves the validity of modal
negation.

But in other respects, however, F* and F do not seem to

differ at all.

Unqualified substitutivity of identity is preserved

in F* (relative to auxiliary symbols), the Restricted Range feature is
absent, and existential generalization in Clark’s "weak form" is valid.

Tienson’s system, by eliminating truth-value gaps and preserving
the validity of ’-Pa-Fx

than F^llesdal'

s F.

KaFx’ does seem to be a more natural system

But one must recall that FjZ^llesdal forfeits

modal negation for the sole purpose of avoiding certain "bad theorems"

which one encounters as
Tienson’

s

a

result of his basic approach.

Since

basic approach does not differ significantly from F^llesdal’s,

and since no attempt is made by Tienson to avoid bad theorems, it

would be reasonable to suppose that these theorems show up in

F*.

As we shall see in the next section, this is indeed the case.

The final varient of KB minus Restricted Range we shall

consider is Sleigh’s system K which he sets forth in ’Restricted
Range in Epistemic Logic’ as well as ’Epistemic Logic, Again’.

Sleigh
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sets out his system in the form of a
model theory, but it can con-

veniently be compared to the theory of
model sets of KB in
we shall explain.

a

manner

The model theory itself (K) is very
elegantly

desci*ibed in the following way:

Elements of a model
V/

- a

non-empty set of worlds

D - a non-empty set of individuals
R - a reflexive and transitive relation defined
over

W

Q - a function assigning to each world a subset of D so that
Q(wj^) = Di

I and V - interpretation and valuation functions characterized

below
Interpretation fimctions must satisfy these conditions:
(i)

For each variable x and each world w^, I(x,Wj^)=u for some

u in D vdth the proviso that I(x,w.
w.

)

= I(x,w.) for all

and W-.
k)

(ii)

For each non-variable term t and each world w^, I(t,w. )=u
for some u in D.

l(t,w
(iii)

Here we allow for the possibility that
).

For each n-ary predicate

(j>

and each

w^^,

I(^,w^)

= a set of

n- tuples from D.

Each interpretation function determines a unique va1 uation function

satisfying these conditions:
(i)

Identities
Vj(<^

(ii)

;

,Wj^)

For any terms

and

and any world w^,

= 1 iff I(<< ,w^) = I(/5 ,w^).

Atomic formalas

;

n are terms Vj(

V/here

^ ^

^

is an n-ary predicate ando(j^, ...
• • •
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Negations, implications, and epistemic statements are
treated as one

would expect
(iii)

—
Vj(Ka/^ ,w^) = 1 iff for every w. such that vr-Rw.,

(a)

(b)

VjO^,Wj) =

1.

V (Pa/'^,w

= 1 iff for some

X

J-

)

\i.

such that

J

v7 .Rw.,

1

J

Vj(/^,w^) = 1.
(iv)

= iff for any I*

Vj((x)

if

is like I except (possibly) at

(a)

I'

(b)

I’(x,Wj^)

^

Di,

x,

and

then

Vi(/',w^) = 1.

We may note then any tuple

D, R,

Q,I^ meeting these conditions is

a model for our simplified epistemic logic, that

= 0 in case

^ 1 and that /^is valid just in case for each I,

Vj(

1 for each world w^ in each model.

Vj(/^,v 7^) =

18

It is very easy to describe how K differs from KB.

system H by the follovidng modification of K:

Form the

When (and only

vjhen)

the variable x occurs within the scope of an epistemic operator and is

bound from the outside by *(x)’, require not only that
but that I*(x,w-)^ Dj, for all
J

proceed as in K.

V7

.

Di

In all other cases

such that Rw.w..

j

I' (x, w^)

1 J

According to Sleigh, "The model theoretic system H

has the same theorems as the model set system KB".

19

It is easy to show that K lacks the Restricted Range feature.

We

shovr

that the move from

be any member of

Let

(x)KaFx’ to ’(x)Fx' is valid in K.

w^^

If V^( (x)KaFx, v;^) = 1, then for any I’ just like I

VJ.

except (possibly) at
Therefore, Vt,(Fx,v7

’

.)

x,

if

= 1,

holds by the roflexivity of

I'

(x,w^)^Di, then Vji(KaFx,w^) =

for all w, such that Rw.w..
R,

V^,(Fx,w^) = 1.

1.

But since

Therefore,

Rv7-v7.

for any I’
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just like I except (possibly) at x, if I'(x,v^)eDi,
then V^,(Fx,w.
1.

But this holds just in case V^((x)Fx,w^) =

proved.

1,

I’

It can be shovm

just like I except (possibly) at x, if I» (x,w

for all wj such that

then Vj,(Fx,w

does not follow that Vj(

= 1,

(x)Fx,w’j^)

= 1.

)

=

which was to be

Notice that a similar strategy fails in H.

that for any

)

•)

^ Dj,

But from this it

For some I* just like I

except (possibly) at x may map (x,w^) to a member of Di, fail
to map
(x,w

)

to a member of Dj,

vrfiere

Rw.w., and be such that V

It vdll then be false that for every
at X, if I«

(Fx.w

)

= 0

just like I except (possibly)

I’

(x,w^)6Di, then V^,(Fx,w^) =

1.

Having taken a brief look at the systems proposed by F^lesdal,
Tien son, and Sleigh, we are now ready to say a few words about each.
Turning first to Fj^3-lesdal*

s

system

F,

certainly are no obvious difficulties to be

we may note that there
fovind.

His basic

approach, preserving unqualified substitutivity of identity by

eliminating from well- formed formulas any singular term
fails to satisfy '(Ey)(x)(x b' s<-^(x=y)

)
*

,

’b’

which

is no doubt regarded by

many logicians as the most preferred approach to handling singular
terms in quantified epistemic logic.

Furthermore, his proposal to

allow truth- value gaps together with his proposal to invalidate ‘-Pa-

Fx—>KaFx’ in F is, on the surface of things, not the cause of any
real difficulty.
’

Finally, what one might expect to be theorems in

(x) (y) (x=y-^>Ka(x=y)

)

’

and

'

(x)Ka(Ey) (x=y)

’

,

F,

form\ilas vdth coimter-

intuitive English readings, are not theorems at all.
In spite of all of this, Stine feels that all is not v;ell vdth

F^llesdal’s
(a)

?.

Consider;

(x)(y)(x=y-^-Pa-(3c=y))
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(b)

(x)-Pa-(Ey)(x=y)

(c)

For all x and all y, if x and y are identical, then
it is
not compatible with _a’ s knowledge that they are not
identical

(d)

Everything is such that it is not compatible
knowledge that it does not exist.

vrith “
a's

Given readings (c) and (d) of (a) and (b), respectively, it is well that we do not require (a) and (b),
F^lesdal tries to justify (a) and (b) vdth the uniform reading of quantifiers, but his argument is
tortured. To make his point he must give up the convertibility of "Ka" and "-Pa-" and hold that "a exists"
is not false, but without truth- value, if a does not
exist.
The latter seems clearly objectionable; it is
one thing to deny that "Fa" has a truth-value if a
does not exist, but another thing to deny that it
is false that a exists.
I believe that Stine’s remarks point us in the direction tovrards

\incovering

tx-jo

features of F which do seem to be difficulties.

Stine’s first suggestion is that (even with the invalidity of
(a') (x)(y)(x=y_7 Ka(x=y)),
(b’)

and

(x)Ka(Ey)(x=y)

in F) formulas (a) and (b), vAiich are valid in
vihich are themselves counterintuitive.

perfectly correct.

F,

have English readings

This point seems to me to be

Sentences (c) and (d) just are equivalent versions

of the sentences
(e)

For all x and all y, if x and y are identical, then a

knows X and y are identical, and
(f)

Everything is such that a knov7S that it exists,

respectively.

So there is no reason in the claim that (c) and (d) are

not counterintuitive even though (e) and (f) are.

\Vhy

then does

F^llesdal think that (a) and (b), unlike their knowledge counterparts
(a’) and (b’)» have readings that are perfectly innocent?

The reason is quiite simple.

The readings F^llesdal assigns
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to (a) and (b) are (roughly):
(g)

For all X and all y, if x and
y are identical in the actual
world, then in no compatible vrorld is ’x=y»
false

(h)

in

any X in the actual world, there is no
compatible world
’x exists* is not true.

vriiich

It is true that (g) and (h) are perfectly innocent,
for (g) and

(h)

are descriptions (in English) of the truthconditions of (a) and (b)

in

F,

and these truth- conditions make perfectly good sense.

But

vriiat

is the relevance of (g) and (h) to the question v^hether
(a) and

(b),

like (a*) and (b*), have English readings which are counter-

intuitive?

None as far as I can see.

One must distinguish between

the English reading of a formula and a description (in relatively

casual English) of a formula's truth- conditions; just because
(g)

and (h) are not counterintuitive, one cannot conclude that (a) and
(b) are no trouble to admit as theorems.

It seems undeniable that

(a) and (b) are no better to admit as theorems than (a*) and (b*).

Hence it looks as though F has "bad theorems" after all.
Stine goes on to suggest that problems arise in connection vdth

sentences of the form "b does not exist".

of such a problem.

Let us identify an example

Consider:

(14) a knows that b does not exist
(15) Ka-(Ex)(b=x)
(16) So far as a knows, b does not exist

(17) Pa-(Ex)(b=x).

It is a peculiar feature of F that (15) and (1?) are inconsistent.

Formally speaking, of course, this feature is unproblematic, but one
is tempted to suppose that the inconsistency of

(

15 ) and (1?) may

raise problems in the expressibility of English sentences vrithin
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the reso\irces of F.

In particular, one might suspect that (l4) and

(16) cannot bo consistently rendered in F.

It may be replied that, although (I 5 ) and (1?) are indeed

inconsistent, the follox'Ting are not;
(18) -Pa(Ex)(b=x)
(19) -Ka(Ex) (b=x).

Hence, it may bo urged, one may symbolize (14) as (18) and (I6) as
(

19 )*

It is true that (18) is consistent, and thus one may regard (18)

as a perfectly adequate symbolization of (14).

hand, is not consistent in F.

But (I9), on the other

Therefore, one cannot consistently

render (I6) as either (1?) or (I9); thus it looks as though F is
incapable of handling sentences such as (I6), and if this is true
it' s a serious difficulty of F.

Tienson's system F* avoids both of these difficulties for the

very simple reason that the validity of modal negation is preserved
and truth- value gaps are not introduced.
the problems

It viould seem, therefore, that

drove F^llesdal to the somevihat radical proposals

i-Thich

he made will not be avoided by Tionson.

And this turns out indeed to

be the case; the follox-dng are all theorems in F*:
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(x)(Ey)Ka(x=y)
(x)(y)(x=y-^Ka(x=y)
(x)Ka((Ey)(x=y))
(x)Ka(x=x)
(x)Ka(Fx V -Fx)

And each of these has an English reading which is quite counterintxiitive.

Consider, for example,

some model set M,

'

-(x)Ka(x=x)

'

6

’

M.

(C.E.^) there is an auxiliary symbol
M.

(x)Ka(x=x)

'

.

Suppose that for

(Ex)Pa(x/x)

Then

'

*o4

such that

'

Therefore, in some alternative M* of M,

'

^ M;

so by

'Pa(^^<)'6
^

M

*•

But
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this is impossible, and hence our initial assumption is false.

Proofs of other formiilas proceed along similar lines.
Sleigh's system too makes theorems out of the formulas

listed above (with the exception of
for example,

'

(x)Ka(x=x)

'

.

'

(x)Ka(Ey) (x=y)

If V^( (Ex)Pa(x?^x)

,

'

) .

Consider,

vn) = 1, for some

function I and world w^^?W, then for some I' just like I except
(possibly) at

x,

I'(x,v7^)^Di and

(x^x,w.) = 1, for some w. such that
3

J

(x,v7j),

(Pa(x^x),w^) = 1.
Rs^x.vj..

1

So

Hence I'(x,w.)
^
^
*

I'

3

but this is impossible by the definition of an interpreta-

tion function in K.

Proofs of the other formulas proceed along

similar lines.

Both F* and K strike me as very reasonable attempts to avoid
the Restricted Range feature.

But it v/ould seem worthvrhile to

investigate whether one could not pursue an altei*native approach to
avoiding Restricted Range which did not involve the bad theorems one
finds in F* and K.

In the next chapter I shall undertake such an

investigation and conclude that one can design a model set theoretic
system based upon KB which avoids Restricted Range but at the same
time avoids the unpleasant consequence that a has

regarding everyone

vrfio

exists.

^ re knovjledge
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APPENDIX

The general question

v;e

have been pursuing in this chapter is

the question whether one can take an
approach to epistemic logic

similar to that taken by Hintikka and design a
system lacking the

Restricted Range feature.

F^llesdal, Tienson, and Sleigh appear each

to have shoxrm that this can be done.

There is, however, a system of

epistemic logic proposed by Gail Stine in ’Quantified Logic
for

Knowledge Statements’ which, though it lacks the Restricted Range
feature, may not be fairly called a "varient" of Hintikka’

For this reason

v:e

s KB.

shall consider it separately.

Stine’s idea is to propose an "alternative approach to

epistemic logic" vjhich lacks features "of at least debatable desirability" found in KB,

F^llesdal’s

are three in number:

Restricted Range, Deductive Closure, and Knovdng

F,

and Sleigh’s K.

These features

a Name (the feature a system has just in case an agent a knows

individual is only if, for some name ’b’,

_a

knows

vlio

b is).

vriio

an

According

to Stine, KB possesses all three of these features, K has the latter
tv;o,

and F has the second.

Stine’s system

is designed to avoid all three.

—

let’s call it

’S’

—

22

It may raise some eyebrows to hear that Stine proposes to avoid
Deductive Closure, but the method she employs is relatively unspectacular.

Unlike all of the systems

x-;e

have considered, S is simply to

be thought of as a formal theory devoid of any intended interpretation.
In particular, S is not to be thought of as having an intended "possible

worlds interpretation".^^

By divorcing S from possible worlds in this

way, it can easily be sho'wn,

S removes from

itself the stigma of
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Deductive Closure.

But clearly S is in this way a vastly
different

kind of system from all of the others we have
up until now considered.
Because one is not to think of modal formulas
in S in terms of

possible worlds, it is almost impossible to develop
more than the
most elementary of intuitions regarding the nature
of

Moreover,

S.

in no place does Stine have much to say about the
rules and axioms of
S.

We are told that •(x)(x^x)«,

(KaFx->Ka(x=x))

»

•

(x) (y) (x=y->(Fx->?y)

are axiom schemata.

)
«

,

and

•

(x)

And rules for instantiation and

generalization are described (U.I. and E.I. are exactly as
in KB
except that in E.I. a free variable is used in place of
a new constant
to avoid the "Knovang

a.

Name" feature described above).

But other than

just this, everything else remains pretty much unspecified.
A good deal of Stine’s concern in 'Quantified Logic for Knowledge

Statements' is directed towards a critique of

Sleigh's K.

F^iille

sdal

'

s

F and

We have already made reference to some insightful

remarks Stine makes along these lines.

It is, hov;ever, regrettable

that not more explanation is provided relative to her ovm system

S.

It may seem irrelevant to our purposes to say anything more
about S.

Nevertheless, Stine does include in her paper a list of

English translations for key formulas in

S,

and a few words about

these vn.ll, I believe, prove instructive towards an understanding of
the system we shall examine in the next chapter.

The translations go

as follow’s:
(a)
(b)
(c)

(x)KaFx

Everyone is knovm by a to be f, and
Everyone is knovm to a and knovm by a to be F
(x) (Ka(x=x)-^KaFx)
Everyone knovm to a is knovm by a to be F
Someone is knovm by a to be F, and
(Ex)KaFx
Someone is knovm to a and knovm by ^ to
be F
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(d)

(Ex)-KaFx

(e)

(Ex)(Xa(x=x) & -KaFx)
Someone known to a is not known by a to be F
"(ExjKaFx
No one is knovm by ^ to be F

(f)

Someone is not

know

by a to be F

-(Ex(Ka(x=x) & KaFx)

(g)

No one knovm to

^

is known by a to be F

The English readings Stine provides seem to make good

sense for a system vjhich lacks Restricted Range.

However, there are

some apparent difficulties which deserve a word of explanation.

It

may appear strange that the formula ’(x)KaFx» may be read either as
"Everyone is known by a to be F" and "Everyone is known to

know by

_a

to be F".

a

and

However, I believe this is as it should be,

for it seems quite clear that these two English sentences are equivalent.

Along the same lines, it turns out that formulas (f) and (g)

are equivalent in S, and it may seem objectionable that the former
is read "No one is

one

know

know by

to a is known by

a to be F" while the
a,

to be F".

latter is read "No

It's not obvious that these

sentences are equivalent, but to argue that they are non-equivalent
one must maintain that "Someone not
P'

know

to

^

is

know by

can be true (the reading for the negation of Stine’s axiom ’(x)

(KaFx-^Ka(x=x)

)

’

,

and it’s hard to see

hovr

that line might be defended.

Finally, it might be argued, if "Everyone is known to a and
_a

a to be

know by

to be F" is an admissible reading of (a), then by quantifier nega-

tion it would seem that (d) ought to be read not as "Someone is not

known by a to be F" but rather "Someone Is either not known by
_a

to be F or not

the clear.

know

by

And once again Stine seems to be in

to

These latter

a

tv;o

sentences are perfectly equivalent once

we accept the truth of "Everyone knov.m by a to be F is knovm to £",
as I believe

\ie

must.

all»

Stine* s readings seern perfectly correct and

acceptable, despite initial appearances.

Hence, quite apart from

anything I have to say about Stine’s system

Stine’s lexicon is worth remembering.

S,

it seems to me that

I believe that this lexicon,

or something closely resembling it, is quite inevitable
for a
system which lacks the Restricted Range feature.

more of these readings in the next chapter.

We shall see
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CHAPTER

V

In this chapter I shall propose a modification of Hintikka*
system KB which lacks the Restricted Range feature.

Vfe

have already

looked at variations of K3 proposed by Ff^llesdal, Tienson, and
Sleigh,
each of which lacks the Restricted Range feature, but we have
found

that each of these systems is beset by a number of undesirable theorems.

In the system I propose all of these theorems are avoided by placing
certain constraints upon the instantiation of existentially quantified
formu3.as,

constraints which we shall argue to be neither arbitrary

nor \mnat\iral.
We shall conclude that Restricted Range can be avoided in a

Hintikka-type semantics
present in KB.

vri.thout

creating any new difficulties not

In closing, we return to Hintikka*

s

argument (pre-

sented in the last chapter) that Restricted Flange is an inevitable

consequence of his approach to epistemic logic, and we shall find
that the proof rests upon a faulty assumption regarding the role of

instantiation and generalization in epistemic logic.

recall that the following formulas are theorems in both

V7e

Tienson’

s

system F* and Sleigh's system K:

(a)

(x)Ka(x=x)

(b)

(x)(Ey)Ka(x=y)

(c)

(x)(y)(x=y^Ka(x=y))

(d)

(x)Ka(Fx V -Fx).

It can easily be shown that all of these formulas are provable in KB.
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But there is a significant difference in
the way these formulas are

read in KB, on the one hand, and in F* and
K on the other.

In KB

these formulas are read, respectively,
as
(1)

Everyone knovm to a is knovm by a to be
self-identical

(2)

For everyone known to a there is someone kno\-m
to ~
a
such that they are knovjn by a to be identical

(3)

Any two persons known to a are, if identical, kno^^n by
a.
to be identical

(4)

Everyone known to a is known by a to be either F or not-F.^

It may be a matter of dispute whether these readings are counter-

intuitive,

but it*
(2),

Elsewhere I have argued that (3) is counterintuitive,

not at all clear that the same can be said for the others;

for example, seems on the surface to be entirely plausible.
The story is much different, on the other hand, xdien we

contrast (l)-(4) vath
(1*

Everyone is knovm by a to be self-identical

(2*)

For everyone x there is someone with whom a knov/s x is
identical

(3')

Any two persons are, if identical, known by a to be
identical

(4»)

Everyone is known by

^

to be either F or not-F.

These are, respectively, the readings of (a)-(d) in F* and K.

It's

absolutely obvious that (l')-(4*) are each entirely implausible.
Ivhile

(3) is somewhat objectionable,

its implausibility is mild in

comparison to (3’)» which, according to F^illesdal, says that ^
"...knows the right ansx^rs to all questions of identity".-^
it is a consequence of (1*), (2*), and (4*) that a has

^ £e

ledge regarding everyone who exists, not just those knovm to

And
knowa*

It is, of course, the presence or absence of the Restricted
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Range feature which determines vrfiether (a)-(d)
take on the troublesome

readings (l»)-(4») or the much less troublesome readings
(l)-(4).
Since KB has Restricted Range the world-lines over which
*(x)’

ranges do not pick up e\rery individual in the domain of the
actual
v7orld;

they pick up only that subset of individuals which
Hintikka

describes as those who are

’’knox'jn"

to

a,.

Loosely speaking, ’(x)’

might be described as ranging over that subset of individuals
known to

a..

In

F,

F*,

are

vrho

and K, on the other hand, the v7orld-lines over

which »(x)' ranges do succeed in picking up every individual
in the
domain of the actual world.

And in the same loose manner of sneaking,

’(x)‘ might be said to range wholesale over the individuals
who

comprise the domain of the actual

v7orld.

This phenomenon constitutes a good case for Hintikka’

s arg\iing

that Restricted Range ought to be present in a Hintikka-type semantics
for knovrledge (vriiether or not it must be present on independent

logical grounds).

If the theoremhood of (a)-(d) is unavoidable in a

Hintikka-type semantics, then to avoid the highly counterintuitive
readings (l’)-(4’) of (a)-(d) it is greatly to one’s advantage (other
things being equal) to have Restricted Range.

Much the same goes for P’^llesdal’s
are provable in

F,

F.

Although none of (a)-(d)

the follovdng are:

(a’)

(x)-Pa-(x=x)

(b»)

(x)(Ey)-Pa-(x=y)

(c’)

(x)(y)(3c=y-^-Pa-(x=y))

(d’)

(x)-Pa-(Fx V -Fx).

And while (a’)-(d’) are likewise provable in KB and have readings
are relatively innocent in KB, the readings are not so innocent in

v;hich
F.
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Again, the innocence of (a*)-(d*) in KB is solely
attributable to
the presence of the Restricted Range feat\ire.

Thus it is open for

Hintikka to argue that, given the theoremhood of (a’)-(d’),
it is to
one’s advantage not to do away with the Restricted Range
feature.

It looks, therefore, like there are good reasons not to
propose variations of KB v/hich lack Restricted Range as long as
either (a)-(d) or (a’)-(d’) are theorems.^

* *

Can a plausible system be produced after the fashion of KB

which not only lacks Restricted Range but vjhich fails to make theorems
out of (a)-(d) and
vrfiy

Let us begin by investigating just

(a’ )-(d’ )?

systems based upon KB are so prone to make theorems out of

(a)-(d) and (a')“(d') in the first place.

Suppose we concentrate

for the time being upon (a) and see how it’s proved in KB:
(a)

-(x)Ka(x=x)

a w

(b)

(Ex)Pa(x^x)

W

(c)

Pa(b^b)

(d)

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

(e)

b/b

£

(f)

b=b

e w*

£

Re dog

(a),(C,-U),(C,-K)

v7^

(b),(108), for some ’b’

(c),(C.P*), for some w*
such that Ri-m*
(C.self,=)

v;*

The crucial move in this proof is clearly the inference from
step (b) to (c) and (d) by v;ay of rule (108),

the rule which allows this inference,

Let us closely examine

Hintikka’

s

rule (108) is usually

thought of as a license which allows one to move from formulas of the
form

’

(Ex)KaFx’ to ’KaFb’ and

given model set w.

’

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

’

,

for some ’b', in some

But it is at the same time a license which
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allovjs one to instantiate upon formulas
of the form

(Ex)PaFx
PaFb
(Ex)Ka(b=x)

^ w
^
6 w,

»

(Ex)PaFx«

;

for some »b’

This latter consequence of rule (108) has been
the object of
Tlenson,

for example, writes;

But C(108)I/ also says that (Ex)PaPx holds, then
two other formulas hold, PaFb and (Ex)Ka(b=x) for
some constant b.
And this is entirely unreasonable.
For it says that if there is someone who a does
not know to be non-F, then a has a unique way of
referring to that person. Since constant terms have
descriptive content for Hintikka, this means that
if there is someone of whom you are ignorant in some
respect, then you know something unique about him.
But I believe, by our ordinary understanding there
can be individuals of vriiom one knows nothing at all.^

And according to Sleigh:
VJhat C(108):7 seems to say

when applied to (Ex)-KaFx*
is that anyone a doesn’t know to be F is among the
persons knovjn to a. This seems obviously unacceptable.
’

.

There is no doubt that the inference

(Ex)PaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)

6 V7
6 w, for some ’b’

(let’s call it »»(*)") ±s highly counterintuitive.

But notice that the

proof of (a) does not rely upon this particular inference,

A close

examination of the above proof shows that step (d) is a wet noodle;
erase it and the proof is not affected.

and (d) do not require

(=**);

Likex-dse, proofs of (c)

it is only V7hen we try to prove (b)

that this inference is needed to reach a contradiction.
The other consequence of

’

(Sx)PaFx’ licensed by (108),

’PaFb’, is not (as far as English readings go) counterintuitive.

it is this inference (let’s call it "(**)'») which is of concern in
the present context of discussion, for all of the formulas (a)-(d)

But
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depend upon it to be proven in KB.

It is the crucial move by which

one is enabled to get rid of the quantifier(s) in order to eventually

reach the contradiction buried inside the scope of ’Pa‘.
Therefore, vri.thout (**) none of the formulas in question can

be proven in KB.

And it is precisely this same inference

makes (a)-(d) theorems in Tienson’
to infer
'.

*A(<=^

from

/x)'

'

F* as well.

s

vjhich

There one is allowed

(Ex)PaAx’ ^ M, for some auxiliary symbol

And in Sleigh's K, although the whole of proof procedure is

couched in terms of interpretation functions, the result is the same.

If V^((Ex)PaFx,
(possibly) at

x,

V7^)

= 1,

then for some I* which is like I except

I»(x,v:j_)^ Ei and V^,(PaFx,w^) = 1.

assignment of x to an element in w

'

s

domain

vrfiich

There is an

makes 'PaFx'

1

true in w^.

Thus one can peel off the quantifier just as in KB

and F* and eventually reach the contradictions vrhich suffice to

establish (a)-(d) as theorems.
In order, therefore, to find a

v:ay

to block proofs of (a)~(d), it

looks as though rules for instantiation of

radically revised.

'

(Ex)PaFx' must be pretty

According to Sleigh:

required is one set of instantiating conditions for formulas of the form '(Ex)KaJ2^' and a
distinct set for formulas of the form (Ex)Pa^
It is possible to develop a tenable model set
approach along these lines which is free of the
restricted range feature of KB but the resulting
system is surprisingly complicated.'^

1/hat is

'

'

A way must be found to grant instantiation upon '(Sx)PaFx'

only

under certain specified conditions and not in the same indiscriminate

fashion accorded to

'

(Ex)KaFx'

.

Can such a technique be found?

And

would such a technique, if it could be found, make good sense not only
on a formal level but relative to an intuitive possible vjorlds inter-

pretation as

vrell?
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*

I shall novr proceed to propose a system
of model sets KB*

involving just such a technique.
Consider the follovdng quantifier rules for contexts
in

which variables occurring inside the scope of a single
epistemic
operator are bound from the outside by quantifiers:^
(ek)

(Ex)KaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
KaFb

(UK)

6

w

6

VJ

vr,

for some »b'

(x)KaFx
e w
(Ex)(b=x)
W
(Ex}(b=x & KaFx)6 w
(S.

(EPL)

(Ex)PaFx
^ V7
(Ex)(b=x)
6W
(Ex)(b=x & PaFx) e w, for some «b’

(EPS)

(Ex)PaFx
(x)KaGx
PaFb

<£.

W
VJ

<£.

W,

for some »b»

(EPM)

(Ex)(Gx & PaFx) a w
6 v;
(x)KaHx
Gc & PaFb
£. W,
for some •b‘.

(UPL)

(x)PaFx
^W
(Ex)(b=x)
v;
(Ex)(b=x & PaFx) 6 \i

(UPS)

(x)PaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
PaFb

^ w
^ v;
w.

We shall now form KB* in the follovdng

rules of KB.
above.

v;ay.

Begin vjith the

Replace (10 8) and (109) by the seven rules listed

Drop from KB the rules
(C.EK.=*)

(C.EK.EK.=*)

Add the rules

(Ex)Ka(b-x)
Ka(Ex)(b=x)
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
(Ex)Ka(b=x)

6. v;

6 w
^

VJ

6

v;*,

for every w* such that

Ri-jw*

(

C.Inci.=.n)

(C.E-)

(c.u.-)

(C.K-)

(C.P-)

And to all of this

(Ex)(Ka)^(b=x)

e

(Ex) (Ka)^(c=x)

c

w

b=c
(Ka)n(b=c)

^
£

w

(Ex)Fx
-(x)-Fx

e

vr

e

w

(x)Fx
-(Ex)-Fx

e
G

vr

Kap
-Pa-p

€
£

w
w

£

vr

Pap
-Ka-p
vje

w

VJ

w

€ w.

add a set of rules, to be described in what

follows, to govern formulas formed by quantifying in contexts

or

tvro

more layers deep of epistemic operators.
Our first order of business is to establish that our
system lacks the Restricted Range feature.

For this it suffices to

show that

(x)KaFx
(x)Fx

^
€

w
w

is provable in KB*:
(a)

(x)KaFx

^

w
1

Re dog

(b)

“(x)Fx

€

V7

(c)

(Ex)-Fx

e

w

(b),(c.-U)

(d)

-Fb

€.

W

(c),(C.Eq),

for some ’b'

(e)

(Ex)(b=x)

€ W

(c),(C.E

for some

]

o

),

*b'

(f)

(Ex)(b=x & KaFx)evr

(g)

b=c & KaFc

(h)

(Ex)Ka(c=x)

€

(i)

KaFc

£ W

(g),Simp

(j)

Fc

e

(i), (C.K*),Reflexivity

ew

^

(a), (e), (UK)

(f),(EK)

Wj

TfT

141
(k)

b=c

*(1)

“Fc

£ w

(g),Simp

(d).(k),(C.=)

Notice that a similar proof cannot be produced
in K3; one may proceed
as far as step (e), but the move from
(a) and (e) to (f) is not

allowed in KB.
As far as instantiation on

'

(x)KaFx’ is concerned, our system

is actually more liberal than KB.

Our rule (UK) allows instantiation

on '(x)KaFx’, in a sort of large-scope fashion, vdth the
auxiliary
clause *(Ex)(b=x)»; KB has no such provision.
Hintikka’

s

(

At the same time,

small- scope) instantiation rule

(x)KaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)

c w
e

w

KaPb)

C

vr

is a consequence of our rules:

wA

(a)

(x)KaFx

£

(b)

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

£

(c)

-KaFb

C

wj

(d)

(Ex)(b=x)

C

w

(b),(C.0{. = )

(e)

(Ex)(b=x & KaFx)

e

w

(a), (d), (UK)

(f)

b=c & KaFc

e

(g)

(Ex)Ka(c=x)

e

Redog

1
w

(e).(EK)

)

KaFc

c w

(f),Simp

(i)

b=c

c

w

(f),Sirap

(j)

Ka(b=c)

e w

(b), (g), (i), (C.Ind.=n)

-KaFc

£ w

(c),(j),(97)

*(h)

*(k)

At the other end of the spectrum, hoviever, our
r\iles for ’Pa'

are much less liberal than in KB.

instantiation

This, of course,

is all a part of our attempt to block proofs of formulas (a)-(d)
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and (a«)-(d»).

If we try, for example, to prove

(a)

by

assuiTiing

that »(Ex)Pa(x^x)« belongs to a model set
w, we can infer both
’

(Ex) (b=x)

»

e

w and

»

(Ex) (b=x & Pa(x^x)

)
»

e w.

But we can infer

nothing that yields a contradiction; we lack the means
to peel off
the quantifier and get at what*

s

inside the epistemic operator.

Thus our rules succeed very nicely in blocking the
proofs of
the unwanted theorems by making at least one of
Hintikka's key

quantifier rules drastically weaker.
here.

Mght

But an important objection arises

not the weakening of (108) be an ad hnc formal maneuver

vrhich fails to make good sense relative to an intended
possible worlds

interpretation of formulas in KB*?

which underlie Hintikka*

s

Perhaps the natural intuitions

rules taken as a vrhole vrill be, once these

rules have been tampered with, gone for good and we shall be left

with a new set of rules vjhich are artificial, contrived, and unable
to be backed vjith the authority of an intuitive model.

In reply to this objection we now proceed to the arduous task

of showing that while it is true that the intuitions underlying
Hintikka*

s

rules are gone for good, we can show that underlying our

rules is a set of intuitions every bit as natural as Hintikka's.
Therefore, let us turn our attention tovrards a possible vrorlds inter-

pretation M of the formulas in KB* and examine our rules in the light
of this interpretation.
however,

vre

Rather than simply describe our model M,

shall follow Sleigh's lead and construct an interpreted,

higher-order theory W which "talks about" M in that the truthconditions for formulas of K3* relative to M are made explicit.

In this way we can judge with a good deal more precision the adequacy
of the rules of KB*.

Following Sleigh, we shall call W the "vjorld
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theory” of KB*, and a formula in W which
describes the truth-conditions

in M of a formula 'A».

Having done this, it will be very easy to

judge whether KB* is an adequate system.
A
B

e-

Any inference

w
w

must be provable in KB* if and only if *A*-^B*' is provable
in
vjhere 'A*»
*A«

W,

and «B*» are the respective world theory transcriptions
of

and 'B».
The theory

Gettier.

v;e

shall utilize is in its essentials due to E.

The language of

W

can be described as follows;

(i) Every symbol in KB* except »Ka»

and 'Pa' belongs to the

language of W;
(ii) In addition:

is a one-place predicate constant in

'I*'

W

•E’

is a tvro-place predicate constant in W

'R'

is a two-place predicate constant in W

•Bjl',

'w. ',
'Wj,'

*62’*

etc. are two-place predicate constants in

W

’^2**

®"tc.

are two-place predicate variables in

W

’w.’,

etc. are variables in

W

is a constant in W;

(iii) Atomic well-formed formulas are as follows:
(a)

If 'A’ is a wff in KB*, then if

occurrences of 'Ka'
terms,

'

(A)w^'

,

'A’

'Pa', or individual constant

is a wff in W, for any i

(b)

'I*P^'

is a wff in W, for any i

(c)

'Exvr^^'

is a wff in

VJ,

for any i and any variable or

constant x in W
(d)

'Rv-7^w^'

contains no

is a wff in W, for any i,

j
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(e)

'P^xv^y is a vrff in

for any i,

j

and any variable or

is a wff in W, for any i,

j

and any variable or

V7,

constant x in W
(f)

’Bixvjj’

W

constant x in

Intuitively, atomic form\ilas in

following way.

V/

are to be understood in the

asserts that a formula

'(A)w^’

world w^ (relative to M).

of KB* is true in

»A»

asserts that a world-line P^ is

»I*P^»

‘privileged’ in the sense that quantifiers in KB* reaching into

epistemic contexts range over a set of world-lines of which P^ is a
^
member.

10

‘P-jXvr.’

'

Rvj, vr

’

‘Ext-j^’

is understood to say that x exists in world w^.

asserts that vrorld-line
asserts that world

vr.

J
xvr

’

P,

picks up object x at world w..

is compatible viith world w.

.

And

‘B.

J

is understood to say simply that x is B-

at w-.

J

In vjhat follows

J

we shall refer to the ‘B^’ predicates as "Badge Predicates".
I believe

language of

V7

vie

now have the machinery to express in the

the explicit truth-conditions of any formula in KB*

relative to our intended model M.
to show how to derive,

transcription ’A*' of
‘Immediate

convenience

vie

vie

now give

a

recursive procedure

for any formula ‘A’ in KB*, the viorld theory
‘A’

V7- translation’

of abbreviation

V7e

in W.
(

We begin by defining the notion

‘IW- translation’

for short).

For purposes

shall shorten ‘wj’ to ‘j’ throughout, and for

shall assume that ’&’ and

are the only truth-

connectives in ‘A’.
(i)

(ii)

If F is atomic, the IW-translation of F is ’(F)i’
If F is of the form '3

C’

,

the IW-translation of F is

‘(B)i & (C)i’
(iii)

If F is of the form ’-B', the IW-translation of F is
‘-((B)i)'
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(iv)

If F is of the form »KaB» then
(a)

If every free variable in B is bound in B by at
least
one epistemic operator, the IW-translation of
F is
*

(b)

(

j)(Rij -^(B) j)»

If

occur free in B outside the scope of all

. . • ,

epistemic operators in B, the IW-translation of F is
'(j)(Rij-^(Ey^)...(Ey^)(P^y^j & ... & P^y^j &
(B(y^/x^))j))«, where F occurs within the context

&

»...(EPj^)((I*P
-L

P.X;.i)

IJ-

n"nnn

& ... (EP^)((I*P

& P xi) &

...F..
(v)

(vi)

If F is of the form *PaB». the IW-translation of F is *-Ka-B»
If F is of the form
(a)

If

»x>

»

(Ex)B»

,

then

doesn't occur free in

B,

the IW-translation of F

is '(B)i*
(b)

If

»x»

occurs free in B but never within the scope of an

epistemic operator, the IW-translation of F is
*(Ex)(Exi & (B)i)»
(c)

If *x' occurs free in B and for at least one occurrence of
'Ka'

not directly preceded by an odd number of negation

signs,

'x'

occurs within its scope and it (the 'Ka*

occurs within the scope of no epistemic operator, then
(i)

If B is of the form 'C &

D*

or '-(C & D)» and *x*

occurs only within the scope of epistemic operators,
then the IW-translation of F is '(Ex)(Exi &
(I*P, &

(EPj^)

P,xi & (C)i) & (EP^)(I*P^ & PpXL &

(D)i))* or '(Ex)(ExL & -((EPj^Kl+P^ & P^xi &
(C)i) & (EP2)(I*P2 &

P2^

& (D)i)))', respectively

(ii)

Otherwise the IW- translation of F is
»(Ex)(Exi &
(EP^)(I*P^ & P^xi & (B)i))».

(d) In all other cases the IW-translation
of F is *(Ex)(Exi &

(P^^Kd^P^ & Pj^xi)-^(B)i))'
(viii) If F is of the form »(x)B», the IW-translation
of F is '-(Ex)-B'

Here we let
as follows.

be a raeta-linguistic variable whose value is determined

«i»

If

*F*

is *A*, the *i* stands for *r'.

And if

is

*F'

*E*

in the procedure described below, then

*j*

in the quantifier *(Ej)' or *(j)’ most directly binding *E*.

•F*

is *E‘ and there is no such quantifier, then
We now say that a formula

»G»

stands for the variable

«i»

»i»

If

stands for »r».

is the »W- translation* of a

formula *F* if and only if (i) There is a finite sequence of formulas
F^, ...,Fj^ such that

translation of F
^

,

F^^

is the IW-translation of

F,

F^_^^

is the IW-

for all i, and G is the IW-translation of F
n

(ii) For every subformula in G of the form *(A)i*,

,

and

is atomic.

»A»

On

the basis of all of this we now calculate *A*' in the following way.

Let

*A]_*

be the Immediate W- translation of *A'.

Now let

*D*

be the

leftmost subformula in ’A^’ which is of the form '(E)i' for some i

and non-atomic formula 'E*.

Ihen 'A-,* is the formula obtained by
j+±

replacing *D* by the W- translation of *E', if it has one, and by its

Immediate W- translation otherwise.

When a formula

in vdiich there is no such subformula *D’, the *A

'

’A

is

'

is reached

*A’*'*.

Let us now look at some examples of basic formulas and their

respective world theory transcriptions in W.

often abbreviate *(B)i* as 'Bi*.
(i) KaB:

(i)(Rri-»(B)i)

From now on we shall

14?
(ii)

(Ex)KaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (EP^)((I»P3^ & P^xr) 4 (l)(Rri->(Ey)(Pj^yi
& Byi))))

(iii)

(x)KaBx:

(x)(Exr^(EP^)((I.p^ & P^xr) & (i)(Rri-^ (Ey)(Pj_yi & Byl))))
(Ex)(Cx & KaBx):
(Ex)(Exr & (EP3_)((I*P^ & p^xr) & Cxr & (i)(Rri->(Ey)(P-.yi
&

(iv)

(v)

(Ex)PaBx;
(Ex)(Exr & (P^)((I*P^ & P^xr)^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & Byi))))

(vi)

(Ex) (KaBx & PaCx)
(Ex)(Exr & (EPi)((I*P & P xr) & ( (i) (Rri-^(Ey) (P^yi & Byi))
& (Ei)(Rri & (Ey)tPiyi^& Cyi)))))

(vii)

(Ex)KaKaBx:
(Ex) (Ext & (EPi)((I*Pt & Pnxr) & (i) (Rri^( j) (Rij->(Ey)
(P^yj & Byj)))))

(viii)

(Ex)(Ka(Ka(Bx & KaCx))
(Ex)(Exr & (EP.)((I*P3_ & P.xr) & (i)(xRri-^((Ey)(Piyi & Byi)
& (J)(Rij~-XEy)(Pij & 4yJ))))))

(ix)

(Ex)PaKaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (Pi)((I*P-, & Pnxr)->(Ei)(Rri &
(PiyJ & Byj)))))

(

j) (RiJ-><Ey)

Before moving on, there is one technical difficulty which

remains to be corrected in the procedure we have just presented.
Constant singular terms in KB* are capable of referring to different

individuals in different worlds, but constant singular terms in
have a fixed reference (always designate rigidly).

VJ

Therefore, to

make sure wobbly terms in KB* do not metamorphize into rigid terns in
the course of our procedure, we must make the folloi^ng revision.

If *B* is a formula in KB* having no constant singular terms
(as in all of the above examples) let ’B’ be ’A* in the above pro-

cedure,

follows.

If

’B*

contains constant singular terms we derive

*A’

as

Since KB* is a system of our own making there is no problem

in assuming that for each constant singular term

*b'

in KB*, there is

a badga predicate in KB* «hioh holds xiniquely
of b.

Replace every

subformula '(Ex)C' in >B' by >(Ex)(Ex& C)'. every
subformula
*(x)C* in *B* by *(x)(Ex-^C)', and every atomic
subforraula 'D* in
*B»

vdiich contains a constant singular term »b»

Bjx)»,

by *(Ex)(D(b/x) &

is the badge predicate of »b' in KB* and

vrfiere

not a symbol in KB*.
the result is *A*.

VJhen all singular terms have

»E»

is

been eliminated

Now go to the recursive procedure outlined

above with the following revision of

»

IW- translation *

Add to

.

the first line of (vi), '•...if B is of the form *Ex
&

C

,

then",

and add "(vii) If F is of the form *(Ex)B* and B is not of the
form *Ex & C*, then..." followed by

(a.)— (d)

of (vi) with the

clause *Exi* deleted everyvrfiere it occurs.

It is a simple matter, incidentally, to assign world-

theory transcriptions in

W

to formulas in Hintikka* s KB.

Wo need

to make only two alterations to our definition of ‘IW- translation*
as follows:

Replace

(B(yk/xj^))i))*

*

(

j)(Ri j-^Ey^) . . . (Ey^)(P^yj_j & ... & p^y^j &

by

& ... & P^y^j) &

(E^^j & ... & Ey^j) & (B(yj^/x^))i)))*, and delete part (vi)-(c).
llie

differences in the intuitions underlying the rules of KB and

those underlying the rules of KB*, therefore, are twofold.

Privileged

world- lines in KB pick out individuals in worlds only

if they happen to exist in such worlds.^

And the truth of

'

(x)KaFx'

in a world does not in KB necessitate that every existent individual
in that world is picked up by a privileged world-line, as is the
case in KB*.

in any

It is hard to see that either set of intuitions is

profound way simpler or more natural than the other.

So far we have spoken only of the language of W.

In order to
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tell whether our rules for KB* are adequate,
however, we must
specify the axioms and rules of inference of W.

logical axioms and rules of

W

VJ

As far as the

are concerned, we can simply treat

as a second-order theory (W having no modal operators). ^2

requires specification is the set of non-logical axioms
of W.

V/hat

These shall be as follows:
(i)

(i)(Rii)

(ii)

(iii)

(i)(j)(k)((Rij & Rjk)^Rik)
(P3_)(i)(Ex)(P^xi & (y)(P^yiH P^xi))

(iv)

(Pi)(P2)(x)(y)(i)(j)((Pj^xi & P^xi & Rij)-^(p^yj3 P^yj))

(v)

'"(EP^)(i)(x)(P3_xi-= (C^x)!)"*

is an axiom, for any badge

predicate
Let us now take a closer look at our system KB* through the
eyes of W.

We look first to see how the issue of Restricted Range

is handled relative to world theory transcriptions in W.
the world theory transcription of

»

(x)KaRx»

In Ehglish

(see above) may be

read, "Anything which exists in the actual world is picked up by a

privileged world-line

vriiich

in every compatible world picks up

something idiich is F in that world".

in

W of

The vrorld theory transcription

the same forra\ila in KB, on the other hand, reads, "Anything

which exists in the actual world and which is picked up by a
privileged vrorld-line is picked up by a world-line which in every
compatible world picks up something
world".
in w*

s

Thus while *(x)KaFx*

e

vriiich

exists and is F in that

w holds in KB* only if every individual

domain is picked up by a privileged world- line, only a re-

stjricted class of w* s domain needs to be picked up by a privileged

worid- line for the same condition to hold in KB.

In this way the
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lack of a Restricted Range feature in KB* is made explicit
through
the world theory transcriptions assigned to formulas in
KB*.
To veid-fy that this is indeed the case we now show that the

demonstration produced above to show that
*

'

(x)KaFic*

virtually implies

(x)Fx* can be paralleled in

X&

)

(x)(Exr-HEPi) ((I*Pi &

Pj^xr)

& (i)(Rri-;'(Ey)(Piyi & pyi))))

(b) Ebr-^EP-|L)((I*P & Plbr) & (i) (Rri-^(Ey)(P,yi & pyi)))
3
^

,

,

f^(c)

(d)

(a),U.I.
Ass.

Ebr

(EPi)((I*Pi & P^br) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(P^yi & ?yi))) (b).(c),MP

r> (e)

(f)

(I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri->(Ey)(Pyi & ?y±))

Ass.

(i)(Rri^(Ey)(Pyi & Fy±))

(e),Simp

(g) Rrr-^(Ey)(Pyr & F^r)

(f),U.I.

(h) Rrr

Ax.

(Ey)(Pyr & Fyr)

(i)

(g).(h).MP

?(j)

Per & Fcr

Ass.

(k)

I*P & Pbr

(e),Simp

(1)

Pbr

(k),Simp

(m)

Per

(j),Simp

(n)

(b=c)r

(o)

Fcr

(j),Simp

(p)

Fbr

(n), (o),Id

(l),(m). Ax.

(q) Fbr

(t)

(i)

(j)”(p).EI

(r) Fbr

(e)-(q).EI

(s) Ebr->Fbr

(c)-(r).CP

(x)(Exr^Fxr)

(s).

\Je

are now in a position to justify our instantiation

*(Ex)PaFx*.

UG

rules for

We first argue that (**) ought not be provable in KB*.
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We assume '(Ex)(Exr & (P^^Kd*?^ 4 PiXr)^(Ei)(Rri
& (Ey)(Pj^yi &
FVl))))' and try to deduce '(Ei)(Hrl 4 (Ey)(Fid 4 B.yl))>, for
some

Bj’t(a)

(Ex)(Exr 4 (P^)((I*P^ 4 Pj^xr)-^(Ei)(Rri 4 (Ey)(Pj^yr
4 Fyi))))

rt (b) (Ebr 4 (Pj^)((I*P 4 Pj_br)-^ (Ei)(Rn 4 (Ey)(Piyr 4
Pyi))))
3
Ass
(c) (P _)((I*P^ & Pibr)->(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yr & Fyl)))
(b).Sjiip
3
_

(d) (I*P &

Pbr>^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyr & F^i))

Here we run stuck.

(c),UI

To obtain »(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Fyi & Bjyi))» it is

absolutely essential to fish out the >Rri' and »Fyr' clauses in the
consequent of step (d), but there is no way on earth to get at
these.

And so the proof is blocked.
In like fashion the inference

world theory.
(Rri-5^(F^) (P^yi
(d) above.

(

)

cannot be backed up by the

There is no way to infer »(EPi)((I*P^ & P^br) & (i)

& (E«((y=«)i & Bj«i))))’ from

\diat

we have in step

Neither (d) nor any step \diich precedes it guarantees

that some privileged world-line actually does pick up b at the real
world.

Hence there is no hope in reaching the world theory

transcription of

'

(Ex)Ka(b=x)»

;

the proof is blocked.^^

On the other hand, the two instantiation mles for
we introduce in KB*, (EPL) and (EPS), are justified in W.

'

(Ex)PaFx'

The

case of (EPL) is obvious; it is only a question of showing that from
»

(Ex) (Ext & (P 2^)((I*P^ & Pixr>^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & Fy±))))^ we

can deduce *(Ex)(Exr & (Pi)((I*P;l ^ PiXr)-'^((Sy)((y=x)r & B^xr) & (Ei)
(Rri & (Ey)(P-j^yi & F^i)))))', for some

((y=x)r & Bj 3a*))>, for some 'Bj'.

and »(Ex)(Exr & (Ey)

And both of these are easily

proven.
The proof of (EPS) goes as follows;
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-^(a)
(b)

(Ex)(Exr & (P^)((I*P^ 4 PlXr)-^(El)(Rri
4 (EyjCP^yi 4 FVi))))

(x)(Exr^(BPi)((I»P3 4

Pj^xr)

^

^ (c)

4 (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(P;^yi 4 Gyl))))

Eor 4 (Pj_)((I*P 4 P _or)^(Ei){Rrl 4 CBy)(Pj^yl 4
FVi)))
3
3
^

As^

(d) Ecr-:^(EP _)((I*P
3

3_

& p^cr)^(i)(Rri-^ (Ey)(P^yi & Gyi))) (b),Ul
(c),Simp

(f) (EP _)((I*P^ & P^cr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & Gyi)))
3

[>(g) (I*P & Per) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Pyi & Gyi))

(d).(e),MP
Ass.

(h) (Pi)((I*P^ & P _cr)-^(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(P^yi & ?y±))) (c),Simp
3
(i)

(I*P & Pcr)-7(Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyi & ?y±))

(j) I*P

(h),UI

& Per

(g),Simp

(k) (Ei)(Rri & (Ey)(Pyi & Fy±))

^(1)
(m)

(i).(j).MP

Rrw & (Ey)(Pyw & pyw)

Ass.

(Ey)(Pyw & Fyw)
> (n)

(l),Simp

Pbw & Fbw

Ass.

(o) Fbw

(n) ,Simp

(p)

Rrw

(l),Simp

(q)

Bjbw

(r)

Fbw & BjW (for some *Bj’)

(s)

(Ex)(Fxw & BjXw)

(for some ’Bj*)

(o)

(o), (q),Conj

(for some 'Bj’)

(t) Rrw & (Ex)(Fxw & B.xw)

(r).EG
(p),(s),Conj

tfor some *B.')
tj

(u)

(v)

(w)

(Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
(for some 'Bj')

(Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
( lor some

(n)-(u),EI
*

Bj ’

•

*

(D-(v).EI

(Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxi & B.xi)
^

(t),EG

(

for some

B^
%}

(x)

(y)

(Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Pxi & B^xi)

(Ei)(Rri & (Ex)(Fxl & B.xi)

(for some ’B^’)
(

for some

'

B

.

•

(g)-(w),EI
(c)-(x),EI
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It is now apparent that blocking the proofs of
formulas (a)-(d)

by rejecting

()

and

()

in favor of alternative rules which are

substantially weaker is not an a^ hoc syntactic device.

Rather, it

is a move backed up by the full authority of an intuitive
possible
worlds interpretation of the formulas in KB* as made
explicit

in the world theory W.
According to this particular interpretation, ’(x)KaFx» can
be
true in a world w only if every individual in the
domain of w is

attached to a world-line over which *(x)» ranges.
stand

»

And so we under-

(x)KaFx» as asserting, for any x in the domain of w, not
only

that every privileged world-line picks up something in every
compatible

world which in that world is
one of those vrorld-lines.

w just in

true in

F,

but that x is picked up by exactly

Therefore, »(x)-Ka~Fx» must be regarded as

case for any x in the domain of

w either not

every privileged world-line in every compatible world picks up
something which is not-F or x is not picked up by one of these

And this gives us precisely the world theory transcrip-

vrorld-lines.

tion of
token,

of

*

’

(x)PaFx* generated by our recursive procedure.

(Ex)PaFx* is true in

w not every

w just in case for

By the same

some x in the domain

pirivileged world-line in every compatible world picks

up something which is not-F or else x is not picked up by one of
these world-lines.
(*) and (**) fail in

Given this interpretation it is easy to see why

KB* and hence why it is fitting that (a)-(d)

shoiald not be pirovable in KB*.

It is at this point that Stine's English readings for epistemic
formulas become instructive.

Given that an individual x in the

domain of w can be said to bo "known to a" in w just in case one of
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privileged vorld-lines picks up x in w, it
is now apparent why

Stine m-ges that *(x)KaFx» be read
(5) Everyone is known to a and kno^-m by & to be
F.

It is understood to make a two- fold (conjionctive)
assertion about
each individual x in the domain of the world
in question.

Consequently.

*(x)PaFbc» must be understood to make a
disjunctive assertion about

each such individual, and hence it is read
(

6 ) Everyone is either not knovm to a or
not known by a to be not-F,

which is equivalent to
(7) No one is known to a and known by a to be not-F.

In the same way,

*

(Ex)KaFx' makes a conjunctive assertion about

a single individual, and this fact is reflected
in Stine*

s

reading for

*(Ex)KaFx*, viz ..
(

8 ) Someone is known to a and known by a to be F.

And by the same token,

*

(Ex)PaFx* makes a disjunctive assertion about

a single individual and is read
(9) Someone is either not known to a or not known by a to be not-F.

Therefore, Stine*

readings for *(x)KaFx*. *(x)PaFx*, *(Ex)KaFx*,

s

and *(Ex)PaFx*, which are (respectively)

(

5 ),

(

7 ),

(

8 ), and (9),

parallel the world theory transcriptions of these formulas which we
have introduced.

It is true, nonetheless, that while Stine lists (5) as a reading
for *(x)KaEx* and

(

8 ) as a reading for *(Ex)KaFx*,

actually listed as having as a reading not

(

*

(x)PaFx* is

7 ) but rather

(10) No one is known by a to be not-F,

and

*

(Ex)PaFx* is officially given as a reading
(11) Someone is not known by & to be not-F
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rather than (9).

As we pointed out in the last chapter,
however, if

wo accept the truth of
(12) Everyone known by a to be F is known to a

(as Stine does), then it is easily proven that
(7) is equivalent to
(10) and (9) is equivalent to (11).

Moreover, if we assume (12), it

can be shown that (5) is equivalent to
(13) Everyone is known by a to be F

and (8) is equivalent to
(14) Someone is known by a to be F.

Therefore, not only are we justified in reading
(5)t

*

(x)PaFx* as (7)$

'

(Ex)KaFx’ as (8), and

'

>

(x)KaPx* as

(Ex)PaFx* as (9).^^

But if we accept (12) we may actually go a step further and adopt the
folloiTing much simpler English lexicon:

(x)KaFx

’’Everybody is known by a to be P’

(Ex)KaFx

’’Someone is knovm by a to be P’

(x)PaFx

”No One is known by

(Ex)PaFx

’’Someone is not known by a to be not-F”.

^

to be F”

It would be very nice to adopt this set of English readings.

But

there is no justification in doing so until we can first justify

accepting the truth of (12).

To do this it suffices to show that

the world theory transcription in

in KB* (which is Stine’s axiom,
in W.
^

*

W of the formal rendition of
(x) (KaFx-^Ka(x=x)

)*

)

(12)

is a theorem

And this can be done as follows:

r^(a) Ebr
->(b)

Ass.
(EP3^)((I*P^ & P^br) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & F^i))) Ass.

n>(c)
(d)

(I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri">'(Ey)(Pyi & F^i))

(i)(Rri—7(By)(Pyi & Fyi))

Ass.

(c),Simp
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w
(e)

RrwsKEy)(Pyv & Fyw)

(d) .UI

r^(f) Rrw
(g)

Ass.

(Ey)(Pyw & ?yw)
(h.)

(e) ,(f).MP

Pew & Few

Ass.

(i) Pew
(J)

(h) ,Simp

(c=c)w

»Id.»

(k) Pew & (e=c)w
(l)

(i) t(J).Conj

(Ey)(Pyw & (y=y)w)

(m) (E^)(Pyw & (y=y)w)

(k),EG
(h)-(l),EI

(n) Rrw-^(Ey)(Pyw & (y=y)w)

(f) -(m).CP

(o)

(i)(Rri-/'(Ey)(Pyi & (y=y)i))

(e)-(n),UG

(p)

I*P & Pbr

(e),Simp

(q)

(I*P & Pbr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Pyi & (y=y)i)) (o).(p).Conj

(r)

(EP]_)((I*P^ & Pibr) & (i)(Rri-;^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))

(q).EG

& Pbr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))

(s) (EP^Cd’^P

(t)

(c)-(r).EI

& (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & F^)))^
(EPn)t(I*Pn & P-.br) & (i)(Rri-:7(%)(PT^yi & (y=y)i)))
=
=
(b)-(s).CP

(EP,)((I*P-, & P,br)

(u)

Ebi-> ((EPi )((I*Pn & P-.br) & (i)(Rri-? (Ey)(Pnyi & Fyi)))—
(EPi)((I*Pn & Pibr) & (i)(Rri-;?^(^7(Piyi & (y=y)i))))
(a)-(t).CP

(v)

(x)(Exr->((EPi)((I*PT & P.xr) & (i)(Rri-:^(Ey)(Piyi & Fyi)))-:^
(EPnTCd^Pn & P-,xr) & (i)(Rri-^(Ey)(Piyi & (y=y)i)))))
(a)-(u).UG

So far we have introdueed a world theory

W on

the basis of which

the set of nales of our system KB* may be tested for adequacy.

We

have discovered that at the crucial point at which our rules diverge
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from those of KB (as well as F* and K).
the instantiation rules for
*(Ex)PaFX»,

W lends full support

to the rules of KB*.

Thus we have

not only a system in which proofs of (a)-(d)
are blocked, but we
have a system whose means of blocking these
proofs has the full

authority of a natural, intuitive possible worlds
interpretation of
the formulas of KB*.

Finally, we have seen that this same inter-

pretation allows us to adopt a set of English readings
for formulas
in KB*

;just

like those introduced by Stine for her system.

Yet so far we have said nothing about rules for KB* governing
contexts in

vrfiich

variables within the scope of two or more epistemic

operators are bound from the outside by quantifiers.

We give first

a complete set of rules covering cases which involve two epistemic

operators.

Then on the basis of these together with the original

seven quantifier rules we listed, we shall propose a concise set
of

rules general enough to cover all cases in which variables occur

within epistemic operators and are then bound from the outside.

The

resulting set of rules we shall officially adopt as our quantifier
rules.
The following is a complete set of rules governing formulas

formed by quantifying in past two epistemic operators;
(E2CK)

(UKK)

(Ex)KaXaFx
(Ex)KaKa(b=x)
KaKaFb
(Ex)KaFx

w
& w
^ w
6 w, for some *b*

(x)KaKaFx

^
6

(Ex) (b=x)

^

w
w

(Ex)(b=x & KaKaFx)^w
6 w
(x)KaFx
(EPPL)

w
^w
(Ex)(b=x & PaPaFx)t^w
(Ex)PaFx
w, for some 'b’

(EPPS)

(Ex)PaPaFx
(x)KaGx
PaPaFb

(UPPL)

(x)PaPaPx
^ w
(Ex)(b=x)
6 w
(Ex)(b=x & PaPaFx) ^ w

(UPPS)

(x)PaPaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
PaPaFb

^

(Ex)KaPaF>c

w
w
e w

(EKP)

^ w
^ w
^ W, for some »b«

^ w

KaPaFb
(Ex)KaPa(b=x)
(Ex)PaFx
(UKP)

(EPKL)

w

w

<

6 w. for some 'b*

(x)KaPaPx
.£ w
(Ex)(b=x)
e w
(Ex)(b=x & KaPaFx) ^ w
(Foc)PaKaFx

<£•

w

(Ex)(b=x)
w
(Ex)(b=x & PaKaRx)
w
(Ex)PaFx
6 w. for some »b'
<5.

(EPKS)

(UPKL)

^ w
^ w

(Ex)PaKaFX
(x)KaGx
PaKaFb

<6

(x)PaKaFx

<£

_LEx)_Cb=x)

(Ex)(b=x & PaKaFx) 6
(UPKS)

w.

for some 'b*

W
W
w

6 w
^ w
^ w.

(x)PaKaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
PaKaFb

In applying rules (EPPS), (EKP), and (EPKS) the following
qualification must be observed.

In any clause bound by '(Ex)’

\diich contains free 'x' but fails to fall within the scope of two

epistemic operators the

'x*

may be instantiated upon but not by

the constant already chosen for free 'x's* which do fall into the
scope of two epistemic operators.

A new constant must be used

for each such clause; two clauses, however, with the same modal

profile

17

may share constants.

By way of example;
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(Ex)((Bx & Pa(Cx & PaDx) & Ax)
^(x)KaFx
Be & Pa(Cd & PaDb) & Ac

^
w

TIT

Now let »Qa* and »Q»a« be short for arbitary
(Possibly empty)
strings formed by concatenating »Ka« and »Pa».

We may then formulate

the official version of our quantifier rules
for KB* as follows:
(EK)

(Ex)KaQaFx
(Ex)KaQa(b=x)
KaQaFb

w
6 w
<£

for some *b'

w,

(EKM)

(Ex)KaQa(Fx & Q»aGx) <£ w
KaQa(Fc & Q’aGb)
^ w
(Ex)KaQa(c=x & Q»a(b=x))6; w, for some *c*,’

(UK)

(x)KaQaFx
(Ex)(b=x)
(Ex)(b=x & KaQaFx)

^ w
^ w
<£
W

(EPL)

(Ex)PaQaPx

^

W
W

(Ex) (b=x & PaQaFx)

6

w.

(Ex)PaQaFx
(x)KaGx
PaQaFb

£ w
6 w

(Ex)PaQa(Fx & Q’aGx)
(x)KaGx
PaQa(Fc & Q»aGb)

^ w
w

(x) PaQaFx

^ w
e w
^ w

(ExKb=x)

(EPS)

(EPM)

(UPL)

(Ex)(b=x)
(Ex)(b=x & PaQaFx)
(UPL)

(EPE)

(EKE)

(EKI)

(EPI)

(x)PaQaFx
(Ex)Ka(b=x)
PaQaFb
(Ex)QaPaPaQ’ aFx
(Ex)QaPaQ' aFx

(Ex)QaKaQ>aFx
(Ex)QaQ' aFx

w.

for some *b'

<c-

cS.

6
<£
£=

6.

W,

vr

W
w
w

6 w
/£

W

e w

(Ex)QaKaQ’ aFx

6

(Ex) QaKaKaQ' aFx

<£

(Ex)QaPaQ' aFx
(Ex)QaPaPaQ' aFx

for some ’b’

w
W

6 W

W

for some *c*,»b’
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Roles (EKM) and (EPM) are to be treated
as qualifications to
(EK) and (EPS), respectively.

special circumstances;

The latter may be applied only
under

When and only when every

’x’

bound by ’(Ex)'

occurs within the scope of 'KaQa', in the case
of (EKM), and ’PaQa’,

in the case of (EPM).

In every other case whatever we automatically

go to (EKM) or (EPM) and make use of distinct
constant terms, a new
terra

for each distinct modal profile.
Unforttjnately, this set of qualifications is too strong
and

will have to be modified.

Suppose we wish to instantiate upon

'

(Ex)

(Fx & KaGx)»; by (EKM) we are allowed to infer 'Fc & KaGb', for
some
*b»

and *c', but our world theory indicates that ’Fb & KaGb' ought

to be deducible, for some 'b'.

cation to our qualification.

Therefore we must attact a qualifi-

We shall say that in applying the

rules (EKM) and (EPM) we may assign the same constant

terra to

any

pair of free *x's* provided there is no occurrence of 'Pa* which
binds one and not the other; in all other cases a new
be assigned for each distinct modal profile.

terra

must

Similar remarks apply

to the qualifications of (EKP) and (EIPKS) described above.

One final word about applying these rules.

There may be

uncertainty at times as to which rules a given formula falls under
when it contains modal clauses sealed off from one another; for
exainple, it is not at all clear in the case of '(EIx)(KaFx & PaGx)'

>diether or not (EK) may be employed.

Therefore, we shall adopt the

sort of convention described in footnote % and say that rules (EK),
(EKM), and (UK) apply to any contexts in which 'x' occurs free

within the scope of some 'Ka' operator itself not bound by any
epistemic operator; only in cases where this condition is not met
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>dll rules (EPL), (EPM), (EPS), (UPL), or (UPS)
apply.
(KaFbc

Thus '(Ex)

& PaGa)’ does indeed fall under (EK).

*

In the last chapter we took notice of a "proof" offered by
Hintikka to show that Restricted Range is an inevitable consequence
of his model set approach to epistemic logic.
that Hintikka’

s

Since we have now seen

approach is perfectly compatible with giving up the

Restricted Range feature, let us diagnose Hintikka’
see exactly

vrfiere

s

argument and

it breaks down.

The argument, wo may recall, proceeded in roughly the following

manner.

Suppose that all the rules of KB have been formulated except

for those governing formulas formed by quantifying in.

Then (i)

Restricted Range is inevitable in KB if it is inevitable that

’

(Ex)

Ka(b=x)’ is the weakest formula required to instantiate and

generalize upon formulas formed by quantifying in exactly one layer

of epistemic operators, to an arbitrary singular term ’b’.
It is easily shown to be inevitable that
\diich entails it is

formulas.

’

(Ex)Ka(b=x)

’

But (ii)

or something

required to instantiate and generalize upon such

Therefore, (iii) Restricted Range is inevitable in KB.

What can be said of this argument?

The following diagnosis is

offered by Sleigh in ’Epistemic Logic, Again’;
A difficulty with this argument is the assumption that
C ( 109 )^ exhaust the conditions we might
wish to impose on instantiation and generalization
in simple epistemic contexts. This assximption seems to
me unfounded. Consider instantiation. Bearing in mind
that b ranges over definite singular terms including
definite descriptions it is clear that there are exactly
two distinct formulas containing b which have equal
right to be regarded as instantiations of ’(x)Ka^

ZI(108)J7 and

’
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small-scope instantiation
is the large-scope instantiyields the appropriate rules
lor sm^-scope instantiation,
vathout
gener^ty we might expect something likeaiming for
the following
as a start toward covering the cases
of large scope
instantiation:
(x)Ka
6 w
__(Ex)(b=x)^w
(Ex)(b=x & Ka/)
With this condition (and no other changes
made)
we can now offer a proof that '(x)KaFx»
implies
(x)Fx*.
This shows that Hintikka’s argument for
the necessity of restricted range is
mistaken
and suggests that the restricted range feature
of KB is avoidable.^®
>rf^le

I

(Ex)(x=b &

Ka$2^ )»

^

Sleigh takes issue with premise (ii) of Hintikka»s
argument
(in the form we have just restated it).

It is true that

'

(Ex)Ka

(b=x)» is required to generalize and
instantiate upon the formulas

in question, but it is true only with regard to
one of two types of
instantiation and generalization:

small-scope instantiation.

Ihe

much weaker condition '(Ex)(b=x)* suffices to do the
job when we

perform large- scope instantiation upon quantified formulas.
it is not in general true that

’

Thus

(Ex)Ka(b=x)’ is required to generalize

and instantiate upon formulas formed by quantifying in (\diere
one

epistemic operator in concerned); yet it is the general form of
this claim upon which the argument depends.

Hence the argument is

mistaken.
The same criticism of Hintikka’s argument seems to have occurred
to Tienson.

Consider:

(C.E)*

If (Ex)Fx^M, then Fb
constant b

(C.U)’

If (x)Fx<^M, and Qb^M, then

fi'M

and

Qb6M

for at least one

Fb<s-M.

• ••we can take (Ex)Ka(b=x) as formulating the additional information we need for existential generalization and universal instantiation in the scope
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of Ka and Pa, and we can substitute it for Qb
in
(C.E)* and (C.U)’,
This gives us ^(108)Jand ZT(109)J
It is clear that Hintikka takes this as establishing
that the basic restriction [Restricted Ranged is
necessary. He does not mal<e it clear why he does so.
Presumably it is because he takes this as establishing
that the rules £"(108)J and t’(109pare necessary, and
in turn takes this as establishing the necessity of
the basic restriction. Such reasoning, however,
would be fallacious. .. .Although Hintikka constructs
a system in which the inferences in question hold
which contains the basic restriction, it is not
necessary that a system in which these inferences
hold contain the basic restriction as the argument
requires, for the addition of further rules concerning
quantification removes the restriction while leaving
the inferences intact. 1^
It seems to me that what Sleigh and Tienson have to say cannot
be disputed.

Premise (i) seems true, but its truth depends upon

reading "instantiate and generalize" as "instantiate and generalize

both large and small- scope'*.

Premise (ii) seems true, but it

truth depends upon reading the same phrase as "instantiate and
generalize small- scope".

both premises are true.

There is no reading according to

vrtiich

Therefore the argument, at least in the

form we have stated it, seems to turn on an equivocation of the
phrase "instantiate and generalize".

Hence either (i) or (ii) is

false, and the argument is unsound.

It should therefore come as no surprise that a number of systems
have been produced which are modelled after Hintikka'
the Restricted Range feature.

that

*

s

but which lack

It is inevitable in all of these systems

(Ex)Ka(b=x)* or something vdiich is equivalent to it be required

for small-scope instantiation and generalization; this is precisely
vjhat Hintikka* s argument shows.

But the argument shows nothing about

the inevitability of Restricted Range in epistemic logic.
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FOOTNOTES

Formula (c) is actually provable only with the rule
(C,Inc.=)
which Hintikka did not add to his system tintil I
967 .
2

As we have done in previous chapters, let us assume for the
sake
of simplicity that our concern throughout is with
domains
consisting of persons .

^Fjillesdal,

‘Knowledge Identity, and Existence*, p. I 5 .

4

Bearing in mind, of course, that the formulas in KB ^^hich are
the formalizations of (1* )-(4* ) are not theorems in
KB.

^Tienson, »The "Basic Restriction" in Hintikka*
Logic*, pp. 5-6.
^Sleigh,

s

Quantified Epistenic

*Epistemic Logic, Again*, p. 6 .

"^Ibid. , p. 6 .

Hintikka himself discusses this possibility in
Knowledge and Belief , p. I 55 , n. 12.

®A word of explanation must accompany these rules.
there are no epistemic operators in *F*. Second,

First,

\je assume
assume for
purposes of simplicity that negation signs have been driven through
epistemic operators. Third, we regard (EK) and (UK) as applying
context in idiich *x* occurs within the scope of any ’Ka*
operator. The other rules apply to all contexts in which ‘x*
is bound by *Pa* but not *Ka*. In this way, *(Ex)(Fx & KaGx)*,
*(Ex)(KaFx& KaGx)*, and *(Ex)(KaFx& PaGx)* fall under (EK)
while *(Ex)(Rx & PaGx)* and *(Ex)(PaFx & PaGx)* fall under rules
;^e

other than (EK).
^Sleigh, ‘Restricted Range in Epistemic Logic*, pp. 71-73. In
doing so we shall in effect specify only the features of M which
are relevant to the task of semantically evaluating our rules.

^®It might be felt desirable to regard *I*P]_* as asserting that P^ is
a rigid world-line. We leave ourselves uncommitted as to whether
privileged wo rid- lines in M are all and only the rigid wo rid- lines
in M.

^Hintikka later dispensed with this restriction.
will not be a standard second-order theory in the sense that
Existential Generalization on predicate constant terms is valid
without restriction.
^^For proofs in
modification;

W

we use straightforward Copi-type rules with one
If * (^ * is of the form *Fbw*, then from yS* may be
*
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inferred *B.bw , provided (i) *B.' does not already
appear in
the proof, tod (ii) The restriction "for some »B.»"
is attached
to every formiila in the proof containing 'B.*. ^
^

14 _
Tienson worries that without () there is no hope in
proving suchi
^
inferences as
(x)KaFx
w_
-(Ex)Pa-Fx
w.
However, for us this is no worry since we have rules (C.P-)
and
(C.E-) idiich make all such inferences provable.

^%erhaps it may be felt that no justification is needed to accept

one set of English translations over another, and perhaps
this is
true. In any case, it is ray x-dsh to preserve a sort of isomorphism (which could be easily specified) between a formula'
world theory transcription and its official English reading, at
least for quantified formulas. If we accept the simpler set of
English translations we accept them only in the capacity of
non-official readings (readings obtained from official readings
by equivalences), (5), (7). (8), and (9) remain the official
readings and preserve the isomorphic relation between world
theory and English,

^^Since the world theory transcription of * (x) (KaFx-^^Ka(x=x) )
is a theorem in W, it better turn out that (x)(KaFx-^Ka(x=x))»
is a theorem in KB*, It is.
»

17

Hintikka defines 'modal profile' in 'Existential and Uniqueness
Presuppositions' , p, 122.

^®Sleigh, 'Episteniic Logic, Again', pp, 5-6.

^^Tienson, Op cit ., pp, 4,9,
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